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ABSTRACT 
 
Sadra and Hegel on the Relationship between Essence/Existence and Subject/Object 
 
 
 
 
By 
Kamal Abdulkarim Shlbei 
May 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Jennifer Bates 
 This dissertation examines the problematic status of Truth within the intersection 
of the medieval ontological relationship of essence/existence and the modern 
epistemological relationship of subject/object. The main question that motivates this 
dissertation is this: does the modern distinction between subject and object find its roots 
in the medieval distinction between essence and existence? Rather than investigating the 
many medieval and modern philosophers in whom we could find answer to this question, 
this dissertation focuses only on two philosophers as study cases: One is the Islamic 
philosopher Mulla Sadra, and the other is the German philosopher George. W. F. Hegel. 
My chose of these two philosophers is not arbitrary. According to many scholars, 
whereas the medieval relationship of essence/existence finds its highest development in 
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism, the modern relationship of subject/object finds its 
 v 
 
highest summit in Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism. Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism breaks 
with the metaphysical essentialism of both Greek philosophy and Arabic philosophy. 
However, Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism is not explicitly mentioned by Hegel— neither 
in the historical development of the Philosophical Idea in the Lectures on The History of 
Philosophy, nor in the conceptual development of the Logical Idea in the Science of 
Logic. If the moment of the Absolute Existentialism is contained within Hegel‘s Absolute 
Idealism at all, it is so implicitly, as a moment within the Hegelian Idea‘s self-dialectical 
process of determining. In this dissertation, I unveil Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute 
Existentialism within Hegel‘s moment of the Absolute Idealism. I argue that, although 
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are different, both 
challenge the traditional views of the metaphysical essentialism of Plato and Aristotle. 
That is to say, both Sadra and Hegel criticize and reject the view that abstract essence is 
the ultimate reality. I provide the logical connection between Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s 
critiques of metaphysical essentialism. I show that, within Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism, 
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to quality as affirmative reality in 
the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition.       
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Introduction 
 
He makes the night enter into the day and makes the day to enter into the night and 
brings forth the living from the dead and brings forth the dead from the living—The Holy 
Qur'an (3: 27) 
For everyone there is a direction to which he turns his face. Strive, then, to excel each 
other in good deeds. Wherever you are, God will bring you all together. God is certainly 
powerful over everything—The Holy Qur'an (2: 48)  
  
Among the ontological relationships, which enriched philosophy in Middle Ages, 
the relationship of essence to existence seems to be the ontological relationship par 
excellence.
1
 In contrast, the relationship of the knowing subject to the known object 
imposed itself as the prominent epistemological relationship in modern philosophy.
2
 
Modern philosophy‘s break with medieval philosophy makes these two relationships of 
essence/existence and subject/object look different; each has its own philosophical 
concerns. Nonetheless, if we look to the center around which both of these relationships 
revolve, the concept of ‗Truth‘ emerges as the promising one.  
Both of these relationships of essence/existence and subject/object aim to 
approach Truth. While the medieval approach of the relationship of essence/existence 
leads to ontological Truth claims, the modern approach of the relationship of 
subject/object leads to epistemological Truth claims. From the standpoint of the 
relationship of essence/existence we can pose this fundamental question: Does Truth 
have a substantial relation with essence and just an accidental relation with existence or 
                                                             
1 See: Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), especially chapter II, 
―Essence and Existence‖. 
2 In this regard Barry Sandywell writes, ―Where the dominant focus of pre-modern philosophy was onto 
theological—asking questions about the nature of existence and Being (being qua being in Aristotle‘s 
idiom), God or Nature—the focus of modern epistemology centers on the relationship between the knower 
and the known—how can the mind know the world? What is the spectatorial relationship between subject 
and object (or the knowing subject and the object of knowledge)?‖ Barry Sandywell, Dictionary of Visual 
Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), p. 267.   
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vice versa? The response to this question usually introduces two opposite philosophical 
tendencies, Essentialism and Existentialism; each regards Truth from a different 
ontological point of view. Whereas Essentialism affirms the priority of essence over 
existence, Existentialism maintains that ―existence precedes essence.‖3 We can 
reformulate the latter question from the standpoint of the relationship of subject/object by 
asking whether Truth has a substantial relation with the knowing subject and just an 
accidental relation with the known object or vice versa. In response to that, we find 
ourselves in front of two different modern schools, Subjectivism and Objectivism; each 
claims Truth from its own epistemological perspective.  
Does the modern epistemological distinction between subject and object find its 
deep root in the medieval ontological distinction between essence and existence? To what 
extent is the break of modern philosophy with medieval philosophy, on the basis of the 
modern epistemological relationship of subject/object, legitimate? These are some 
questions that motivate this dissertation. However, this dissertation does not claim to find 
answers to the problematic status of Truth at the intersection of the medieval relationship 
of essence/existence and the modern relationship of subject/object. This task exceeds the 
limit of this dissertation. Rather than investigating the many medieval and modern 
philosophers in whom we might find answers to my proposed problem, this dissertation 
focuses on two philosophers as study cases: One is the Islamic philosopher Sadr Al-Din 
Muhammad Al-Shirazi (1571-1641), known as Mulla Sadra, and the other is the German 
philosopher George. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831).
4
 
                                                             
3 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotion (New York, Citadel Press, 1985), p. 13. 
4 With respect to the importance of Hegel in the problem of the relationship of Subject/Object, I draw and 
benefit from Nectarios G. Limnatis,  German Idealism and The Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel (Hampstead, NY: Springer, 2008).  
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Sadra, who labeled his philosophy Transcendent Wisdom, wrote many books and 
treatises.
5
 My reading focuses on his major books related to his Absolute Existentialism. 
These are: The Transcendent Wisdom of The Four Journeys of The Intellect, The Book of 
Metaphysical Prehensions, The Wisdom of The Throne, and The Define Manifestations.
 
As for Hegel, my reading primarily focuses on Lectures on The History of Philosophy, 
Science of Logic, and The Encyclopaedia Logic.  
Let me now explain why I chose these two philosophers as study cases for the 
problematic status of Truth within the relationships of essence/existence and 
subject/object. Although Sadra does not, chronologically speaking, belong to medieval 
philosophy, his philosophy is based on philosophical developments of the medieval 
problem of the relationship of essence/existence. Moreover, in Sadra‘s theory of 
knowledge, the modern relationship of the knowing subject to the known object is 
implicit in his medieval doctrine of the unification of the intellect/knower with the 
intelligible/known. As for Hegel, he represents the philosophical summit of the modern 
problem of the relationship of subject/object. But what is significant in particular for this 
investigation is that Hegel‘s logical treatment of the relationship of essence to existence 
is central to his Absolute Idealism.   
But why do I choose Sadra from the East and Hegel from the West? This question 
becomes more appealing when we know that these two philosophers do not know each 
other, though they are well known in their own regions. Both Sadra‘s Absolute 
Existentialism and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are represented by many scholars as the 
important, if not the most important, philosophical moments in East and West 
                                                             
5 For more on Sadra‘s life and works, see: Ibrahim Kalin ―An Annotated Bibliography of the Works of 
Mulla Sadra with a Brief Account of his Life,‖ in Islamic Studies (2003), 42: 21–62. 
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respectively. Investigating the relationship of essence/existence and subject/object in 
terms of the relation between these two philosophical giants is thus significant.  
For Hegel, philosophy in its dialectical development must sublate its previous 
principles.
6
Accordingly, for Hegel, his philosophy represents the highest philosophical 
moment within which not only the previous principles of western philosophy, but also the 
principles of eastern philosophy are sublated. On the other side, Sadra‘s Absolute 
Existentialism, as many scholars argue,
7
 contains and overcomes the main principles of 
its predecessors: Peripatetic, new-Platonic, and Intuitionism.  
The moment of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism is not explicitly mentioned by 
Hegel— neither in the historical development of the Philosophical Idea in the Lectures on 
The History of Philosophy, nor in the conceptual development of the Logical Idea in the 
Science of Logic. If the moment of the Absolute Existentialism is contained within 
Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism at all, it is so implicitly, as a moment within the Hegelian 
Idea‘s self-dialectical process of determining. 
In this dissertation, I unveil Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute Existentialism within 
Hegel‘s moment of the Absolute Idealism.8 I argue that within Hegel‘s Absolute 
                                                             
6 Hegel writes, ―Although it must certainly be conceded that all philosophies have been refuted, it must also 
equally be affirmed that no philosophy has ever been refuted, nor can it be….So ―refuting‖ of a philosophy 
means only that its restricting boundary has been overstepped and its determinate principle has been 
reduced to an ideal moment.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 86 addition 1, p. 138. It is not my 
purpose to argue with or against Hegel‘s latter claim. I cite it for the purpose of my general argument in this 
dissertation. 
7 In this regard, some prominent scholars in Islamic Philosophy, such as Oliver Leaman and Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, consider Sadra as one of the most important Islamic philosopher in the last four hundred 
years. See: Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1999), pp. 88-107. See further Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: 
Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (New York: State University of New York, 2006), p.223. 
8 By including Sadra though Hegel did not, I amend Hegel‘s account of the history of medieval philosophy. 
According to Hegel, ―We find the various stages of the Logical Idea in the history of philosophy in the 
shape of a succession of emerging philosophical systems, each of which has a particular definition of the 
Absolute as its foundation.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 86 addition 1, p. 138. I argue that Sadra 
has a logical position in this Hegelian history.  
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Idealism, the moment of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to a 
moment in the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition, that is, in 
opposition to quality as affirmative reality.
9
    
 In order to achieve this task, I firstly investigate how Sadra‘s Absolute 
Existentialism has emerged (to speak in a Hegelian way) in opposition to its previous 
moment. This previous moment lies in the traditional views of the metaphysical 
essentialism of Plato and Aristotle as Sadra inherited them from his Islamic 
predecessors—especially Avicenna,10 Suhrawardi, and Ibn Arabi. By the metaphysical 
essentialism of Plato and Aristotle, therefore, I do not mean what Plato and Aristotle 
really hold regarding the relationship of essence/existence. Rather, I mean the traditional 
views which are widely attributed to Plato and Aristotle by the Avicennian Peripateticism 
and the Illuminationist tradition in the Islamic East. These traditional views, as Sadra 
understands them, maintain that the ultimate reality is essence, whether in its 
transcendental sense of the Platonic Ideas or in its immanent sense of the Aristotelian 
substantial forms.  
To show that Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism presents a challenge to the 
traditional views of metaphysical essentialism, I provide a comprehensive interpretation 
                                                             
9 I use the term ‗moment‘ in accordance with Hegel‘s terminology. For Hegel, the term ‗moment‘ 
represents an aspect of the whole. A ‗moment‘ of the whole is fully intelligible only in its relation to the 
other moments or aspects which constitute the whole. As Magee explains ―Hegel sometimes uses the term 
'moment' to refer to an 'aspect' of something, or, more technically, a part which is separable from the whole 
only in thought..., In Hegel's Logic, each category is a moment in the whole. Each is a part, but not a literal, 
physical part--and each derives its meaning from its place in the whole, and is thus not fully intelligible 
considered in separation from it.‖ Glenn Alexander Magee, The Hegel Dictionary (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2010), pp. 150-151. 
10 Avicenna‘s influence on Sadra is significant when we consider Avicenna‘s influence on the medieval 
philosophers. In this regard Parviz Morewedge writes, ―Ibn Sina[Avicenna]‘s influence on Jewish and 
Christian philosophies has been well documented. For example, basing many of his Christian metaphysical 
theological issues, such as the essence-existence distinction, on Ibn Sina‘s philosophy, Aquinas mentions 
the Persian philosopher over five hundred times. In this light, it is impossible to exaggerate his influence on 
either latter Muslim philosophers or on Latin fathers of Christian tradition.‖ Parviz Morewedge, The 
Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna (Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, 2001), pp.4-5.  
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of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism. This is accomplished in Chapter One. There, I argue 
that Sadra‘s critique of essentialism is based on his double view of the reality of essence: 
essence-in-itself, and essence-for-other (existence). Whereas the reality of essence-in-
itself is equivalent to nothing, the reality of essence-for-other makes sense only as a 
mental being in the knowing subject. Under the impact of the reality of existence, the 
knowing subject, from within, creates universal concepts/essences and then mistakenly 
attributes them to the existents as their inner reality. For Sadra, this is an inadequate 
account of reality, performed by the cognizing soul at one of its stages of unfolding into 
Absolute existence. Here I discuss Sadra‘s doctrine of substantial motion to show how 
the unfolding of existence is correlated with the unfolding of knowledge.  
 According to Sadra‘s doctrine of substantial motion, existence is one objective 
reality with various existential grades of unfolding towards Absolute Existence.  
Thus the existence which descends from the higher degrees begins to ascend from 
the lowest degree, and gradually in ascent it returns to the ultimate level from 
which it had descended. So existence is like a circle which revolves around itself, 
its end joining the beginning, as God the exalted said: As He originated you so 
will you return [7:29], and He said: It is He who originates creation, and then He 
will bring it back again [30:27]
11
 
  
To grasp the reality of existence neither as a multiplicity of existents nor as a unity of 
universal essences but rather as multiplicity-in-unity, the knowing subject must pass to a 
higher stage of unfolding:  the stage of intellection. Here, the difference between one 
existent and another is not their abstract essences but their grade of existence. Existence 
is the qualitative deferential element of reality and essence is just a negative quality that 
can be equated with nothing.  
 
                                                             
11 Ibid., p. 113. 
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The result of my analysis in Chapter One shows that, for Sadra, the unity of the 
Absolute cannot be fully known. It can only be approached by the intuitive grasp of the 
Extended Existence as unity-in-multiplicity which Sadra calls the ―Truth of truths.‖ This 
intuitive knowledge of the Truth of truths is a kind of mystical knowledge that goes 
beyond the understanding‘s principle of abstract identity. If the discursive knowledge of 
understanding takes ―multiplicity‖ and ―unity‖ as true only in their separation, Sadra‘s 
mystical knowledge takes them in their unity. In this regard, Sadra‘s mystical knowledge 
of the Extended existence as unity of distinct opposites is similar to Hegel‘s speculative 
knowledge. For Hegel,  
the meaning of the speculative is to be understood as being the same as what used 
in earlier times to be called ―mystical‖, especially with regard to the religious 
consciousness and its content….About this we must remark first that the 
―mystical‖ is certainly something mysterious, but only for the understanding, and 
then only because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding. But when 
it is regarded as synonymous with the speculative, the mystical is the concrete 
unity of just those determinations that count true for the understanding in their 
separation and opposition.
12
 
  
But, whereas Sadra limits this mystical knowledge of the opposites to the 
Extended Existence as the proximate grade of the Absolute Existence, Hegel extends it to 
the Absolute itself. As I conclude in the fourth chapter, from Hegel‘s view, the deficiency 
of Sadra‘s account of the Absolute lies in that Sadra does not consider negation as an 
essential drive of the Absolute‘s self-determination. 
  Sadra‘s account of existence is not without difficulties of its own. The main 
difficulty consists in his account of the inessentiality of essences. Essences in-themselves, 
Sadra maintains, are nothing; they are not even objects of creation. They ―have never 
                                                             
12 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 82, addition. p. 133.  
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inhaled the perfume of real existence at all,‖13 as Sadra expresses. The identity of the 
individual existent, especially when we consider Sadra‘s account of the motion in the 
category of substance, is problematic. Sadra argues that what identifies a determinate 
existent is its existential grade within the whole picture of the ontological gradation of 
existence towards the Absolute. But the individual existent is inherently in a state of 
substantial change from one existential degree to another degree. The existent‘s 
substantial state of changing contrasts its state of identity with itself. Unlike Hegel, who 
argues that there is a speculative sublation of opposites, Sadra appeals to the doctrine of 
intellective forms which he posits in the eternality of God‘s knowledge. To me, this 
doctrine does not solve the problem of the unity of God, which is not only central to 
Sadra‘s philosophy but to Islamic philosophy in general. For how can we save the 
absolute unity of God if His knowledge contains all the existents as unique species? I 
raise these difficulties in Sadra‘s philosophy again in the final chapter.  
 In Chapter Two, I investigate Hegel‘s reading of Plato and Aristotle in his 
Lectures on The History of Philosophy. This step is important in that it helps us 
understand the difference between Hegel and Sadra in terms of their critiques of 
metaphysical essentialism. Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato and Aristotle not only differs 
from the traditional views of metaphysical essentialism but also stands over against the 
subjective Idealisms and objective Idealisms of modern philosophy. Thus Hegel‘s 
critique of the Kantian thing in-itself, for example, can be well understood in light of 
Hegel‘s account of the relationship of essence to existence.14 
                                                             
13 Mulla Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, trans. Parviz Morewedge (New York: SSIPS, 1992), p. 
43.  
14 One could argue that Kant‘s critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God does not start from 
a genuine critique of the medieval relationship of existence/essence upon which the proof originally stands. 
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The main result of Chapter Two is that Hegel does not consider Plato‘s and 
Aristotle‘s accounts of essence as two different views of reality: (i.e., he does not accept 
that the ―idealist‖ Plato  just believes in the transcendental world of essences or that the 
―empiricist‖ Aristotle just believes in the objectivity of existence). Hegel‘s dialectical 
reading of Plato and Aristotle unveils the speculative moment of essence within their 
philosophies. Truth does not lie in the isolated world of objective transcendental 
essences, nor does it lie in the isolated world of the subjective essences of cognizant finite 
beings.  
The speculative account of essence that Hegel finds in the philosophies of Plato 
and Aristotle is a negative dynamicity that contains its mediation within itself. The 
question as to whether this is consistent with what essence is in Hegel‘s speculative 
philosophy, is dealt with in Chapter Three, in which I examine Hegel‘s own position as 
he represents it in his Science of Logic.  
But let me first mention another two important results of Chapter Two. The first 
one is related to the general approximation between Hegel and Sadra in terms of their 
disapproval of considering the abstract essence as a true correspondence to reality. The 
second important result concerns Hegel‘s discussion of the four Aristotelian principles. 
Hegel makes Aristotle‘s formal principle equivalent to ―determination or quality as such, 
the wherefore of anything, essence or form.‖15 This result raises the following idea: If 
Hegel really maintains that Aristotle‘s account of essence is equivalent to quality as such, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The lack of such critique of the relationship of essence/existence might preclude the other relationship of 
subject/object in Kant‘s Subjective Idealism from reaching its highest moment in Absolute Idealism. 
15 G.W.F Hegel. Hegel‟s Lectures on The History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane & Frances H. Simson 
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 335. 
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then in Hegel‘s Logic we must look to the sphere of Quality rather than the sphere of 
Essence, if we want to make sense of Hegel‘s critique of metaphysical essentialism.  
Whether Aristotle‘s account of essence is indeed equivalent to quality as such is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Aristotle has four meanings for quality; 
one of them makes sense with what Hegel says above. In Book V in his Metaphysics 
Aristotle says,  
We call a quality (1) the differentia of the substance, e.g. man is an animal of a 
certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-
footed; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles—
which shows that the differentia with reference to substance is a quality—this, 
then, is one meaning of quality—differentia of substance.16  
 
I find that Hegel‘s account of quality in his Lectures confirms his account of 
quality in his Logic. So Hegel‘s critique of the qualitative determination of Truth in his 
Logic can be taken as equivalent to his critique of the traditional views of essentialism. 
Given this, Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute existentialism as an opposition to the 
traditional views of metaphysical essentialism may be found within Hegel‘s treatment of 
the category of Quality in the Logic.  
I suspend my last result until I see first if Hegel‘s strict division of Arabic 
philosophy into (theologians /speakers) and (commentators /philosophers) is also 
applicable to Sadra. And this was the task of Chapter Three.  
In Chapter Three, I show that Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critique of Arabic philosophy 
share some common concerns. Both refuse the speakers‘ claim of causality which takes 
                                                             
16 Aristotle, The Completed Works of Aristotle, vol.2. ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 1020a 34-b2, p. 1611. (my emphasis). Moreover, in his Categories Aristotle says, ―I call 
‗quality‘ that in virtue of which some things are said to be such and such. But the name ‗quality‘ is used in 
many ways….A forth genus of qualities is ….the form of each thing…And each thing, with respect to its 
form, is said to be such and such.‖ 16 Aristotle, Aristotle Selected Works, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle & 
Lloyd P. Gerson (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1991), pp.45-46. 
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the connection between cause and effect as a mere habit. Moreover, both of them criticize 
the formal logic of understanding upon which the metaphysical essentialism of Arabic 
philosophers is based. Therefore, Sadra‘s philosophy cannot be properly fit within 
Hegel‘s division of Arabic philosophy into ―theologians/ speakers‖ and 
―commentators/philosophers‖.  
In order to see whether Sadra and Hegel start from the same standpoint in their 
critique of Arabic philosophy, I examined the principles underlying Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s 
critique of Arabic philosophy. They are different. Whereas Sadra take existence as the 
ground in which the opposites find their dissolution, Hegel takes essence as the ground 
into which the opposites find their sublation. Sadra‘s dissolution of opposites into the 
absolute unity of existence is different from Hegel‘s sublation of the opposites into the 
speculative unity of essence. Whereas Sadra builds his account of the absolute 
groundedness of existence on the assumption that essence-in-itself is an indeterminate 
negativity that he equates with nothing, Hegel‘s essence-in-itself as a ground is a 
dynamic self-sublation of its own determinations—a sublation that must result in 
existence. In order to prove the last point, I provide a detailed analysis to two important 
moments in Hegel‘s Logic: ―Essence‘s issuing from Being‖ and ―Essence‘s emerging 
into Existence.‖  
 Chapter Four concludes the dissertation by buildings upon the results of the 
previous chapters. I examine the result that I reached in Chapter Two regarding quality as 
a determination of truth in metaphysical essentialism. Three results emerged from my 
detailed analysis to Hegel‘s sphere of Quality in his Logic. Firstly, Hegel‘s immediate 
account of quality resembles the traditional Aristotelian view of essence as positive 
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quality. Secondly, Sadra‘s account of essence-in-itself resembles the moment of negative 
quality in Hegel‘s Logic. Finally, Hegel‘s account of essence sublates the previous two 
moments of positive and negative quality within a higher moment of determinacy that 
dialectically unfolds towards the Idea of Being and Essence. 
 Thus, in this dissertation I show that, although Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism 
and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are different, both challenge the traditional views of 
metaphysical essentialism. I also provide the logical connection between Sadra‘s and 
Hegel‘s critiques of metaphysical essentialism. I show that, within Hegel‘s Absolute 
Idealism, Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to quality as affirmative 
reality in the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition.       
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Chapter One 
Sadra on Metaphysical Essentialism: The Unfolding of Existence and 
the Concealment of Essence 
 
The whole is one rational being called the „great man‟ and the world of objects is like his 
body and exterior, and the world of spirits is like his soul and interior, and the whole is 
set orderly in one line—Sadra, Divine Manifestations, p.33.  
For these thousands of years the same Architect has directed the work: and that Architect 
is the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, 
and, with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time raised above it, and 
so to reach a higher stage of its own being—Hegel, Logic Encyclopedia, § 13. 
 
Introduction 
Introducing his philosophical conversion from the metaphysical principality of 
essence to the metaphysical principality of existence, Mulla Sadra says,  
In the past, I used to be firm on the defense of the principality of essence, making 
existence a mentally dependent abstract entity, until my God guided me and 
showed me his proof. It became clear to me that the issue is opposite of what has 
been convinced and determined. Thank God who took me out of the darkness of 
illusion through the light of comprehension, who removed from my heart the 
clouds of these doubts through the rise of the sun of truth, and who held me close 
to the true discourse in this life and the life after. Existences are genuine 
determinate realties and essences are the eternal ―thisnesses‖ which have never 
inhaled the perfume of real existence at all.
17
 
 
Sadra had originally sided with a tendency that premises its account of Truth/reality on an 
ontological assumption of the metaphysical principality of essence over existence.
18
 But 
                                                             
17 Mulla Sadra, The  Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, trans. Parviz Morewedge (New York: SSIPS, 1992), 
p.43. See also: Mulla Sadra, Al-Hikma Al-Muta„aliya fi-l-Asfar al-„Aqliyya al-Arba„a [The Transcendent 
Philosophy of the Four Journeys of the Intellect] vol. I (Beirut: Dar Ihya‘ al-Turath al-Arabi, 1999), p.63. 
18 Fazlur Rahman writes, ―Most philosophers [after Ibn Sina‘s famous distinction between essence and 
existence] argued on behalf of ‗essentialism‘ on the ground that existence, being a common attribute of all 
beings, is a most general concept and hence has only the reality of a ‗secondary intelligible‘ to which 
nothing in reality corresponds. The ‗Illuminationist‘ philosopher al-Suhrawardi, in particular, strongly 
argued against the reality of existence.‖ Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1975), p. 27. 
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he eventually rejected this position and converted to its opposite, the metaphysical 
principality of existence. The significance of this philosophical conversion is related to 
the philosophical context of the problem of essence and existence in the Islamic 
intellectual tradition, a tradition of more than seven centuries.
19
 In this regard, many 
scholars have considered Sadra as the representative of the highest Islamic philosophical 
moment, in which the three different Islamic traditional moments of Peripatetic, new-
Platonic, and Intuitionism are synthesized.
20
 If this is so, Sadra‘s philosophy might bear 
its own confirmation of Hegel‘s statement that  
in philosophy the latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have 
preceded it, and must include their principles; and so, if, on other grounds, it 
deserves the title of philosophy, will be the fullest, most comprehensive, and most 
adequate system of all.
21
 
 
My interpretation of Sadra‘s doctrine of the principality of existence, however, is 
not limited to the explicit Islamic formulation of the problem of essence and existence—
as it is manifested clearly with Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes.
22
 My focus, rather, is 
                                                             
19 Historians usually date the beginning of Islamic philosophy with the Muslim peripatetic philosopher Al-
Kindi (Latin: Alkindus) (801–873A.C) See: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to 
The Present: Philosophy in the land of Prophecy (New York: State University of New York, 2006), 
pp. 137–138. For more about Al-Kindi see: Tony Abboud, Al-Kindi: The Father of Arab Philosophy (New 
York: Rosem, 2006).  
20 The well-known Islamic scholar Nasr Hossein in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World writes, 
―He (Sadra) created a synthesis between ( ishraq/illumination), and doctrinal Sufism of the School of Ibn 
'Arabi. He believed that authentic hikma or philosophy/theosophy could only be attained by combining 
revealed knowledge, inner illumination, and ratiocination and he called this integral hikma "The 
transcendent philosophy/theosophy" (al-hikma al-muta˓aliyya).‖ Nasr Seyyed Hossein, ―Mulla Sadra,‖ 
in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (USA: Macmillan Reference), pp.491-492. Rahman also 
writes that ―the Peripatetic philosophical tradition emanating from Ibn Sina, the tradition of the Kalam 
theology, both Shii and Sunni, the illuminationist philosophy of al-Suhrawardi and his followers and 
commentators and, finally, the Sufi tradition culminating in the theosophy of Ibn Arabi and his disciples 
and commentators—all these went into the intellectual makeup of our philosopher (Mulla Sadra).‖ 
Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.9.  
21 Hegel, G.W.F, Logic Encyclopaedia (1830), trans. William Wallace (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1975), §13, p.19. 
22 For more about the influence of Al- Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on the formulation of the problem of 
existence and essence in medieval philosophy and its philosophical consequences on modern philosophy 
see chapter two and three in:  Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: PIMS, 2005). 
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on its implicit formulation in Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s traditional views of Being—as it is 
understood by Sadra.  
In so doing, I must make it clear at the outset what is meant by the traditional 
views of Plato and Aristotle, both of which Sadra and Hegel try to overcome.
23
 With 
regard to Plato, the traditional views present him as an idealist who thinks that 
―essences/Ideas‖ exist objectively and absolutely in a transcendental realm of Truth of 
which the concrete existents/beings of the sensible world are just copies of these 
essences.
24
 The traditional views of Aristotle, on the other hand, present him as a realist 
philosopher who thinks that ―essences/universals‖ are immanent in substances. Gilson 
summarizes these views:  
It has often been remarked, and rightly, that the forms of Aristotle are but the 
Ideas of Plato brought down from heaven to earth. We know a form through the 
being to which it gives rise, and we know that being through its definition. As 
knowable and known, the form is called ―essence‖.25 
  
Accordingly, these views introduce both Plato and Aristotle as ―essentialists‖ who 
consider essences to be the truest correspondence of reality.  
In order to limit my analysis, I will not deal with the other dimensions of Plato‘s 
and Aristotle‘s philosophy. My aim is to analyze how Sadra overcomes the metaphysical 
claim which considers reality as a correspondence to essence, whether in its Platonic 
                                                             
23 These traditional views, however, do not necessarily reflect what exactly Plato and Aristotle themselves 
intend to mean. Gray, in his Hegel and Greek Thought characterizes these traditional views, which Hegel 
tries to overcome, by saying: ―Tradition, especially modern habits of interpretation, had separated them 
(Plato and Aristotle) and had made Plato ―the patron saint of mere enthusiasm‖ and Aristotle the progenitor 
of empiricism in philosophy. Plato was the fountain head of all idealism, Aristotle the source of realism.‖ J. 
Glenn Gray, Hegel and Greek Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p.77. 
24 Gadamer describes this Platonic traditional view by saying that ―the prevailing form of interpretation in 
which Plato‘s philosophy has been passed on to us has advocated the two-world theory, that is, the 
complete separation of the paradigmatic world of ideas from the ebb and flow of change in our experience 
of the sense-perceived world. Idea and reality are made to look like two worlds separated by a chasm, and 
the interrelationship of the two remains obscure.‖ Hans Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight 
Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. Trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 
156. 
25 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p.47. 
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transcendental form or in its Aristotelian immanent form. This will be in light of the 
ontological relationship between essence and existence, on the one hand, and the 
epistemological relationship between subject and object, on the other hand. This parallels 
my general argument in this dissertation, which claims that, both in Sadra and Hegel, the 
ontological duality of essence and existence implies the epistemological duality of 
subject and object, and vice versa.
26
  
 
The Ontological Difference between (Being/Essence) and (Existence) and its 
Epistemological Reflections
27
  
 
If for every philosopher there are central questions around which his 
investigations revolve, Sadra‘s main philosophical questions could be formulated in three 
                                                             
26 Sadra, unlike Hegel, does not devote long chapters to display and discuss Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s 
philosophies. He was satisfied with the rich heritage of many commentaries on Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s 
works, which had passed on to him from his Islamic predecessors, especially Avicenna. With regard to 
Aristotle, Sadra, in fact, does not criticize the Greek Aristotle but the Arabic Aristotle, who, in a 
historically famous mistake, had been confused with Plotinus. For more about the relation between Sadra 
and Plotinus see: Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 4. 
27 The conceptual distinction between existence and essence in Sadra‘s metaphysics is based upon another 
distinction, which is absent in Greek philosophy, namely the distinction between Being and existence. The 
concept of existence has emerged as a significantly distinct concept within the context of the Islamic 
metaphysical investigations on Greek philosophy. In this regard, Charles H. Kahn, for instance, in his 
essay, ―Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy‖, argues that ―in the 
extended discussion of the concept (or concepts) of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to 
Aristotle, the theme of existence does not figure as a distinct topic for philosophical reflection…. The new 
metaphysics seems to have taken shape in Islamic philosophy, in the form of a radical distinction between 
necessary and contingent existence: between the existence of God, on the one hand, and that of the created 
world, on the other.‖ Charles H. Kahn,  ―Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek 
Philosophy?‖ in Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval, edited by Parviz Morewedge (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982), p.7. Gilson also relates the emergence of the concept of existence to 
Islamic philosophy and argues that when Aristotle ―speaks of being, he never thought of existence. He does 
not reject it, he completely overlooks it….Once evidenced by sense or concluded by rational 
argumentation, existence is tacitly dismissed.‖ Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p.46. This 
conceptually metaphysical turn from Greek metaphysics is firstly inaugurated by Al-Farabi and then found 
its summit with Avicenna, through whom the concept of existence found its direct way into the Christian 
medieval philosophers. Thomas Aquinas found in Avicenna‘s distinction of existence and essence many 
answers for the relationship between the creator God and the created world, and opened the door to the 
concept of existence to be an essential part in most of the western modern metaphysical discussions. See: 
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 2 (Kent: Burns & Oates, 1999), pp.334-335. For more 
about Avicenna‘s influence on Aquinas, see: Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: 
Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas' Positions (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp.3-8.  
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interrelated questions: does ―existence‖ exist in a determinate and concrete sense the way 
things in the external realm exist? Is the corresponding reality of the affirmation of 
―existence is an existent‖ the same as that of the affirmation of ―a tree, for instance, is an 
existent‖? How could the difference between, as Sadra puts it, ―the existence of things 
and the existent status of existence itself,‖28 be philosophically employed in order to 
perform a comprehensive theory of reality?  
The question of existence is central in Sadra‘s thinking: 
The question of existence is the foundation of the principles of wisdom, the basis 
of philosophical theology, and the mill-stone of sciences of unity, the resurrection 
of souls and bodies, and of much else that only we have developed and 
articulated.
29
     
 
In order to avoid the loss of the implications and philosophical direction of Sadra‘s 
thought, it is important to isolate and make clearly recognizable the fundamental and 
primary meaning of the Arabic term (wujud)/existence. Sadra‘s writings are imbued with 
the word wujud. In this regard, Chittick, in his translation of Sadra‘s The Elixir of the 
Gnostics, states that 
wujud is the primary topic of discussion. In the Asfar
30
 and its commentary the 
word itself is employed15, 000 times, not to mention its verbal forms and 
derivatives.
31
  
 
The Arabic term wujud, however, remains an approximate, rather than an exact, 
translation of the English term ―existence‖. Here I disagree with some scholars such as 
Toshihiko Izutsu who considers wujud to be ―an Arabic word which exactly corresponds 
                                                             
28 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.25. 
29 Ibid., p.3. 
30 The Arabic word Asfar means ―journeys‖ and refers to one of the most important books of Sadra‘s 
ontology of existence: The Transcendent Philosophy of the Four Journeys (Asfar) of the Intellect. 
31 William Chittick. ―Introduction‖, in Mulla Sadra, The Elixir of the Gnostics (Provo, UT: Brigham Young 
University Press, 2003), p. xxvi. 
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to the English word existence.‖32 In fact, the exact literal translation of wujud is ―to find‖ 
and it entails, moreover, an involving of the human cognitive faculties by which 
something can be actually found. As Seyyed Naser explains,  
As far as the etymological derivation of the term wujud is concerned, it is an 
Arabic term related to the root wjd, which possesses the basic meaning ―to find‖ 
or ―come to know‖ about something. It is etymologically related to the term 
wijdan, which means ‗consciousness,‘ ‗awareness,‘ or ‗knowledge,‘ as well as to 
wajd, which means ‗ecstasy‘ or ‗bliss‘.33 
 
Not recognizing this literal meaning and this implied epistemological dimension of the 
Arabic term wujud could cause confusion when we relate wujud with the English term 
―existence‖.34  
Within this literal meaning of wujud, both ―consciousness‖ and ―presence‖ 
furnish the initial epistemological and ontological web for an object to be found. In 
propositions such as ―I find it‖, existence epistemologically and ontologically extends 
(yn„basid) between the subject/knower and the object/known.35 The literal meaning of 
wujud thus demands that, for an object to be found for a conscious subject, both object 
and subject must be present in some definite place and at some definite time. In this 
                                                             
32 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2007), p. 
41. 
33 Seyyed H. Nasr, Islamic Philosophy From its Origin to the Present, p.66. 
34 With regard to the epistemological dimension of wujud, Chittick rightly notes that ―one important 
dimension of the discussion of wujud that is immediately lost to sight in translation is the fact that the word 
itself demands consciousness and perception.‖  William Chittick, Perception According to Mulla Sadra 
(London: Institute of Islamic studies, 2002), p.228. 
35 We will see, when I discuss Sadra‘s doctrine of the unity of the knower/subject, the known/object, and 
the act of knowing, how his theory of ―knowledge-by-presence‖ is related to the epistemological dimension 
of wujud/existence. In this context, the literal meaning of the term wujud, when it is related not only to its 
ontological dimension but also to its inherent epistemological dimension based on ―tasting and finding,‖ or 
what Sadra calls kashf (unveiling or unconcealedness), could bear a significant comparison with 
Heidegger‘s interpretation of Truth as it is manifested in the Greek term aletheia. Heidegger writes, ―What 
the Greeks name ἀλήθεια [Aletheia] we ordinarily "translate" with the word "truth." If we translate the 
Greek word "literally," however, then it says "unconcealedness."  Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. 
Andre Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 11.  
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limited linguistic sense, the Arabic term wujud bears similarity with the German term 
Dasein. As Gilson notes, the well-known Arabic philosopher 
Averroes remarks that, in common language, when people want to say that a thing 
exists, they say that it is ―to be found,‖ just as, in order to convey that a certain 
thing does not exist, they say that it is ―not to be found.‖ We ourselves would now 
say that, to Averroes‘ compatriots, as to some German philosophers, to be is to be 
there: sein is dasein.
36
 
  
Hence, the concrete presence of an object is constitutive in the literal meaning of 
wujud. Sadra employs this implied sense of the objective concreteness of wujud to stress 
―the realized determination‖ of existence that appears as an evident result of the 
existential realization of an object. As he says, ―The realization [lit. inner-reality] of 
existence in its presence and inner revelation is the most evident of all entities, whereas 
its essence is the most hidden in concept and in its inner-being.‖37 When we apply this 
meaning of wujud/existence to concepts per se, or essences per se—without any spiritual, 
imaginative, or material correlation—we find that none of them can be found or can be 
concretely present; that is, none of them exists. Essences qua essences, therefore, are 
indeterminate. When they are regarded without any reference to their existential 
correlations, essences are equivalent to ―nothingness‖. Essences in themselves stay 
forever in their concretely absent state and this is why they, as Sadra says, ―have never 
inhaled the perfume of real existence at all.‖38 The forever-concretely absent state of 
essences in themselves constitutes their own peculiar ontological status. This leads me to 
what I call the Sadrian dualism of what is concretely presence and what is concretely 
absence. The former refers to existence in its determinate presence and the latter refers to 
essence per se in its forever absence and forever indeterminate state.  
                                                             
36 Gilson, Being and Some Philosopher, p.53. 
37 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.6. 
38 Ibid., p.43. 
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The Difference between Essence-in-itself and Essence-for-Existence 
For Sadra, although essence is ontologically absent when it is considered solely 
in-itself, it has an ontological presence when it is considered in relation to the external 
existence. Hence Sadra distinguishes between two ontological accounts of essence: 
essence-in-itself, and essence-for-existence, so to speak. It is the former account of 
essence which Sadra considers as equivalent to nothingness. That is, when we cognitively 
consider essence-in-itself without any extra-mental correlation, then essence does not 
have any reality: 
An essence, considered only in itself apart from existence, would be deprived of 
existence. If it [an essence] is considered in itself regardless of both existence and 
privation, it would be neither an existent nor an entity deprived of the status of 
being an existent.
39
   
 
Essence in itself is thus indifferent to its own existence or non-existence. This 
makes essence deprived of any kind of activity and effects. Essence, however, acquires a 
meaningful sense in relation to something other than itself. If the status of essence-in-
itself is ontologically poor to the extent it becomes equivalent to nothing, essence-for-
existence is only meaningful in relation to the reality of existence. For Sadra, essences, as 
Rahman puts it ―arise only in the mind by the impact of reality upon it.‖40 In this sense, 
Sadra considers essences no more than a consequence of the human understanding‘s 
conceptual analysis of the objective reality of the external world. Consequentially, Sadra 
posits the ontological reality of essences within the ontological status of what he calls 
―mental Being‖: 
 We can make true affirmative judgments about things that have no existence in 
extra-mental reality at all. Similarly, we can judge what possesses being. We 
judge it comprehensively for all its quantitative realized particulars. For example, 
                                                             
39 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.15. 
40 Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.11. 
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we say ‗every Gryphon flies‘ and ‗every triangle has three sides‘. Now we know 
the reference [truth] of every affirmative judgment requires the existence of its 
subject. Since we know that the subject of the judgment has no concrete 
existence, we know that it must have another existence. That is mental Being.
41
  
 
Mental here refers to the human mind as a subjective creator of the cognitive 
forms of the reality of existence. The soul creates from within itself concepts and abstract 
universals under the impact of the external reality of existence.
42
 It is important here to 
stress the point that Sadra believes in the active role of the knowing subject in the 
cognitive process of knowledge. For him, the cognitive forms, as he writes, ―present to 
the cognizant soul, and [are] related to it as an act is related to its actor, not as something 
received is related to its recipient.‖43 Within this epistemological view, essences, as 
abstract universals, are formed by the active knowing subject. Essences, accordingly, do 
not objectively exist in a Platonic transcendental realm, nor are they immanent as the 
most real in substances in the Aristotelian traditional sense. Rather, essences emanate 
from within the cognitive transformation of the knowing subject himself under the impact 
of the reality of existence on him. 
The reality of existence is thus the main differential factor between existences. 
This does not mean that things do not differ from each other by means of their essences. 
It is true for Sadra that the essence of man is different from the essence of stone, but this 
difference stems fundamentally from the reality of existence.  
Although its species and its individuals differ in essence, and its genera and 
differences are diversified by definition and by essence, existence in its totality is 
                                                             
41 Sadra, Asfar, vol.1, pp. 269-270.  
42 For Sadra, ―perceptible forms,‖ as Rahman puts it, ―are operations of or emanations from the soul itself 
and the presentation of an object to a sense organ only provides the occasion for the projection of the form 
from the soul. All forms in knowledge are produced by the soul in this way and Sadra says that the 
relationship of cognitive forms to the soul is analogous to the relationship of the contingent to the 
Necessary Being, God.‖ Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 211.  
43 Mulla Sadra, Asfar, IV, 1, P. 178, in Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 223. 
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a unique entity, having but a single unique essence, simply presenting superior 
and inferior levels and degrees.
44
 
 
The difference in terms of essences is thus secondary and not primary. The difference in 
essence is a conceptual difference and not a real difference. What determines the real 
difference between man and stone consists primarily in their existential degree, which, 
subsequently, results conceptually in a difference of essence. Essences, in this 
metaphysical vision, are merely the cognizing soul‘s self-approximation to the reality of 
existence, and the difference essences bring remains abstract and not concrete.  
Why, for Sadra, is the knowing subject in all knowledge (sense-perception, 
imagination, and intellection) not a passive recipient of the material forms or the bodily 
qualities of the external object? The reason for this consists in the different nature of the 
material forms of the external object from the inner nature of the cognizing soul itself. 
For Sadra, ―the external sensible and the affections of the sense organ are merely 
preparatory and provide the ‗occasion‘ for the rise in the soul, or rather, the creation by it, 
of the perceptible form.‖45 According to Sadra, the cognizing soul‘s self-creation of its 
cognitive forms, under the impact of the reality of existence, constitutes the condition of 
the identity between the knower and the known. For it is in this case that the nature of the 
knower and the nature of the known becomes similar, and thus the identity between them 
could be possible. This point is explained in this following important passage. Sadra 
explains, 
Perception in general does not take place—as the well-known doctrine of the 
majority of the philosophers states—by the perceptual faculty‘s abstraction of the 
perceptible form itself from matter and encountering it along with its enveloping 
material attachments—since it has been established that forms imprinted in matter 
cannot move locally….Perception occurs because the giver (of forms, i.e., the 
                                                             
44 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.4. 
45 Sadra, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 223. 
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soul itself) bestows another psychic and luminous cognitive form, thanks to which 
perception or knowledge arises. This form is the actual sentient and the actual 
sensible at the same time. As for form-in matter, it is neither sentient nor sensible, 
but is only a condition (or occasion) for the emanation of that (actually cognized) 
form.
46
 
 
  Sadra‘s account of the cognitive activity of the knowing subject as a self-creator 
of forms is based first on his critique of abstraction. He criticizes his preceding Islamic 
philosophers in their misapprehension of the Greek‘s philosophers‘ true view of 
abstraction by saying:  
These philosophers, when they read in the books of the ancient sages that the 
various types of knowledge—sense perception, imagination, and intellection—
take place by a kind of abstraction, took this ―abstraction‖ to mean that certain 
qualities or parts (of the known object) are removed while others are preserved. 
On the contrary, all knowledge comes through a sort of existence—one level of 
existence being replaced by another.
47
  
 
Sadra reinterprets the ancient‘s view of abstraction in a way that could support his 
metaphysical theory of the simultaneous unfolding of existence and knowledge: 
The meaning of their (i.e., the philosophers‘) statement that every type of 
knowledge involves a kind of abstraction and that difference in the ranks of 
knowledge corresponds to the difference in the levels of abstraction is—as we 
have already said—not that abstraction involves the removal of certain qualities 
and retention of certain others, but its meaning is that existence changes levels—
from lower and baser to higher and nobler.
48
  
 
The knowing subject‘s self-creation of successive knowable forms results in the 
unfolding of knowledge as identical to the unfolding of existence. For the knowing 
subject‘s existential status in the stage of sensible knowledge, for instance, will not be the 
same as that of imaginable knowledge or intellectual knowledge.  
For Sadra, the existential cognitive process of unfolding does not exclude its 
lower ones but includes them. That is, the higher existential and cognitive level that the 
                                                             
46 Sadra, Asfar, IV, 1,  p. 181, in Ibid., p. 224.  
47 Sadra, Asfar, IV, .2, p. 95, in Ibid., p. 233.  
48 Ibid. 
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knowing subject reaches not only exceeds but also includes the lower level. To emphasis 
this important point, Sadra writes, ―Thus, when the soul is perfected and becomes actual 
intellect, it is not the case that it loses some faculties, like the perceptive, and comes to 
have others, like the rational.‖49 On the contrary, the cognizing soul in its higher stage of 
existence/knowledge both includes and transcends its previous levels. The same soul in 
its higher and simple stage of unfolding is all-inclusive. The same soul is, as Sadra writes, 
―intellective, perceptive, smelling, tasting, walking, growing, self-nourishing, appetitive, 
and angry.‖50 The true knowledge is thus that kind of existence which envelops all of its 
ontological and epistemological developments within simple wholeness. Rahman stresses 
this point by saying: 
According to Sadra, the higher does not ―abstract from‖ or negate but absorbs, 
includes, and transcends them: they exist in it in a simple manner. That is why, 
while characterizing God, he enunciates the principle, ―a simple being is [i.e., 
includes] all things.‖51 
 
If we could use Hegel‘s terminology, the cognizing soul in its higher stage sublates its 
previous levels of existence/knowledge. The highest moment that the cognizing soul 
could reach is the actual intellect. At this stage, the knowing subject becomes, as Sadra 
says, ―pure existence free from matter‖: 
Knowledge is neither a privation like abstraction from matter, nor a relation but a 
being (wujud/existence). (It is) not every being but that which is an actual being 
(bil-fi „l), not potential (bil-quwwah). (It is) not even every actual being, but a 
pure being (wujudan khalisan/pure existence), unmixed with non-being. To the 
extent that it becomes free from an admixture of non-being, its intensity as 
knowledge increases.
52
 
 
                                                             
49,Ibid., pp. 233-234. 
50 Sadra, Asfar, IV, 1, P. 65, in Rahma, p. 235.  
51 Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 91. 
52 Mulla Sadra, Asfar, I, 3, p. 306,  in Ibid., p. 213. 
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Sadra, in his view of the ontological and epistemological transformation of the 
knowing subject, breaks with his predecessor Aristotelian philosophers. As Rahman 
explains, ―According to Sadra, the Aristotelian-Ibn Sinaian theory of abstraction holds, 
whereas the objects of knowledge change—from the sensibles, through the imaginables 
to the intelligibles—the cognizing subject, the soul, remains the same.‖53 In contrast, 
Sadra, based on his theory of ―the substantial change,‖54 maintains that the knowing 
subject substantially changes
 
 from one level of (existence/knowledge) to another higher 
level of (existence/knowledge). The unfolding of existence implies the unfolding of 
knowledge and vice versa. 
 In this existential evolutionary process of the knowing subject, essences come to 
be mere conceptual creations arising from within the soul at a certain level of its 
existential development, in which the soul is still preoccupied by the affairs of its body. 
Essences in this existential and cognitive development of the knowing subject are mere 
approximation to the reality of existence but not the true correspondence of it. They are 
illusory representations of the reality of existences. What correspond to the reality of the 
external existences are their individual intellective forms rather than their universal 
essences. Does Sadra confuse the intellective forms with the essences in the Platonic 
sense? Rahman explains Sadra‘s position by writing, 
As for the intellective forms, Sadra‘s position is that these forms exist in their 
own right in a Platonic sense, and as immaterial individuals (afrad) and that when 
                                                             
53 Ibid.,  p. 234.  
54 I will explain and discuss Sadra‘s theory of substantial movement later on in this chapter. But, this 
following comment of Rahman in this regard is helpful: ―This evolution of the soul itself—the successive 
levels of its existence—is an important proof, for Sadra, of the law of substantive change to which the 
entire field of natural existence is subject, a law from whose operation only God and the transcendent 
intelligences (which are parts or attributes of God) are exempt.‖ Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra,  
p. 234.   
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the soul fully knows them, it does so by an illuminationist direct knowledge 
whereby it becomes identical with them.
55
 
 
These intellective forms, however, are not universal essences under which 
individuals of certain kind are subsumed. Rather, they are themselves unique individuals. 
That is, each material existent in the realm of contingency has its unique intellective form 
that exists as a pure existential difference in the divine mind or the actual intellect. When 
the individual existent progressively becomes his intellective form, it at once becomes a 
unique species. So, although Sadra‘s metaphysical position of intellective forms has 
Platonic merit, there is considerable difference that we can see. For whereas the Platonic 
essences are immaterial universals under which material individuals of certain kind are 
subsumed, the Saderian intellective forms are immaterial individuals. They are pure 
existences free from matter, each of which is devoted only to one material individual. 
Sadra, however, is aware of Plato‘s theory of Ideas. He thought that he 
comprehended it more correctly than his Islamic predecessors.  He, for instance, criticizes 
Avicenna who considers Plato‘s Ideas as ―abstract universal essences‖ devoid of all 
particularity.
56
 Sadra argues that these traditional views of Plato misunderstand what 
Plato really meant. For Sadra, Plato‘s Ideas should be understood not as isolated and 
abstract entities, not as universals under which individuals univocally subsumed, but as a 
―concrete and existential order of existence which contains within it all particularities and 
determinations.‖57 For Sadra, ―there is no subsistence of the essence abstracted from 
                                                             
55 Ibid., p. 215. 
56 In this regard, Rahman says, ―Indeed, Sadra accuses Ibn Sina (Avicenna) of confusing unity-by-
abstraction with unity-by-integration and concretization, between which Plato must have distinguished.‖ 
Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.47.  
57 Ibid., p.47. 
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existence.‖58 The key point in Sadra‘s reinterpretation of Plato consists in his 
transformation of the Platonic Ideas from being universal essences to being individual 
intellective forms.  
However, at the end of this chapter we will see how Sadra‘s position of 
intellective forms is still problematic and forms a weak point in his metaphysics of 
existence. But let us just mention again that Sadra does not think that he rejects what 
Plato really says about the Ideas, only what his interpreters understand. Sadra‘s position 
in this point is exactly the same as Hegel‘s. For, as we will see in the next chapter, Hegel 
thinks that Plato is misinterpreted by many interpreters, modern and medieval, and 
Hegel‘s task is to reinterpret Plato in a way proper to the development of the 
philosophical idea.   
Sadra’s Triple Metaphysical View of Existence 
 In Sadra‘s metaphysics, there are three grades of existence: The Absolute, the 
Extended, and the Relative. The Absolute existence in its pure simplicity and unity is 
completely undetermined and unlimited. The Extended existence, on the other hand, 
represents the first manifestation of the Absolute existence. Sadra also refers to this 
Extended existence as the First Intellect, or the Sacred Effusion.
59
 In its unity, the 
Extended existence possesses infinite ontological determinations. From this single 
Extended existence all the ontological differentiations, which are manifested in the 
cosmos, issue. So, whereas the Absolute existence is unity that produces only unity, the 
Extended existence is unity that produces multiplicity. But this does not mean that unity 
and multiplicity are exclusive opposites within the Extended existence. It is only so from 
                                                             
58 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.42.  
59 See: Zailan Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason in the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra: An 
Analysis of the al-Hikmah al-Arshiyyah (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 92. 
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the perspective of the third degree of existence: the Relative or the Relational existence. 
This degree of existence refers to all the existents existentiated by the Extended 
existence.
60
  
These three grades of existence correspond to three cognitive levels: 
1- The Absolut existence (The Absolute Unity)—completely unknowable. 
2-  The Extended existence (Unity in Multiplicity/ Multiplicity in Unity)—knowable 
only by intellectual intuition. 
3- The Relative existence (Multiplicity and Unity as exclusive opposites)—
knowable by sense-perception and conceptual analysis. 
But these three ontological degrees of existence with their epistemological 
correspondences are all manifestations of God‘s Truth. In this existential metaphysical 
view of reality, all existents are appearances, attributes, names, and manifestations 
qualifying the simple reality of existence in its Absolute necessity. God, as the absolute 
simplicity of the reality of existence, includes and transcends at the same time all His 
manifestations.  
You should know that The Necessary [Existent]/[God] is the true in its Reality. 
Each simple reality, due to its unity, is the totality of all entities. [As it is stated in 
The Quran] ―It leaves out nothing, Small or Great, but takes account thereof.‖ 
[18:49]
61
 
 
In His absolute degree of existence, God is the pure unity that is completely 
unknowable by the human mind. Sadra also calls this absolute degree of existence ―the 
                                                             
60 See: Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
61 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.62. Rahman explains the formula of  ―each simple reality is 
the totality of all things‖: ―Each higher stage of existence includes all the lower ones and transcends them; 
this is expressed by the formula, "a simple reality is everything, " i.e., the higher a reality is, the simpler and 
more inclusive it is; the more something has or achieves of existence, the less it has of essence, since, while 
existence is real, concrete, determinate, individual, and luminous, essences are exactly the opposite and 
arise only in the mind by the impact of reality upon it. Hence, God being pure existence has no essence at 
all.‖ Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.11. 
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Hidden Ipseity,‖ which, as Zailan writes, ―transcends all limitations and determinations 
and which is absolutely unknowable.‖ 62 In the extended degree of existence, God is 
manifesting as ―unity in multiplicity‖ and ―multiplicity in unity‖. Since this degree 
represents the first manifestation of the Absolute, it is, according to Sadra, the Truth of 
truths. This is the highest epistemological stage that the human mind, by means of the 
intellectual intuition, can reach. In the relative degree of existence, God is manifesting in 
the infinite ontological determinations of multiplicity as relational existents. This is the 
lowest degree of existence in which the individual existents are viewed by conceptual 
analysis as distinct essences in the human mind.  
 In this triple metaphysical view of existence, everything originates from and 
returns to the Absolute existence. Origination is the descending of existence from its 
(absoluteness), through (extendedness), to (relativity). Returning is the reverse movement 
of existence that progressively moves forwards towards its origin and never moves 
backwards. In its metaphysical Extension mode as ascending towards the Absolute, 
Relative existence unfolds in gradual intensive progress from a lower degree to a higher 
degree of existence. In this metaphysical picture of gradation, the Extended existence still 
preserves its simple unity: 
Existence is a single, objective and simple reality, and there is no difference 
between its parts, unless in terms of perfection and imperfection, strength, and 
weakness.
63
 
 
With this existential, gradational ontology in view, the Extended existence is the 
ontological center around which the Absolute existence‘s self-manifestations are 
different, but it is also the same center around which they are identical. This relationship 
                                                             
62 See: Ibid., p. 92. 
63 Sadra, Asfar, vol. 6. p.14. 
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finds its implication in the important Sadrian principle which states that existence is 
―‗unity/one‘ in ‗multiplicity/many‘ and ‗multiplicity/many‘ in ‗unity/one‘.‖64  
Here we notice three ontological and epistemological moments interwoven in 
Sadra‘s account of the Extended existence. The first moment is the immediacy of the 
unity of existence—the concept of existence as self-evident for the knowing subject. The 
second moment is the multiplicity of existences—the knowing subject‘s self-creation of 
essences as an approximation to the reality of existence. The third moment is the 
synthetically, mutual relationship between ―unity in multiplicity‖ and ―multiplicity in 
unity‖—the knowing subject‘s intuitional grasp of the reality of existence. For Sadra, it is 
precisely this third moment that truly reveals the Truth of truths.
65
  
In the first moment of unity, we, from a Hegelian point of view, face the sphere of 
immediacy. Like Hegel, Sadra rejects this one-sided principle of Truth which does not 
recognize the other principle of distinction and difference. He rises from this point of 
view of unity in which all things are undistinguished to the point of view of multiplicity, 
distinction, and difference. Although this sphere, in which things mediate each other in 
terms of their differences, that is, in terms of their ―essences,‖ seems more precise and 
elaborated than the sphere of immediacy, Sadra refuses to see Truth from this one-sided 
view of difference. For him, the sphere of classification and difference, which results in 
                                                             
64 Sadra, Asfar, vol. 1, p.92. 
65 The Truth of truths, in which unity and multiplicity are identical, represents the manifestation of God as 
Extended existence, which, as we saw, is the first manifestation of God, and thus the most representative of 
His Truth. Now, for Sadra, the knowing subject cannot grasp this (unity in multiplicity) and (multiplicity in 
unity) until he goes beyond the logic of the conceptual analysis of reality based on the primacy of essence 
over existence. The Truth of truths, as manifested in the Extended existence in its unfolding based on the 
substantial motion of existence, can be grasped only by the intellectual intuition in which the knowing 
subject and the known object are identical. It is the moment in which the cognizing soul becomes identical 
with the actual intellect. Here the existence of the soul becomes nobler and higher than its previous 
developmental stages. It is nobler and higher in that it at once includes and transcends its previous 
existential and cognitive stages.  
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multiplicity as essences in the human mind, constitutes just part of Truth but not the 
whole of Truth.  
To grasp Truth in its highest ontological sense is to rise over both ―unity‖ and 
―multiplicity‖ to ―unity in multiplicity‖/―multiplicity in unity‖. For Sadra, the true unity 
must have the multiplicity within it, and vice versa. This is the ontological case of the 
Extended existence in its perpetual unfolding towards the Absolute existence. God, as the 
ground of Origination and Return, is the Absolute unity of the Extended existence and the 
Relative existence. The infinite existence has the finite existence within it only by the 
mediation of the Extended existence, which is at once finite and infinite. The Extended 
existence is infinite in its immediate emergence from the Absolute, yet it is finite in its 
relation with the multiplicity of the Relative existences.  
The Extended existence, with all its ontological differentiations, is constitutive of 
our subjectivity as knowers. For we, as Relative existents within the Extended existence, 
create all kinds of knowable forms, including essences. But this epistemological 
emergence of the cognitive forms within our soul is correlated with the absolute 
unfolding of the Extended existence from which we are initially emerged.  
According to this analysis, there is tension between two relationships in Sadra‘s 
metaphysics. The first one is between relativity and absoluteness, and the second one is 
between the knower and the known. The ontological dimension (of relativity in 
absoluteness and absoluteness in relativity) and the epistemological dimension (of 
knower in known and known in knower) implicitly entail each other in Sadra‘s account of 
the Absolute existence. By the mediation of the Extended existence, Sadra thinks that the 
problem of how multiplicity issues from the Absolute unity of God is solved. Whether he 
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is aware to the mutual relationship between what is epistemological and what is 
ontological is another issue that could be answered under the light of our later discussion 
of Hegel. 
The Substantial Motion of Existence (al-harakat al-jawhariyya) 
The Extended existence, in its unfolding extension from a lower degree of 
existence to a higher degree of existence towards the Absolute, represents the perpetual 
dynamic nature of existence in itself. Sadra‘s consideration of the unfolding of existence 
is based on his break with the Aristotelian account of motion. In contrast to the Muslim 
Peripatetic tradition, Sadra affirms the motion in the category of ―substance‖ itself. He 
introduces his different view of motion by saying: 
According to most philosophers, the remaining categories in which motion is 
supposed to occur are four, but in our opinion they are five: substance, quality, 
quantity, place, and position.
66
  
 
Admitting motion in substance forms a revolutionary break with the Aristotelian 
theory of motion. Whereas Aristotle does not accept motion in the category of substance 
but only in the accidental categories of quantity (growth or diminution), quality 
(alteration), and place (locomotion),
67
 Sadra does not only insist on the motion in 
substance, but also makes it the foundation of his metaphysics: 
Note that motion, being essentially both a renewal and passing-away of things, is 
identified with this thing in motion. So motion‘s proximate cause must be some 
identity essentially nonperduring. Otherwise the components of motion would not 
be annihilated and so motion could not be motion, and renewal could not be 
renewal but only rest and cessation. The agent of motion must be itself in motion 
intrinsically.
68
  
 
                                                             
66 Mulla Sadra,  Transubstantial Motion and the Natural World : Volume III, Stage 7, Chapters 18-32 of 
the Asfar of Mulla Sadra. trans. Mahdi Dehbashi ( London: ICAS Press, 2010), p.127. 
67 Aristotle, ―De Anima‖ in The complete Works of Aristotle. 2 vols. ed. J (Barnes. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 406a 12. 
68 Sadra, Transubstantial Motion and the Natural World, p 97. 
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It is not my purpose, however, to analyze the three complicated and long 
arguments that Sadra presents in his Asfar to support his claim of the substantial motion 
of existence.
69
 What is important here is Sadra‘s awareness of the reason behind 
Aristotle‘s refusal of the motion in substance. This reason is concerned with the principle 
of identity, according to which substance must remain unaffected throughout its motion. 
For Aristotle, substance must be the stable foundation of motion; otherwise it will lose its 
identity. Hence, motion must happen in accidents of which substance is the substratum. 
Aristotle‘s substance does not have a contrary and hence the motion in substance leads 
either to destruction (change from positive to negative) or generation (change from 
negative to positive).
70
  
For Sadra, the Aristotelian‘s concern about the loss of identity in motion is not a 
problem because the identity of substance is related primarily to its existence, and not to 
its essence. This constitutes a critique of the abstract law of identity based on the 
principality of essence over existence.
71
 Having considered existence as the sole 
principality of reality, Sadra holds that substance preserves its identity during its 
existential motion insofar it moves gradually, and not by leaps, from a realistic degree of 
existence to another realistic degree of existence. The new existential form that substance 
realizes in the course of its substantial change does not exclude but includes its previous 
one. Substance only actualizes and realizes itself existentially in this substantial motion 
from one existential mode of existence to another, more intensive existential mode. This 
                                                             
69 For more about these arguments and about Sadra‘s discussion of the theories of motion in Pythagoras, 
Plato, and Aristotle, see chapter four in my book: The Priority of Existence in Mulla Sadra: From the 
Centrism of Essence to the Centrism of Existence, (Damascus: Dar Safahat, 2008). 
70 For more in Aristotle‘s theory of motion see: Otfried Hoffe, Aristotle, trans. Christine Salazar (Albany: 
State Univesity of NewYork, 2003), pp. 71-75. 
71 Sadra‘s implied critique of the abstract law of identity of essence is compared with Hegel‘s critique of 
the abstract law of identity of understanding in chapter three of this dissertation. 
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substantial change, as we have seen, is applied by Sadra to the cognizing soul in its 
cognitive and existential evaluation from one level of realization to another higher level.  
According to this metaphysical vision, the knowing subject graduates 
substantially from a lower intensive degree of existence (with its higher intensive 
corresponding essence/mental Being) to a higher intensive degree of existence (with its 
lower intensive corresponding essence/mental Being). The more the knowing subject 
realizes itself existentially the more it negates the abstract universals of reality and 
becomes closer to the Absolute existence, which is pure existence without any 
corresponding essence. Essence in the Absolute existence is perfectly vanished both 
concretely and conceptually. For, as discussed above, the Absolute existence is pure and 
simple oneness without any multiplicity that could be represented as essence. That the 
Absolute is pure existence without any trace of essence needs more discussion. This will 
be clarified now in light of Sadra‘s important difference between the concept of existence 
and the reality of existence. 
The Ontological and Epistemological difference between The Concept of 
Existence /Mental Being and The Reality of Existence 
The linguistic implication of the Arabic term kaun/Being will shed more light on 
the correlation between ‗the concept of essence‘/‗mental Being,‘ on one hand, and ‗the 
concept of existence‘/‗the reality of existence‘, on the other hand.  Kaun, as a name, can 
be considered as an equivalent Arabic term to the English term ―Being‖ when ―Being‖ is 
used as equivalent to universe-cosmos-world. On the other hand, kaun, as a verb, has 
copulative uses related to the three tenses (past-present-future), similar to some extent to 
the English verb to be. However, kaun in this verbal sense designates more specifically 
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the past tense. In light of this linguistic implication and on the basis that what is past is 
concretely absent, essence-in-itself as absent becomes more related to kaun as past Being. 
 It is worthwhile here to notice the linguistic similarities—in terms of the 
correlation of essence and past Being— between Arabic and German. In this regard, 
Hegel himself says, 
With respect to other meanings and uses of the category of Essence, we may note 
that in the German auxiliary verb, sein (to be), the past tense is expressed by the 
term for Essence (wesen): we designate past being as gewesen. This anomaly of 
language implies to some extent a correct perception of the relation between 
Being and Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering 
however meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid aside and thus 
at the same time preserved.
72
  
 
Thus, while the reality of existence addresses what is concretely present, (the concept of 
essence /(past Being) addresses what is absent in the concrete level of the external world. 
The ontological preservation of the concept of essence as past Being is performed in the 
human mind as a knower. Sadra, however, introduces what he calls ―mental Being‖ as an 
ontological preservation not only for the concept of essence but also for the concept of 
existence as well as any imaginative or unreal concept. Mental Being here is considered 
in general as another order of existence, different in degree from the order of the reality 
of existence. 
Sadra‘s metaphysics busies itself chiefly with the relationship between the 
cognitive forms, which have the ontological status of mental Being, including the concept 
of essence and the concept of existence, on one hand, and the reality of existence, on the 
other hand. Moreover, the crucial insertion of the epistemological dimension of mental 
                                                             
72 Hegel, Logic Encyclopaedia, §112. In this regard, Gustav relates Hegel with Aristotle by saying, 
―Wesen‖ (essence) belongs to the past participle (gewesen) of the verb ―sein‖ (to be). Hegel translates here 
a very similar expression of Aristotle: ―the what was being.‖ Gustav Emil Mueller, ―Translator‘s Note‖ in 
Hegel Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (New York:  Philosophical Library, 1959), p.4. 
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Being within the relationship of existence/essence makes this relationship neither purely 
ontological nor purely epistemological but a combination of both.  
The difference between the order of existence in its external reality and the order 
of existence in its conceptual mental Being can be clarified more in the light of the 
difference between the existential propositional form of (X is, or X exists) and the 
copulative propositional form of (X is Y). To clarify this important difference let us take 
the example which Sadra borrows from Aristotle.
73
 An existential proposition such as 
―Homer is‖ can be transformed to ―Homer is an existent.‖ If we compare this existential 
proposition with another copulative proposition, such as ―Homer is a poet,‖ we find that 
―an existent‖ grammatically and logically plays the same role as ―a poet‖—both are 
predicates denoting a quality of Homer. For Sadra, it is only at this level of 
logical/Mental analysis of reality that existence could be regarded as a property or a 
categorical accident.
74
 That is, it is only the ‗concept of existence‘, not the ‗reality of 
existence‘, which can be considered as a predicate or an accident of an essence. 
 
According to Sadra, the main confusion of the philosophers, who value essence 
over existence, lies in their consideration of existence only in its conceptual level 
(abstract Being), rather than in its concrete external level. That is to say, they confuse the 
ontological and the epistemological dimensions of reality. If existence is taken in its 
                                                             
73 Kahn notices that Aristotle ―distinguishes in passing between the use of to be in ―Homer is a poet‖ and 
the ―absolute‖ use of the verb in the sentence ―Homer is‖ (in De interpretation 11); and he repeatedly 
distinguishes in Posterior Analytics II between the questions ―What is X‖ and ―Whether x is or not?‖  
Kahn, ―Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy?‖, p.7. 
74 For Aristotle, as Risto Vilkko puts it, ―existence could not serve alone as a predicate term because it 
would have been too broad a term, not restricted to any one category and thus not an essence of anything 
[An. post., B 7, 92b, 13-15]. In this sense, according to Aristotle, existence was not a predicate. However, it 
could be a part of the force of a predicate term.‖ Risto Vilkko, ―Existence, identity, and the algebra of 
logic‖ in Foundations the Formal Sciences: The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences. ed. Löwe 
Benedikt (London: College Publications, 2006), pp. 255-265.  
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conceptual consideration only, Sadra agrees that essence will be prior in principle to 
existence: 
From the mental point of view,[…] the prior factor is essence, because it is a 
universal mental notion which is realized in its deep-seated sense of being in the 
mental realm; it is not obtained [in the mode of being concrete] from existence, 
except in a general and mental concept. Therefore, essence is the principle factor 
in mental propositions but not in the realm external to the mind. This priority in 
this respect is a priority in meaning and essence rather than a priority in 
existence.
75
 
 
At the level of the reality of existence, however, the comparison between the two 
propositions of ―Homer is an existent‖ and ―Homer is a poet‖ is totally different. While in 
the latter proposition Sadra agrees that ―Homer‖ is the subject and ―a poet‖ is the 
predicate, in the former proposition of ―Homer is an existent‖ he completely reverses the 
relationship between the subject and the predicate. For in the latter proposition Sadra 
considers ―existence‖ as the real subject, while ―Homer‖ is but an accident or a predicate 
determining or modifying existence into a particular thing (Homer). For, as Sadra writes,   
The reality of anything is its existence, which ranks with its effects and 
implications. Existence, therefore, must be the most real of [all] things for it is the 
possessor of reality, because whatever possesses reality possesses reality [only] 
due to it. Existence is the reality of anything possessing reality.
76
  
 
At the conceptual level of mental Being, then, existence in its predicative form (X is Y) 
does not necessarily negate ―nothingness‖ but could imply it. Here we can say that 
―Homer is a poet and is not a musician‖ at the same time. We can affirm at the same time 
that Zayd is in the house and is not in the market. We can conceptually affirm that the 
unicorn is an existent, for it exists in the mental Being. Here the reality implied in the 
verb ‗is‘ does not necessarily have a correspondence in the external world. What 
corresponds to ―is‖ remains confined within the conceptual sphere of judgment as 
                                                             
75 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.38. 
76 Ibid., p.10. 
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affirmation or negation. Essences-in-themselves belong to this general ―absence‖ of is-
ness. In contrast to this conceptual view of existence as mental Being and taken from the 
stand point of the reality of existence, the concrete existence of ―Zayd‖ transgresses the 
logical or mental boundaries of the judgment in that it corresponds to the realized 
concreteness of ―Zayd‖ as an existent. This marks a significant difference between the 
subjective, logical realm of essences as mental Being, on one hand, and the objective, 
external realm of the reality of existence, on the other hand. From the standpoint of the 
reality of existence, the subjective realm of the mental Being/essences could be an 
ontological realm of contradictions and impossibilities, for we can posit in our mind even 
what is really impossible and contradictory e.g., a square circle. On the other hand, the 
reality of existence is necessarily an ontological realm of consistencies and actualities.  
Sadra builds his metaphysics around the privileging of presence over absence. 
However, his metaphysics of presence is not of pure presence of essences or pure 
presence of existence—which becomes, among other kinds of presence, the target of 
critique for the western deconstructive thinkers
77—but of concrete presence of existence. 
Let us clarify this point more in light of Sadra‘s distinction between (the concept of 
existence) and (the reality of existence). 
                                                             
77 Examples of these thinkers are Heidegger and Derrida. In his critique of the metaphysics of pure 
presence, Derrida writes, ―The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these 
metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix […] is the determination of being as presence in all the senses of this 
word. It would be possible to show that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center 
have always designated the constant of a presence—eidos, arché, telos, energia, ousia, aletheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth.‖ Jacques Derrida, ―Structure, 
Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences‖ in Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of 
Criticism & the Sciences of Man (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 249. It is 
possible that even Sadra‘s account of presence could be included within the target of Derrida‘s critique. But 
I want to differentiate Sadra‘s existential presence from the essential presence of western metaphysics 
which is the main target of destructive thinkers.  
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As we have seen earlier, the distinction between essence and existence is only 
conceptual, in our experience. In the external world, however, existence and essence are 
identical and there is no real distinction between them:
78
   
If it is affirmed that the existence of every contingent is identical with its essence 
in the determined [realm], then either there is or there is not a difference between 
them in meaning and conception. The latter is invalid, because it implies that 
―man,‖ for example, and ―existence‖ would be synonymous utterances, and our 
saying ―man [is] man‖ would be the same, and it would be impossible to imagine 
one of them while disregarding the other.
79
 
 
But this conceptual distinction between essence and existence means that existence is 
also taken as a concept. Sadra agrees that existence could be viewed as a concept in in the 
logical analysis of mental Being, but he criticizes his philosophical Islamic predecessors, 
who could not think of existence outside of its conceptual dimension. In contrast to his 
predecessors, Sadra stresses the reality of existence over the concept of existence. While 
the latter can be reconciled with Aristotle‘s universal categorical scheme of 
substance/Being/essence, the former cannot.  For Sadra, the conceptual level of existence 
is similar to that of essence; both are situated within the static and univocal realm of 
mental Being rather than the dynamic and equivocal realm of the reality of existence.   
Let us analyze more what Sadra means by the distinction of the concept of 
existence and the reality of existence. An object has its ontological status of mental 
Being/essence as long as it is possible to be conceived. By means of this epistemological 
act, an external object can be conceptually transformed from the ontological status of the 
reality of existence to another ontological status of mental Being/essence—from its 
                                                             
78 Sadra‘s doctrine of the conceptual, rather than the real, distinction between essence and existence is 
significant in terms of Heidegger‘s preference of Suarez‘s conceptual distinction between essence and 
existence and his critique of Aquinas‘s real distinction between essence and existence. For more on 
Heidegger‘s view of the distinction between essence and existence see: John D. Caputo, Heidegger and 
Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp.64-72. 
79 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.36.  
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concrete level to its abstract level. But this conceptual transformation of a present 
existent/object does not reflect the inner reality of this object because it cannot transform 
it ontologically but only epistemologically. It is only the representation of an existential 
object that is in the mind of the subject, and not the object itself. It is true that the object 
has now another ontological status of mental Being but this is different from its 
ontological status as concrete existence. For Sadra, the former is reflected as the concept 
of existence, while the latter is the reality of existence.   
Although the concept of essence and the concept of existence are now both 
considered within the abstract level of knowledge, there is a difference between them. 
Unlike the concept of essence, which is complex because it is combined from genus and 
differentia, the concept of existence is simple, self-evident, and cannot be deduced from 
an ultimate concept. It is conceptually the most apparent presence to the degree in which 
the concept of existence is by no means definable.
80
 This primary concept of existence 
demands no intermediary. As Sadra himself says, ―its understanding cannot be supplied 
by anything more manifest and prevalent than it.‖81 He emphasizes this unique, 
distinguished feature of the concept of existence: 
It is a mistake to attempt to describe existence, for it would need to be described 
by something more hidden than the [entity] itself—unless the aim were to 
[approach it by] either an indication or an ostensive notification, or some 
description; the latter is merely a syntactical [lit. linguistic inquiry].
82
  
 
The difference between the concept of existence, which is now correlated with the 
mental Being/essence located epistemologically in the mind of the subject, and the reality 
of existence, which reflects the concrete presence of an existent/object, is crucial in 
                                                             
80 See: Sadra, Asfar, vol.1, p.53. 
81 Ibid., p.6.  
82 Ibid., p.7. 
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Sadra‘s metaphysics of Truth. What we are now dealing with is a single term ―wujud,” 
but taken in two different degrees of precision: the abstract level and the concrete level. 
The former level implies all kinds of concepts including the concept of existence. The 
latter level stands exclusively as an ontological realm for the reality of existence. So, 
although the concept of existence is not the same as the concept of essence, both are now 
situated within the same realm of the abstract mental Being of the subject/knower. As a 
result, neither the concept of existence nor the concept of essence, but only the reality of 
existence is what can account for the present objectivity of the concrete existence. Now, 
if Truth, as Sadra thinks, consists within the very objectivity of existence rather than the  
mental Being of the subjectivity of concepts, then it must correspond neither to the 
concept of existence, nor to the concept of essence, but solely to the reality of existence. 
 This sharp distinction between the concept and reality of existence will result in 
the exclusion of any conceptual universal— whether it be essence, form, species, or 
genus—from being the true correspondence of reality. Any knowledge obtained through 
a formal or conceptual mediation cannot grasp the reality of an object:
83
  
All notions which arise from [our experience of] the external world and are fully 
grasped by the mind, their essences are preserved [in the mind] even though the 
mode of their existence changes [in the mind]. But since the very nature of 
existence is that it is outside the mind and everything whose very nature it is to be 
outside the mind can never possibly come into the mind—or else, its nature will 
be completely transformed—hence, existence can never be [conceptually] known 
by any mind.
84
 
 
Accordingly, neither the concept of essence nor the concept of existence can grasp the 
reality of existence. For there is no correspondence between the nature of the reality of 
existence, which always in a state of substantial change, and the nature of the concepts of 
                                                             
83 For more on this kind of knowledge which Sadra calls the knowledge by the mediation of conceptual 
forms ―Al-‗iIm al-husuli‖, literally means ‗acquisition‘, see Hejazi, Knowledge by Presence, p.49. 
84 Sadra, Asfar, vol.1, in Rahman‘s The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.28. 
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essence and existence, which are in a state of static fixity. In so far as the reality of 
existence is in a state of unfolding, the corresponding knowledge must be also in a state 
of unfolding. That is, the unfolding of existence must be identical to the unfolding of 
knowledge. This can happen when we consider knowledge not as something 
distinguished from existence, but as a mode of existence.  
The Univocity of (The Concept of Existence and The Concept of Essence/The 
Mental Being/) and the Equivocity of (The Reality of Existence)  
We have seen how Sadra‘s distinction between the conceptual order of mental 
Being and the reality of existence allows the possibility of contradiction in the subjective 
realm of mental Being. The human faculty of imagination, which is highly estimated in 
Sadra‘s metaphysics and which is considered to be immortal, creates absolute possibility 
of mental entities within the world of mental Being.
85
 As a result, the conceptual realm of 
mental Being admits an infinite number of mental entities, possible and impossible, 
fictional and real.  
The metaphysical circle of the concept of existence as mental Being becomes 
more extensive in that it includes within it even what is impossible and chimerical. The 
metaphysical circle of the reality of existence, on the other hand, becomes less extensive 
but more intensive in that it includes within it only what is actually realized, unique, 
individualistic, and concrete. The conceptual realm of existence as the mental Being of 
concepts, universals, and essences is static and fixed.
 
 That is, all the conceptual entities 
within the mental Being share the same degree of existence. The difference between them 
                                                             
85  For more on the important role of the human faculty of imagination in Sadra‘s metaphysics see: Zailan 
Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason in the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, pp.105-116. See 
also: Fazlur Rahman, Dream, Imagination and 'Alam al-Mithal,' Islamic Studies, Vol.3, No.2, (June 1964): 
171. 
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is only difference in terms of their meanings not in terms of their existence. Existence in 
the mental Being, i.e., the concept of existence, is applied univocally whether one is 
talking about God, a man, or a unicorn. In contrast, the realm of the reality of existences 
is differential and dynamic. The reality of existence that admits degrees of power and 
perfection is applied equivocally and not univocally to the existences. In this equivocal 
picture of the reality of existence there are those existences which are more powerful and 
perfect and those who are less. An accident, for example, is less perfect than its substance 
on the real level of existence. The most powerful and perfect existence is the Absolute 
existence. The other existences are but His manifestations, attributes, names, and 
modifications. These existences are related to the Absolute by the mediation of the 
Extended existence, as we have seen. 
Sadra and Kant on the Knowledge of the Thing-in-itself 
Sadra is proud that he is the first philosopher to become aware of the difference 
between the concept of existence, on one hand, and the reality of existence, on the other 
hand.
86
 To make modern sense of this claim, let us compare it with the Kantian duality of 
phenomenon and noumenon.  
The Kantian phenomenon and the Sadrian concept of existence are both located in 
the mind. On the other hand, the Kantian noumenon is similar to the Sadrian reality of 
existence in that both are outside the mind. For Kant, appearances, or phenomena, are 
transcendentally ideal objects because they exist only in the mind according to epistemic 
conditions, and for this reason they are knowable. Things-in-themselves, on the other 
hand, are transcendentally real objects existing outside us because they are not subject to 
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the epistemic conditions, and for this reason they are unknowable.
87
 Sadra also argues 
intensively throughout his writings that the reality of existence cannot be captured by any 
understanding or rational reasoning.
88
 He also would have agreed with Kant that this 
inner reality of existence can be knowable only through a very peculiar kind of intuition. 
But while Kant argues that ―such an intuition, namely intellectual intuition, lies 
absolutely outside our faculty of cognition,‖89 Sadra believes that such an intuition is 
possible.
90
  
The difference between Kant and Sadra in terms of the unknowability of the real 
is related to their different understandings of ―existence‖. Kant, in his critique of the 
ontological proof of God, asserts that existence is not ―a real predicate, i.e., a concept of 
something that could add to the concept of a thing.  It is merely the positing of a thing or 
of certain determinations in themselves.‖91 Sadra in his philosophical career faced this 
issue of the predictability of existence, which the Islamic prominent essentialist Al-
Suhrawardi had raised as an argument for the principality of essence over existence. To 
make sense of this point in relation to my discussion it is sufficient to quote Rahman‘s 
description of this argument:  
Al-Suhrawardi further argued that if existence were a constituent of external 
reality, then existence will have to exist and this second existence will, in turn, 
have to exist, and so on ad infinitum…. He then enunciated a general principle 
                                                             
87 See: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A239/B 298.  
88 Sadra, Asfar,vol.1 p.63. 
89Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, B308.  
90 In the Islamic tradition of Sufism, this kind of intuition consists of two spiritual movements called Fana 
and Baqa which literally mean ―annihilation‖ and ―survival‖ respectively. In the spiritual experience of 
annihilation, knowing subject cleans his mind from its relations with anything other than the absolute 
reality. The knowing subject must reach the stage of ―the annihilation of annihilation‖ in which his 
consciousness of his own annihilation disappears from his consciousness. Thshihiko Izutsu, who is scholar 
in both Islamic and Buddhist studies, writes that ―this experience would correspond to a spiritual event 
which is known in Zen Buddhism as the mind-and-body-dropping-off (shin jin datsu raku).‖ Thshihiko 
Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence, p.16.  
91 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A598/B626, p. 567.  
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that every general concept (like existence, unity, necessity, contingency, etc.) 
whose nature is such that, if a corresponding factor or form is assumed to exist in 
external reality, this will lead to an infinite regress, must exist only in the mind 
and not in external reality. What these arguments really prove is that existence is 
not an extra factor or attribute in external reality but merely denotes a status of 
being more or less in Kantian terms.
92
  
 
Against this Kantian status of being which operates by an abstract notion of existence 
which eventually leads him to consider it as an empty concept, Sadra defends the realistic 
side of existence which lies in its realized concreteness. Taken as a concept, Sadra would 
agree with Kant, as he agrees with Al-Suhrawardi, that existence is just an analytic 
concept that does not add any new conceptual knowledge to what is already known. But 
this view is only a one-sided view of existence. In contrast to this Kantian abstracted 
notion of existence which results in viewing existence as an object without any content 
whatsoever, Sadra looks to existence as the full content of every reality. Viewed from this 
perspective, existence is completely synthetic, for it is the determination of the thing in 
itself by which it gains its uniqueness. Existence –as a reality, and not just as a concept—
accordingly, does not only signify the ―positing‖ of a thing, as Kant insists, but also 
constitutes its unique determination. Existence as a reality becomes the sole differentia by 
which things are distinguished and individuated, as it will become clear when I discuss 
individuation as a mode of existence.  As a result, the present concreteness of existence is 
the rich reality of Truth.  
So, while the real cannot be captured by reason, it can be captured by an unusual 
kind of cognition. The technical terms Sadra gives to this kind of cognition are: 
―presence‖ (hudur), ―inner witnessing‖ (shuhud), ―tasting‖ (dhawq), or ―illumination‖ 
(ishraq). As Izutsu puts it, this mode of cognition 
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in the view of Mulla Sadra, consists precisely in knowing ‗existence‘ through the 
―unification of the knower and the known‖ , i.e., knowing ―existence‖ not from 
the outside as an ―object‖ of knowledge, but from the inside, by man‘s becoming 
or rather being ―existence‖ itself, that is, by man‘s self-realization.93 
 
In order to grasp the reality of existence, we need another kind of cognition that could 
overcome not only the epistemological but also the ontological gap between the subject 
and the object, a cognition that is peculiar to the reality of existence itself. Sadra writes, 
―The knowledge of the reality of existence cannot be except through the illuminative 
presence and an intuition of the [immediate] determined [reality].‖94  Here Sadra argues 
in favor of a special kind of intuitional immediacy in which the knower/subject, 
known/object, and the knowledge are existentially unified.
95
  
In order to grasp this kind of unification between the knower and the known, the 
object of knowledge must be considered in another appropriate mode. Here comes what I 
consider the turning point in the relationship between ontology and epistemology in 
Sadra‘s metaphysics. The highest object of knowledge that can reveal the truth of reality 
is no longer essences or abstract universals— as it is the case with the traditional views of 
Plato and Aristotle. If, as Sadra says, ―the reality of anything is its existence, which ranks 
with its effects and implications,‖96 then, the true object of knowledge is nothing else but 
existence in its own realization as an existent in itself. Sadra affirms that ―existence is [in 
itself] existent.‖97 It is important to note here that, for Sadra, ―existence in itself‖ as ―an 
existent‖ is different from other existents, 
                                                             
93 Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence, p.10. 
94 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.30.  
95 See: Hejazi, Knowledge by Presence, p. 18.  
96 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.10. 
97 Ibid., p.25. 
 35 
 
for its [ontic status] as the possessor of reality is not in need of any other reality. It 
is determined due to its inner-reality. Other entities—namely essences—are 
determined due to it and not due their own inner-natures.
98
  
 
Thus, the absolute identity between the subject and the object can be perfectly 
performed only if the object of knowledge is ―existence‖ and not ―essence‖. This point 
forms a break with the metaphysical tendency of the traditional views of Plato and 
Aristotle, which consider essence as the real object of knowledge.  It also marks a 
significant difference with Hegel‘s Absolute Knowing, as I will argue in the later 
chapters.  
Rather than identifying the true knowledge with the concept of essence or with 
the concept of existence, Sadra thus identifies it with the reality of existence. For him, as 
far as the reality of existence negates ―nothingness‖, knowledge negates ―ignorance‖. 
This process goes side by side. The more we epistemologically negate ―ignorance‖ the 
more we ontologically negate ―nothingness‖ and, hence, the more we intensify our mode 
of existence.  
Let us view the problem within the limit of the traditional views of Plato and 
Aristotle, which introduce the logical realm of essences as static and unchangeable. 
Against such views which take the static feature of essences as a criterion of Truth, Sadra 
argues that it is exactly this feature that makes essences equivalent to ―nothingness‖, and 
it is exactly this claimed feature that constitutes the factor of contradiction internal to the 
logic of essence. Concrete existence, on the other hand, is dynamic life. It is this ever-
vital dynamicity of existence that negates ―nothingness‖ and makes contradiction 
impossible in the extra-mental reality and thus gives to existence its consistency. 
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The Philosophical Appropriation of the Theological Conception of Creation
99
 
The theological conception of ―creation‖ requires that the world must exist out of 
―nothing‖. Sadra‘s theological sense of the reality of ―existence‖ reflects the conceptual 
emergence of ―essences‖ from ―nothingness‖ to their ontological status as ―mental 
Being‖ in the human mind. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that, for Sadra, the cognizing 
soul creates from within itself all kinds of knowledge. The sensible, imaginable, and 
intellectual forms of existence are related to the knowing subject as its acts. For Sadra, 
the creative relationship between the cognizing soul and its own cognitive forms 
resembles the creative relationship between God and the contingent world. For the 
contingent world is related to God as His acts. In this regard, Rahman writes,  
For just as God is Pure and Simple Existence, the Absolute Existence, the 
Absolute Mind and all other existents are related to Him, thanks to the ―unfolding 
existence [extended existence/ wujud munbasit)‖ at different levels—which 
constitute a systematically ambiguous world of existence of identity-in-
differences, at the same time generating a semi-real realm of essences—so the 
soul gives rise, thanks to the unfolding knowledge (which is a perfect analogue of 
the ―unfolding existence‖ of God) to different levels of knowables—of 
perception, imagination, estimation, and intellection—as systematically 
ambiguous knowables which are, in a sense, different and in a sense identical.
100
 
 
The metaphysic of creation is reconciled with a philosophical theory of reality by 
the mediation of the substantial motion of the unfolding existence or the Extended 
existence. It is by virtue of this dynamic changeability of existence that essences emerge 
in the mind as subjectivity; otherwise, they will stay forever in their ―nothingness‖: 
They [i.e., essences], so long as they remain un-illuminated by the light of 
existence, are not something to which the mind can point by saying whether they 
exist or not….They eternally remain in their native concealment and their original 
                                                             
99 In this regard, Khan says, ―My general view of the historical development [of the concept of existence] is 
that existence in the modern sense becomes a central concept in philosophy only in the period when Greek 
ontology is radically revised in the light of a metaphysic of creation.‖ Kahn, ―Why Existence Does Not 
Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy‖, p. 7. 
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state of non-existence. They (essences) cannot be said to be or not to be—neither 
do they create, nor are they objects of creation [the objects of creation being the 
contingent existences, not essences]…. [Contingent] existences, on the other 
hand, are pure relations [to absolute existence]; the mind cannot point to them 
either when they are considered out of relation with their sustaining Creator, since 
these have no existence independently [of God]. However, in themselves [unlike 
essences], these [contingent] existences are concrete realities, uninfected by the 
indeterminacy [of essences], pure existences without [the admixture] of essences 
and simple lights without any darkness.
101
 
 
Sadra here refers to the un-creativity of essences in the realm of the reality of existence, 
not in the mental realm of existence/ mental Being.  The un-creativity of essences in the 
existential real level makes them no longer entities that exist in their own transcendental 
realm, nor are they real distinct entities immanent in things. Essences are created only by 
the cognizant soul, and they merely have the ontological status of mental Being. What are 
there to be found in the reality of existence are ―concrete realties,‖ as Sadra says above.  
But we should refer here to a kind of inconsistency in Sadra‘s view of essences, 
contingent existents, and Absolute existence. For although the contingent existences are 
different from essences in that they are concrete realities, they do not enjoy their own 
reality out of their relation to the Absolute existence. They are pure relations to God, as 
Sadra says. Creation—whether on the conceptual level of mental Being, or on the 
concrete level of the reality of existence—is viewed within the substantial motion of the 
Extended existence.
 102
But the Extended existence, as we have seen, emerges from the 
Absolute existence as its first manifestation and simultaneously includes the Relative 
existence within it. That is, multiplicity and unity are reflected in the absolute substantial 
                                                             
101 Sadra, Asfar, I, in Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p.22.  
102For Sadra, ―time‖ is another existential dimension of the contingent existences added to their magnitude 
dimensions. Sadra regards ―time‖ as the fourth dimension of existents rather than a measurement of their 
motion in the Aristotelian sense: ―Time is related to the physical nature (or form) in respect of its time-
dimension just as spatial magnitude is related to the bodily nature (or form) in respect of its space-
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motion of the Extended existence, which produces the multiplicity in its pure illuminative 
relation to the Absolute. Hence all the various manifestations of existence are pure 
relations to the Absolute Existence, with no self-subsistence of their own.
103
  
Individuation as A Mode of Existence 
The Islamic traditional view of the Platonic dualism of (real essences/apparent 
existences) is substituted by the Sadrian dualism of (conceptual essences /concrete 
existences). What is considered really real in the traditional Platonic sense becomes in 
Sadra‘s account of reality merely mental Being deprived of any concrete effects, while 
what is considered mere appearance in the traditional Platonic sense becomes determinate 
manifestations of the reality of existence in Sadra‘s metaphysics. 
As for the Aristotelian duality of matter/form, Sadra reinterprets it in light of the 
Aristotelian duality of genus/differentia. An overturning of the latter duality involves an 
overturning of the former duality. The priority of differentia over genus, in terms of the 
determination of reality, would reflect the priority of existence over essence. Sadra‘s 
centrality on the primacy of the reality of existence does not accept genus or the common 
nature of existents to be the main determination of individuality. He writes, 
A particular individual must have something more than the common nature of 
which it partakes and this additional factor must be a factor peculiar by its inner-
reality, which is inconceivable as the result of the mere multiplicity of notions.
104
  
  
The decisive point here consists in Sadra‘s equation of differentia with existence. He 
asserts that ―individuation is identical with existence.‖105 In another place he says, “The 
                                                             
103 I agree with Toshihiko Izutsu‘s comment on Sadra‘s use of the word ―relation‖. Izutsu writes, ―The 
world ‗relation‘ (idafah) should not be take in the sense of an ordinary relation subsisting between two 
terms each of which is conceived as a self-subsistent entity. For in this particular context, ‗relation‘ means 
‗illuminative relation‘ (idafa ishraqiyyah). That is to say, the things of the empirical world are established 
as partial realities only through the illuminative or self-manifesting act of the one absolute Reality.‖ Izutsu, 
The Concept and Reality of Existence, pp.70-71.  
104 Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, p.17. 
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existence of everything is equal to its individuation and its individuation is equal to its 
existence. And that which gives it existence gives it its individuation, too.‖106  Hence, 
there is no other meaning for existence except these conditions of which a particular 
individual becomes existentially distinguished and unique. Existence, taken as a realized 
reality and not as a concept, is the principal of differentia because, as Sadra says, ―all 
other entities are individuated due to it, each realized entity is realized due to it, and each 
determinate and specified entity is determined due to it.‖107 The overturning of the 
ontological principality of essence, therefore, releases differentia from being limited only 
within what Aristotle considers as a secondary substance. 
For Sadra, the relationship between genus and differentia in Aristotle is related to 
the relationship between form and matter. Both of these relationships, Sadra thinks, find 
their origin in the Aristotelian categorical scheme of Being/Substance.
108
 Sadra‘s main 
goal is to liberate differentia from the universal subsuming of genera in the Aristotelian 
categorical scheme of Being/Substance. Rethinking substance, for Sadra, means 
rethinking the whole Aristotelian theory of Being. He notices that, although Aristotle 
introduces his account of reality, in contrast to Plato, as a philosophy of individual 
substances, Aristotle still operates within a philosophy of species, since what is mostly 
real in substance is nothing else but its universal form which, at the end, is a kind of 
essence. Sadra says, 
The substance, quality and the other categories are kinds of essence, and there are 
universal meanings which are called genus, species, being essential and being 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
105 Ibid., p.49. 
106 Sadra, Divine Manifestations, trans. Fael Asadi Amjad & Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi (London: ICAS Press, 
2010), p.33. 
107 Ibid., p.10. 
108 For more on how Sadra interprets the relationship between genus/differentia and matter/form in 
Aristotle See: Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, pp.49-52. 
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accidental. But, in contrast, the realities which exist are concrete determined 
inner-natures and specific inner-realities, which cannot be included in the classes 
under a universal, be it that of inner-reality or accident. Substance, for example, is 
a universal essence, whose truth in the external concrete realm is not to be in a 
subject. Quality is a universal; its ontic status of reality is a universal reality, 
whose truth in the external realm of concrete existence is not to be receptive either 
of division or of relation. Similarly it is the case for the other categories.
109
 
 
I take this passage as a clear break with the Aristotelian categorical scheme of reality 
within which Being/substance is limited.
110
 Here we see how the collapse of substance as 
a universal essence results in the collapse of the other categories. By asserting that 
Aristotle‘s substance is a kind of a universal essence, just like the other accidental 
categories, Sadra exposes Aristotle‘s metaphysical essentialism of Truth. The ―concrete 
determined inner-nature‖ of the present existence refuses to be subsumed under any kind 
of universality.  
Sadra‘s displacement of essence from the differential dynamic realm of the reality 
of existence to the identical static realm of the mental Being prevents essence from being 
the main principle of Truth. That is, essence in its static ontological state of mental Being 
cannot grasp the inner dynamic nature of the differential realm of existence. The 
intensive differential element of the reality of existence, which is not reducible to any 
type of universality but demands its own uniqueness at the equivocal level of the realized 
existence, and not at the univocal level of the mental Being, is Sadra‘s account of 
individuation. The abstract universal of mental Being that results in essences, therefore, 
cannot capture this unique existential mode of an individual. Essence as a universal can 
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side only with this static univocity of mental Being, and, for this reason, it cannot grasp 
the dynamic nature of existence.  
Sadra‘s metaphysical vision of one simple reality of existence refuses the Islamic 
Platonic duality of Being/Becoming as well as the Islamic Aristotelian duality of 
substance/accident. In contrast to two distinct realms, Sadra‘s metaphysics introduces 
only the simple Truth of the concrete perpetual unfolding of existences—in which any 
change that happens in accident is necessitated by a previous change in substance itself. 
Accordingly, essences of any kind—whether they are Platonic Ideas, or Aristotelian 
forms, are not sufficient to be the real correspondence of reality. Against the Platonic 
traditional views of truthful unchangeable essences, and against the Aristotelian 
traditional views of truthful unmoved substantial forms, Sadra introduces the truthful 
ever-unfolding of concrete existences. And, as Sadra says,  
The truth of existence is the actuality and the realization of existence itself not in 
an abstract sense, as all previous philosophers thought, but in the sense that 
existence is itself the truth of realization. And for those who do not attach for 
existence any truth other than this abstract concept, it is difficult for them to 
consider existence as pure good.
111
 
 
*** 
 
Having elaborated Sadra‘s metaphysis of existence and essence, we must now 
point to the main problem with it. This problem is related to the tension between monism 
and pluralism in his metaphysics.  Let us view the problem in this question: does Sadra‘s 
view of one simple reality with its two univocal and equivocal dimensions break with the 
one-sided view of monism and the one-sided view of pluralism? 
 Against the view of reality as monism, in which distinct substances lose their 
own realties in one univocal substance, and against pluralism in which distinct substances 
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are considered only in their plurality, Sadra wants his metaphysics to be like a synthesis 
of the abstract static univocity of the concept of existence, on the one hand, and the 
dynamic concrete equivocity of the reality of existence, on the other hand. Sadra warns 
his readers, 
Be not like those who are committed the effeminacy of pure immanence or the 
enunchism of mechanically combining both, like a Janus-faced object, but be in 
your belief like the inhabitants of the sanctuaries of the Divine Realm, the lofty 
ones, those who believe that existence by its very nature is both unitary and 
diverse, and both in a real sense.
112
  
 
But Sadra‘s synthesis of unity and diversity is not free from inconsistency. On the one 
hand, Sadra considers the reality of existence as the mode of individuation for every 
existent in the Relative realm of existence. This consideration implies that individuals 
have their own realities that make them distinguished as concrete existences. On the other 
hand, Sadra insists that all Relative existents are appearances, manifestations, and mere 
relations to the Absolute existence. This line of thought deprives the individual existents 
from their own realities and makes them just shadows of the Absolute. Sadra‘s attempt to 
synthesize these two different realms by means of the Extended existence is still 
problematic. This principle of synthesis itself results in contradiction that Sadra does not 
resolve. For although Sadra‘s mediation of the Extended existence might save the unity 
of the Absolute from being self-contradictory, it does not save the contradiction within 
the Extended existence itself, which, as a unity, is made to produce multiplicity.  
Sadra shifts the principle of self-development, whereby the Relative existents are 
comprehended by the knowing subject who is relative as well, from the Absolute 
existence to the Extended existence. He thought that by doing so the Absolute would be 
saved in its absolute eternity. The substantial motion of existence neither happens in the 
                                                             
112 Sadra, Asfar, IV, p. 376, in Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 177. 
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Absolute nor in the intellective forms of things which exist in the divine mind. But if 
these intellective forms of the relative existents stay in their ontological absoluteness in 
the divine mind and the relative existents are appearances of them, then we return to kind 
of Platonism.  
It is true that Sadra distinguishes between these intellective forms and essences. 
Under the impact of the reality of existence, essences, as we have seen, exist in the 
knowing subject as his self-creation. The intellective forms, on the other hand, exist in 
the divine mind as his own-creation. The analogy between the Human mind‘s self-
creation of essences and the Divine mind‘s self-creation of intellective forms is striking. 
For if the intellective forms that exist in the Divine mind are the true correspondence of 
the reality of existence, and the essences which exist in the Human mind are just false 
approximations for them, then the process of the unfolding of the knowing subject is 
itself false. 
From Sadra to Hegel: Short Transition 
For Sadra, if the Absolute existence is the realm of Necessity, and the Relative 
existence is the realm of Contingency, the Extended existence is posited as the mediated 
realm of both Contingency and Necessity. The Absolute existence/God is the true Who is 
the beginning/origination and the end/return of the substantial movement of existence, 
yet the Absolute does not change. For Hegel, the true, "is the process of its own 
becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its 
beginning.‖113 For Sadra, the Extended existence, with its infinite ontological 
determinations which constitute the Relative existence, has the Absolute as its end and 
                                                             
113 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology Of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 10. 
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also as its beginning. The Extended existence already presupposes its end as its goal. The 
movement of existence is forward and it never moves backward. For Sadra, 
Every prior form of existence behaves like genus or matter and is swallowed up 
into the concreteness of the posterior from which behaves like differentia or form. 
This movement from the less perfect to the more perfect is, further, uni-
directional and irreversible, for existence never moves backwards.
114
  
 
  But Sadra does not recognize, as Hegel does, that the unfolding truth of reality, 
though it is forward and never backward, is at once circular. The circularity of truth 
demands the dialectic as the driving principle of movement. Nonetheless, Sadra‘s 
philosophy, based on the inner substantial movement of existence as the subject matter of 
knowledge, is in principle dialectical. However, even if dialectic is implied in his 
philosophy, Sadra might not conscious enough of it.  
Hegel could argue—as he does with Plato and Aristotle— that the reason for 
Sadra‘s deficiency in grasping the Notion as dialectical circularity consists in the form by 
which he represented his philosophy, which is still pictorial and not rational and 
systematic enough. This claim will undergo further examination after I show how Hegel 
discovers, in Plato and Aristotle, the implied dialectical relationship of subject/object, on 
the one hand, and Being/essence/existence, on the other hand. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
114 See: Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 36. 
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Chapter Two 
Hegel on Metaphysical Essentialism: The Unlocking of Essence 
 
Philosophy is not somnambulism, but is developed consciousness, and what these heroes 
have done is to bring that which is implicitly rational out of the depths of Mind, where it 
is found at first as substance only, or as inwardly existent, into the light of day, and to 
advance it into consciousness and knowledge. This forms a continuous awakening—
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy.   
Would anyone, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground 
that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit?—Hegel, Logic 
Encyclopaedia,§13 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Hegel‘s Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy is not simply an 
opening to the philosophies with which Hegel deals. In its deep dialectical sense, this 
introduction reflects the main principles of Hegel‘s view of Truth. These principles, as 
Hegel writes, ―are the two principles of Development and of the Concrete.‖115 Their 
significance for his view of Truth is prominent when we see how they speculatively 
rather than abstractly serve as a guide by which Hegel distinguishes, preserves, and 
sublates, what is essential from what is unessential in every philosophy he deals with. 
From the speculative perspective of the movement of thought, these principles are not 
static presuppositions of Truth.  Rather, they are the product of the developmental 
activity of thinking: 
The product of thinking is the thought; thought is, however, still formal; 
somewhat more defined it becomes Notion, and finally Idea is Thought in its 
                                                             
115 G.W.F Hegel. Hegel‟s Lectures on The History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane & Frances H. Simson 
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 20. 
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totality, implicitly and explicitly determined. Thus the Idea, and it alone is 
Truth.
116
 
  
If the Idea alone is Truth, then, ―the aim of Philosophy,‖‘ Hegel adds, 
is to know this one Truth as the immediate source from which all else proceeds, 
both all the laws of nature and all the manifestations of life and consciousness of 
which they are mere reflections, or to lead these laws and manifestations in ways 
apparently contrary, back to that single source, and from that source to 
comprehend them, which is to understand their derivation.
117
 
 
For Hegel, recognizing these elements of Truth in the succession of ―noble minds, 
a gallery of heroes of thought‖118 is a reactivation of their inherent activity. By doing so, 
he delves deeper into what is most fundamental in those ―noble minds‖. His reading of 
Plato and Aristotle pushes in this direction of filtering their philosophical views from the 
abstractions and empty generalities that are imposed upon them in the course of the 
history of philosophy. Hegel‘s aim is to reinstate Plato and Aristotle correctly within the 
context of the concrete development of Truth.  
Within the horizon of the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity, on the one hand, and the dialectical relationship between thought and reality, 
on the other hand, Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato and Aristotle exhibits two interrelated 
ways. The first way exposes the deficiency of some modern philosophies, especially the 
philosophies of intuition, and the philosophies of understanding (Verstand). The second 
way supports some philosophical themes evolving around Hegel‘s appreciation of 
speculation and reason (Vernunft). My task in this chapter is to follow these two ways in 
                                                             
116 Ibid., p. 20. Hegel emphasizes the point that truth is equivalent to the Idea in his Logic: ―The Idea is 
truth in itself and for itself — the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing 
but the notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the exhibition which the notion gives itself in 
the form of external existence, while yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and 
so keeps itself in it." G.W.F Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic: Being Part One of The Encyclopaedia of The 
Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), § 213, p. 
247.   
117 Hegel. Lectures on The History of Philosophy, pp.19-20.  
118 Ibid., p.1. 
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order to grasp their inner dialectical joints. This exposes the mutual relationship between 
subjectivity /objectivity, on the one hand, and essence/ existence, on the other hand, in 
Hegel‘s thought.  
Hegel’s Method of Reading Plato 
 In his presentation of Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel writes, 
 
This philosophy has been differently understood in different periods of time; and 
more than all, because it has been much and roughly handled in modern times by 
those who have either read into it their own crude notions, being unable to 
conceive the spiritual spiritually, or has regarded as the essential and most 
significant element in Plato‘s philosophy that which in reality does not belong to 
Philosophy at all, but only to mode of presentation.
119
  
 
It is clear from this passage how Hegel‘s critique of Plato‘s philosophy is not directed 
merely against Plato himself. Hegel finds reasonable justifications for some deficiencies 
in Plato‘s philosophy related basically to the concrete development of Truth. As Hegel 
says, ―the philosophical culture of Plato, like the general culture of his time, was not yet 
ripe for really scientific work.‖120 However, Hegel discovers in Plato rich philosophical 
content that could be redirected as a critique against those philosophies which satisfy 
themselves only with what is explicit and unessential and could not look deeper into what 
is implicit and essential in Plato‘s philosophy.  
Hegel‘s reading of Plato, then, does not concern itself with what is stated by Plato 
explicitly, but with what is included implicitly.
121
 Hegel dialectally regulates this tension 
between what is implicit and what is explicit in Plato‘s philosophy in a way similar to his 
                                                             
119 Ibid., p. 206. 
120 Ibid., p. 214. 
121 Hegel says, ―In order to gather Plato‘s philosophy from his dialogues, what we have to do is to 
distinguish what belongs to ordinary conception—especially where Plato has resources to myths for the 
presentation of a philosophic idea—from the philosophic idea itself; only then do we know that what 
belongs only to the ordinary conception, as such, does not belong to thought, is not the essential.‖ Ibid., 
p.217. 
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regulation of the two different states of being-in-itself and being-for-itself.
122
 This 
strategy of reading could be viewed as a confirmation of the Hegelian statement which 
states that ―all knowledge, and learning, science, and even commerce have no other 
object than to draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective.‖123 Two 
interrelated results follow from this Hegelian strategy of drawing out what is inward in 
Plato‘s philosophy. Firstly, it liberates many central Platonic themes—related to God,124 
soul,
125
 the theory of recollection, and, most importantly to my discussion, the central 
Platonic theory of Ideas—from their traditional metaphysical dogmatism. Secondly, it 
gives to these same themes a Hegelian phenomenological dimension. 
By making what is implicit in Plato‘s philosophy explicit, Hegel achieves what 
Plato himself could not achieve, and reads into him what modern philosophers could not 
read. This gives the justification of Hegel‘s statement when he demands that ―we must 
stand above Plato.‖126 This standing above Plato, however, cannot be done until we 
―acquaint ourselves with the needs of thoughtful minds in our own time.‖127This means 
nothing other than reading Plato through the lens of speculative logic rather than the lens 
of formal logic.
128
 While the former enables us to discover what is more united and more 
                                                             
122 Hegel writes, ―In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states 
must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia, 
δυναμις); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus, ενεργεια)….The whole variation 
in the development of the world in history is found on this difference.‖ Ibid., p. 21.  
123
 Ibid., p. 22. 
124 Hegel says, ―If, however, it is taken as a philosophic dogma on Plato‘s part that God made the world, 
that higher beings of a spiritual kind exist, and, in the creation of the world, lent God a helping hand, we 
may see that this stands word for word in Plato, and yet it does not belong to his philosophy.‖ Ibid., p.218. 
125  Hegel says, ―When in pictorial fashion he (Plato) says of the soul of man that it has a rational and 
irrational part, this is to be taken only in a general sense; Plato does not thereby make the philosophical 
assertion that the soul is compounded of two kinds of substance, two kinds of thing.‖ Ibid.  
126 Ibid., p. 207. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, does not give specific names to the philosophers 
who read Plato‘s dialectic through the formal logic of understanding. Even when he returns to the same 
point in the final chapter, The Absolute Idea, of his Science of Logic, Hegel speaks in general about those 
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concrete, the latter merely displays what is separated, finite, and unreal in Plato‘s 
philosophy. 
 One of the main achievements of this strategy is to rediscover in Plato‘s 
philosophy not only the apparent negative moment in which Plato‘s dialogues result, but 
also the negation of this negative moment. This strategy of reading, therefore, breaks with 
the strategy of ―formal philosophy,‖ which, as Hegel says, 
cannot look at dialectic in any other way than as being the art of confusing 
ordinary conceptions or even Notions, and demonstrating their nullity, thus 
making their result to be merely negative.
129
 
 
So, if the philosophies of formal logic stop at the negative results of Plato, Hegel‘s 
speculative insight goes a further step to explore the hidden affirmative moment in 
Plato‘s speculative thinking. Accordingly, and as Hegel says, ―it would be perfectly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
who misunderstood Plato‘s real meaning of the dialectic. He writes, ―Dialectic is one of those ancient 
sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular 
philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, just as Thales was 
the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third 
science pertaining to philosophy, namely, dialectic—a service which the ancient world esteemed his 
highest, but which often remains quite overlooked by those who have most to say about him.‖ G.W.F. 
Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 831. Hegel here has in mind 
any philosopher who thinks that Plato‘s dialectic makes a sharp distinction between the intelligible world of 
Universals and the material world of Individuals. He also has in mind the idealist philosophers who in their 
idealistic view of reality remain skeptic about the extra-mental reality. Leibniz and Kant might be among 
those Hegel means. For we know that Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a 
materialist. See: Emily Grosholz, ―Plato and Leibniz against the Materialists‖ in Journal of the History of 
Ideas (Volume 57, Number 2, April 1996), pp. 255-276. And we know that Kant as Idealist remains a 
skeptic about knowing the reality of the thing-in-itself. Kant criticizes Plato by writing: “The light dove, 
parting the air in her easy flight and feeling its resistance, might come to imagine that flight would be easier 
still in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of sense, as setting too narrow limits to our 
understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas and into the empty space of pure 
understanding. He did not notice that he was making no progress by means of these endeavors, because he 
met with no resistance that might serve as a support on which he could rest or against which he could apply 
his power, in order to cause to understanding to advance.‖ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Marcus 
Weigelt (London, Penguin Classics, 2007), A5/B9, p. 42. See further: David A. White, ―Kant on Plato and 
The Metaphysics of Purpose‖ in History of Philosophy Quarterly (volume 10, Number 1, January 1993), 
pp.67-80. Against such formal interpretation of Plato, Hegel understands the Platonic realm of Universals 
as that which does not exclude but includes and sublates the individuals. Gray, in his study on Hegel and 
Greek thought maintains that Hegel in ―the attempt to apply his own logical structure to the understanding 
of the course of Greek thought is responsible for most of the false theories so often lashed by critics.‖ J. 
Glenn Gray, Hegel‟s Hellenic Ideal (New York: King‘s Crown Press, 1941), p 37.  
129 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.248. 
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justifiable to return to Plato in order to learn anew from him the Idea of speculative 
Philosophy.‖130 This returning and learning from the speculative Plato pushes towards 
supporting Hegel‘s attitude concerning the doctrine of Essence provided in his Logic, as 
we will see.  
Hegel‘s division of Plato‘s works mirrors Hegel‘s own division of his 
Encyclopaedia system. Here Hegel‘s first division of Plato‘s works , Dialectic, echoes 
Hegel‘s own first division of Encyclopaedia, Logic, especially when we look at the way 
in which Hegel pushes it in this direction. The other two divisions of Plato‘s works 
correspond to the other two divisions of Hegel‘s Encyclopaedia. These divisions, 
according to Hegel, are Plato‘s Philosophy of Nature,131 and Plato‘s Philosophy of 
Mind,
132
 to each of which Hegel devotes a separate and long treatment.
133
  
Rather than direct my focus onto the many aspects of Plato‘s philosophy upon 
which Hegel applied his speculative reading, I will center my analysis on one main issue 
related to my topic. This issue is concerned with how Hegel interprets the relationship 
between subjectivity and objectivity in the logic of Plato‘s Dialectic.134 I will try to 
investigate whether Hegel‘s Plato is a subjectivist, an objectivist, or, on the other hand, 
advocates the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and how, accordingly, the relationship 
between essence and existence could be interpreted.  
                                                             
130 Ibid., p. 207. 
131 Under this division Hegel considers the Timaeus to be the most significant among Plato‘s dialogues. 
See: Ibid., p.246. For more details on this division, see: Ibid., pp. 268-286.    
132 With regard to this division Hegel says, ―The third is the philosophy of the mind—an ethical 
philosophy—and its representation is essentially that of a perfect state in the Republic.‖ Ibid., p. 246.  For 
more details on this division, see: Ibid., pp. 287-314.  
133
 It is worth noting that Hegel also applies the same method of division to Aristotle‘s works. Ferrarin in 
his study on Hegel and Aristotle writes, ―Hegel presents Aristotle‘s philosophy in the same order as his 
own encyclopaedic system….They clearly correspond not only to Hegel‘s order of treatment but also to his 
intentions as far as the interpretation of the content is concerned.‖ Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 
(UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.55. 
134 Hegel writes, ―The logical Philosophy the ancients called dialectic, and its addition to philosophy is by 
the ancient writers on the subject ascribed to Plato.‖ Ibid., p.245. 
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The Three Dialectical Moments in Hegel’s Platonic Dialectic 
According to his view that the true speculative logic must deal only with the 
necessary movement of pure Notions and should result in an affirmative moment,
135
 
Hegel selects from Plato‘s dialogues only three that could confirm to Hegel‘s speculative 
demand. These dialogues are Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus.
136
 In these 
speculative dialogues, Plato, as Hegel says, 
lays great stress on the dialectical point of view, which is not the point of view of 
the merely external, but is a living point of view whose content is formed of pure 
thoughts only, whose movement consists in their making only their unity in what 
is truly justified. 
137
 
 
Generally speaking, the Hegelian interpretation of these Platonic speculative 
dialogues, on the one hand, and the Hegelian logical Notion, on the other, dialectically 
conclude with the same positive affirmation of the absolute unity of subjectivity 
/objectivity, on the one hand, and thought /reality, on the other.  In his introduction to the 
general notion of Logic in his Science of Logic, Hegel is aware of this affinity between 
his logic and that of Plato. In the context of stressing the Notion of pure logic, Hegel 
writes, 
                                                             
135―We have already remarked by way of preparation that the Notion of true dialectic is to show forth the 
necessary movement of pure Notions, without thereby resolving these into nothing; for the result, simply 
expressed, is that they are this movement, and the universal is just the unity of these opposite Notions.‖ 
Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 246. 
136 Ibid., p. 253. In this regard, Gadamer considers Hegel as ―the discoverer of the truly speculative Platonic 
dialogues, the Sophist, Parmenides, and Philebus, which did not even exist for eighteenth-century 
philosophy and which only because of him were recognized as the real core of Plato‘s philosophy in the 
following period, which lasted until the feeble attempts in the middle 1800s to demonstrate that these works 
were spurious.‖ Hans G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Hermeneutical Studies, Tran. P. Christopher Smith 
(USA: Yale University, 1976), p.7.  
137 Hegel, Lectures On The History of Philosophy, p.255. In his Science of Logic Hegel emphases the same 
point: ―What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a 
base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or 
distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self−consciousness of thought are 
the content and the ultimate truth itself.‖ G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 50. 
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To get some idea of this [pure movement of thought] one must discard the 
prejudice that truth must be something tangible. Such tangibility is, for example, 
imported even into the Platonic Ideas which are in God's thinking, as if they are, 
as it were, existing things but in another world or region; while the world of 
actuality exists outside that region and has a substantial existence distinct from 
those Ideas and only through this distinction  is a substantial reality. The Platonic 
Idea is the universal, or more definitely the Notion of an object; only in its Notion 
does something possess actuality and to the extent that it is distinct from its 
Notion it ceases to be actual and is a non−entity; the side of tangibility and 
sensuous self−externality belongs to this null aspect.138 
 
 Contrary to Plato‘s speculative dialogues, the other Platonic dialogues, which 
Hegel excluded from his speculative selection, contain, in general, the one-sided 
unessential moments of subjectivity and objectivity which could be found in the dialectic 
of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
139
 The resemblance here, however, is 
not to be taken in its perfect form but only in its general spiritual sense related to the 
moment of negation at which the dialectic in both cases arrives. Hegel explains these two 
sides of subjectivity and objectivity in Plato‘s dialectic:  
These first two sides of the dialectic, directed as they are towards the dissolution 
of the particular and thus to the production of the universal, are not yet dialectic in 
its true form: it is a dialectic which Plato has in common with the Sophists, who 
understood very well how to disintegrate the particular. 
140
 
 
The final conclusion of the one-sided dimension of the un-speculative Platonic dialogues 
is similar to the final conclusion of the one-sided dimension of consciousness in 
Phenomenology in that both are not sufficient to grasp the True.
141
 
                                                             
138
 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 50. 
139
  Hegel, in the section of Consciousness of his Phenomenology, considers the moments of Sense-
Certainty and Perception as one-sided unessential moments of objectivity. On the other side, he considers 
Force and the Understanding as one-sided unessential moment of subjectivity. See: Hegel, Phenomenology 
of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.58-104.  
140 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 249. 
141
 At the end of the section of Consciousness in his Phenomenology Hegel finds that the one-sided 
unessential moments of consciousness falls short of grasping the True. Hegel writes, ―In the dialectic of 
sense-certainty, Seeing and Hearing have been lost to consciousness; and, as perception, consciousness has 
arrived at thoughts, which it brings together for the first time in the unconditioned universal. This, now, if it 
were taken as an inert simple essence, would itself in turn be nothing else than the one-sided extreme of 
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Thus the aim of many of Plato‘s Dialogues, which conclude without any positive 
affirmation is to show that the immediately existent, the many things that appear 
to us, although we may have quite true conceptions of them, are still not in 
themselves, in an objective sense, the true, because they alter and are determined 
through their relation to something else and not through themselves; thus we must 
even in the sensuous individuals consider the universal, or what Plato has called 
the Idea.
142
 
 
This reminds us, as Gadamer shows, of the moment of the one-sided principle of sense-
certainty in Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit.143  
Contrary to the philosophers who concern themselves only with the Platonic 
dialogues that conclude without any positive affirmation—whether reflected in the 
subjective side or the objective side of the Platonic dialectic—Hegel grasps Plato‘s 
philosophical depth in the unity of these two sides of the dialectic. This unitary principle 
is inherent in the three mentioned speculative dialogues. For Hegel, it is precisely this 
unitary side of the dialectic which represents the truly speculative Plato. This does not 
mean that the one-sided principles of subjectivity and objectivity are not necessary. 
Rather, they are constitutive in the process of the whole. The point that concerns Hegel 
most is that the dialectic does not stop only at one side of subjectivity or objectivity but 
progresses in its dialectical movement carrying what is essential in these previous 
principles into their sublation moment.  
Hegel‘s progress from Plato‘s un-speculative dialogues to Plato‘s speculative 
dialogues reflects the progress from the stage of understanding to the stage of reason, 
from the stage of differences to the stage of the speculative unity of differences, from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
being-for-self, for it would then be confronted by non-essence; but, if it were related to this, it would itself 
be unessential.‖ Hegel, Phenomenology of Sprit, p 79.    
142 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy. p. 247. 
143
 Gadamer remarks that ―Plato's great accomplishment was in fact that he exposed sense certainty and the 
belief in it as illusion. He thus made thought so sufficient that it might strive to know the truth of reality in 
the pure universality of thought without interference from dense perception.‖ Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, 
p.8.  
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stage of abstractness to the stage of concreteness. The three speculative dialogues, with 
which Hegel‘s reading is mostly concerned, are the most difficult for the formal 
philosophies of understanding, ―just because they deal with pure thought.‖144 In Plato‘s 
speculative dialogues, thought reaches the moment of reason‘s self-dialectical 
movement— not in its relation to the external things, which is the case of understanding,  
but in its relation to the pure notions of thought.  
Thus, Hegel invites us to explore the depth of the Platonic philosophy within the 
concrete sense of the Idea, rather than the abstract sense of the Idea. The former unites 
the different determinations of Truth in a higher identity whereas the latter deals only 
with determinations in their separation and externality. This invitation is in fact an 
invitation to Hegel‘s own view of Truth. In his Introduction to his Lectures, he states it 
clearly: 
It is a common prejudice that the science of Philosophy deals only with 
abstractions and empty generalities…. In itself the Idea is really concrete, for it is 
the union of the different determinations. It is here that reasoned knowledge 
differs from mere knowledge of the understanding, and it is the business of 
Philosophy, as opposed to understanding to show that the Truth or the Idea does 
not consist in empty generalities, but in a universal; and that is within itself the 
particular and the determined.
145
 
    
The speculative universal, therefore, differs from the abstract universal in that it does not 
exclude the particular but includes it. Accordingly, if the Platonic Absolute world of 
essences is the truth of the particular determinate existents, the Absolute must be viewed 
as a concrete universality rather than abstract universality; that is to say, a universality 
which includes existence in an immanent way rather than excludes it in a transcendent 
way.  
                                                             
144 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 253. 
145 Ibid., p. 24. 
 55 
 
The Absolute of Plato, as being the one in itself and identical with itself, is at the 
same time concrete in itself, in that it is a movement returning into itself, and is 
eternally at home with itself.
146
  
 
This ―movement returning into itself‖ makes the ―difference‖ within Plato‘s 
Absolute an immanent difference rather than transcendent difference. That is to say, the 
moment of ―opposition‖ within Plato‘s Absolute is an internal moment of opposition, and 
not an external moment of opposition. The former moment is speculative and exists for 
an internal reflection/reason while the latter is empirical and exists for an external 
reflection/understanding. Hegel thus presents Plato within the speculative horizon of the 
internal reflection of thought in which the Absolute opposes itself and distinguishes itself 
from itself. That is to say, the Absolute determines itself by negating itself; its 
determination is its own negation. Viewed from this perspective, the Absolute, which 
Hegel now discovers in Plato, is a rediscovery of the Absolute that Hegel already 
introduces in his Phenomenology by saying: 
It is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as internal 
difference, or difference in its own self….The two differentiated terms both 
subsist; they are in themselves as opposed, i.e., each is the opposite of itself; each 
has its other within it and they are only one single unity.
147
 
 
Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato‘s dialectic leads, therefore, to the dialectical 
construction of the opposite moments of subjectivity and objectivity. While he is aware 
of the fluid nature of these moments in the Platonic dialectic, Hegel‘s aim is to 
conceptually grasp their internal organic unity within the dialectical movement of 
thought. In order to do so, Hegel does not consider the Platonic dialogues as merely an 
external reproduction of the previous philosophies, but as a unity of what is most 
fundamental in them.  
                                                             
146 Ibid., p. 227. 
147 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 160-161. 
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Plato‘s Dialogues are not to be considered as if their aim were to put forward a 
verity of philosophies, nor as if Plato‘s were an eclectic philosophy derived from 
them; it forms rather the knot in which these abstract and one-sided principles 
have become truly united in a concrete fashion.
148
 
  
These abstract and one-sided principles are the one-sidedness of subjectivity inherited 
from Parmenides, on the one hand, and the one-sidedness of objectivity inherited from 
Heraclitus, on the other hand. For Hegel, the former resembles the logical moment of 
Being, whereas the latter resembles the logical moment of Becoming. The Parmenidean 
Being expresses the static essential side of Truth, while the Heraclitean Becoming 
expresses the dynamic existential side of Truth. These are the two moments of Truth 
which formal philosophies of understanding treat as two separated principles, as two 
opposite moments that could not be united. In contrast, Hegel‘s dialectical interpretation 
of Plato shows that, although these two principles are introduced by Plato expressly and 
separately in many dialogues, which are the ones we have mentioned above,
149
 there is 
still another implicit principle in his dialectic in which these opposite principles are 
indeed united: 
Plato grasped the Absolute as the unity of Being and non-being—in Becoming, as 
Heraclitus says—or of the one and the many. He further now took into the 
objective dialectic of Heraclitus the Eleatic dialectic, which is the external 
endeavour of the subject to show forth contradiction.
150
 
 
Thus, Hegel‘s Platonic dialectic introduces not only two moments but three 
moments; two of them are explicitly stated by Plato and the third is already implicit. The 
two explicit moments are subjectivity and objectivity, and they reflect respectively the 
moments of affirmation and negation. The third moment is the unity of these previous 
                                                             
148 Hegel. Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.210. 
149 Hegel explains, ―The concrete is the unity of diverse determinations and principles; these in order to 
be perfected, in order to come definitely before the consciousness, must first of all be presented separately.‖ 
Ibid., p. 210. 
150 Ibid., p. 251. 
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moments of subjectivity and objectivity. This latter synthetic moment reflects the 
moment of the negation of the negation, the sublation of contradiction. Here we reach the 
summit of the Hegelian interpretation of Plato by which Hegel does not only stand above 
Plato
151
, but also above the modern philosophies of subjective idealism and objective 
idealism, as well as the theological interpretation of Plato. For Hegel, this implied 
moment of sublation in Plato‘s dialectic is exactly what the Platonic Universal means, 
and it is exactly this moment which formal philosophy could not understand.  He writes, 
The universal is hence determined as that which resolves and has resolved the 
contradictions in itself, and hence it is the concrete in itself; thus this sublation of 
contradiction is the affirmative. Dialectic in this higher sense is the really 
Platonic; as speculative it does not conclude with a negative result, for it 
demonstrates the union of opposites which have annulled themselves. Here begins 
what is difficult for the understanding to grasp.
152
 
 
The important point that concerns my discussion is the notion of the immanency 
of the universal in which the opposites are absorbed. Hegel does not see in Plato a 
transcendent universal that exists beyond the existentiality of the apparent opposites of 
existence. In contrast, Hegel sees in Plato the immanent universal that has within it its 
own resolved contradictions. This leads me to a disagreement with Gadamer who argues 
that Hegel‘s reading of Plato  
relies far more upon the principles of the Cartesian method, on the learning of the 
Catechism, and on the Bible. Thus Hegel‘s admiration for the Ancients is 
intertwined in a curious way with his feeling that modern truth shaped by 
Christianity and its renewal in the Reformation is superior.
153
  
 
                                                             
151
 Hegel thinks that he stands above the wrong interpretations of Plato and reveals Plato‘s real meaning, 
but he also thinks that he stands above Plato himself. For he reveals the real Plato in more thoughtful and 
systematic way than Plato himself does. For Hegel, some of Plato‘s deficiencies are simply a function of 
the time in history in which Plato lived (e.g., his use of myths, which I discuss later on in this chapter). 
152 Ibid., p.249.  
153 Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Hermeneutical Studies, p.7. 
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In contrast to Gadamer‘s view, it is of this Cartesian principle of subjectivity guided by 
the knowledge of understanding, as well as of this Christian dogma of a transcendent 
world guided by intuitive knowledge,
154
 which Hegel finds the true speculative Plato to 
be free, or at least, Hegel tries to free Plato from it. The difficulty that Hegel mentions in 
the above passage refers to the insufficiency of the philosophies of understanding which 
operate within the sphere of abstract essence, including that of Descartes. Within this 
sphere of abstract essence, knowledge stops merely at the level of separation, at the level 
of contradiction, at the level of duality. It cannot go a further step as to unite these 
opposite determinations. That is to say, the abstract knowledge of understanding 
produces formal universals which cannot move beyond the limitation of essence 
governed by the abstract law of non-contradiction. It cannot solve the contradiction since 
it will violate its abstract law of identity. The result is the production of abstract or empty 
absolute—a God which is void from the richness of reality.  
 Hegel warns his readers of the deficiency of this one-sidedness of thought right 
from the beginning of his introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy: 
Were the Idea abstract, it would simply be the highest conceivable existence, and 
that would be all that could be said of it; but such a God is the product of the 
understanding of modern times. What is true is rather found in motion, in a 
process, however, in which there is rest; difference, while it lasts, is but a 
temporary condition, through which comes unity, full and concrete.
155
 
  
The dismissing of the internal relations between objects and the focus on the externality 
alone cannot reveal the inner truth of an object.  Hegel‘s Platonic dialectic sublates this 
                                                             
154 In this regard, Hyppolite says, ―Theology was realizing the intelligible beyond intelligence. Hegelian 
logic recognizes neither the thing-in-itself nor the intelligible world. The absolute is not thought anywhere 
else than in the phenomenal world.‖ Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor & Amit 
Sen (New York: Sate University of New York Press, 1997), p.58.  
155 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.25. 
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moment of externality by recognizing interiority as a constitutive principle in the reality 
of the Idea.  
The insufficiency of the one-sided principle of subjectivity is not found in Plato‘s 
dialectic and this why Hegel asserts that 
the idealism of Plato must not be thought of as being subjective idealism, and as 
that false idealism which has made its appearance in modern times, and which 
maintains that we do not learn anything, are not influenced from without, but that 
all conceptions are derived from out of the subject.
156
 
 
This passage implies an attack on the innate ideas of the Cartesian subjectivity, of which 
the idea of abstract God is substantial. And Hegel clearly refuses to attribute the notion of 
the innate ideas to Plato‘s theory of recollection: 
We must not think that the bald conception of innate ideas is hereby indicated—
such an expression implies the existence of ideas by nature, as though our 
thoughts were in part already implanted, and had in part a natural existence which 
did not first produce itself through the movement of the mind.
157
 
 
Subjectivity and objectivity in Hegel‘s Plato are just immanent moments of the 
development of the universal, which needs more determination to become more concrete. 
The speculative moment of Truth cannot be achieved until the previous moments of 
subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality, essence and existence, are sublated to a 
higher moment in which the contradictions are dissolved.  
The Hegelian Refreshment of the Platonic World of Essences 
The subjective principle of Truth in Hegel‘s Plato is, therefore, neither that of 
Parmenides nor that of the false subjective idealism. The Platonic subjectivity does not 
reflect only the universal static side of essence. Nor does it dismiss the objective side of 
                                                             
156 Ibid., p. 240. 
157 Ibid., p. 227. 
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existence reflected in the sensible world. Nor is the Platonic objectivity that of Heraclitus 
or the objective idealism, in which the dialectical role of subjectivity is absent. For Hegel, 
Plato‘s highest form is the identity of Being and non-being. The true is that which 
is, but this Being is not without negation. Plato‘s object is thus to show that non- 
being is an essential determination in Being, and that the simple, self-identical, 
partakes of other-being.
158
  
 
If Plato‘s object, as Hegel now says, is ―to show that non-being is an essential 
determination in Being, and that the simple, self-identical, partakes of other-being,‖ then 
Hyppolite seems mistaken when he asserts that  
Platonic alterity allows for an immobile dialectic, a dialectic that still does not 
have the self for its driving force. Hegelian dialectic, however, deepens alterity 
into opposition and opposition into contradiction.
159
 
 
But Hegel, as we saw, highlights the moment of negation which already is implicit within 
the conceptual realm of the rational Platonic Universal. It is this internal negation of the 
Platonic Universal which constitutes the determination of the Absolute, and, by way of 
mediation, it constitutes the determination of the particulars. By negating itself, the 
Platonic Universal posits ―difference‖ as an essential element within itself, and, as thus, 
―non-being‖ becomes ―an essential determination in Being‖. This makes the important 
point that negation is both within the external existential world and within the internal 
essential world, in both of which the Absolute is the mediation. By negating itself as a 
transcendent essence, the Absolute posits itself as immanent existence. That is to say, 
both essence and existence contain their own negation by means of the mediation of the 
Absolute. The ontological contradiction of essence parallels the ontological contradiction 
of existence; each of which contains and reflects the other. On the other hand, the 
                                                             
158 Ibid., p. 263. 
159 Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, p.113. 
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epistemological contradiction of subjectivity parallels that of objectivity, each of which 
contains and reflects the other— each of which negates and sublates the other.160  
 If this reading of the Hegelian interpretation of the dialectical movement of 
essence/existence-subjectivity/objectivity truly reflects the really Platonic dialectic, then 
the traditional metaphysical view of the central theory of the Platonic Ideas with its 
implied static essentialism opens up a different dimension. The point here is to oppose 
the dynamicity of the Platonic Universal with the static nature of the formal Universal of 
the philosophies of understanding. Whereas the formal Universal is confined within 
species and within the law of abstract identity, Hegel sees the dynamic unity of 
differences, the dissolution of contradictions, and the true expression of what is 
dialectically more determinate, in the Platonic speculative Universal. And while the 
formal Universal is only concerned with one side of Truth—whether it is the subjective 
or the objective, the essential or the existential—Hegel‘s Platonic Universal is the 
moment in which not only the subjective essential moment of Truth, but also its objective 
existential moment is absorbed and sublated. Hegel writes, 
The Idea is nothing else than that which is known to us more familiarly by the 
name of the Universal, regarded, however, not as the formal Universal, which is 
only a property of things, but as implicitly and explicitly existent, as reality, as 
that which alone is true.… Through the presentation of his Ideas, Plato opened up 
the intellectual world, which, however, is not beyond reality, in another place, but 
is the real world.
161
 
 
                                                             
160
 While it is possible to find examples from Plato‘s dialogues for the contradiction in the external world of 
existence— when existence is regarded as the world of becoming, change, and opinion— it is difficult to 
find clear examples for the contradiction in Plato‘s world of essences. This is exactly what makes Hegel‘s 
reading of Plato look unique in comparison with the common reading of Plato. Hegel‘s discovery of the 
self-rebellion or the contradiction in Plato‘s world of essences is performed by means of applying his 
speculative dialectic on Plato‘s dialogues. Since my dissertation is on how Hegel understands Plato more 
than on what Plato himself says, I prefer to keep the results of my analysis of Hegel‘s Plato without 
confusing them with examples from Plato.    
161 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 226. 
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 To Hegel, therefore, the Platonic world of essences is not a transcendental static 
world that is totally free from contradiction and totally isolated from the objective 
existences of the phenomenal world.  If essence is transcendent in a second world, then it 
cannot be distinguished, and that kind of undistinguishable world, for Hegel, is dead. 
Hegel thus breathes life into the traditional and false views of the Platonic static world of 
essences by stressing the activity of the mutual, dialectical relationships of essence 
/existence, reality/appearance, subject/ object: 
The undistinguished is the lifeless; the active, living, concrete universal is hence 
what inwardly distinguishes itself, but yet remains free in so doing. Now this 
determinateness consists in the one being identical with itself in the other, in the 
many, in what is distinguished. This constitutes the only truth, and the only 
interest for knowledge in what is called Platonic philosophy, and if this is not 
known, the main point of it is not known. 
162
 
 
This passage makes the decisive point:  Plato‘s world of essences inwardly distinguishes 
itself. That is to say, essence includes its negation within itself as a part of its definition 
or determination. Plato‘s essence thus reaches the state of essence in Hegel‘s Logic 
Encyclopaedia, where essence, as Hegel writes, “is negativity relating itself to itself, and 
hence by being self-repulsion from itself; thus it contains the determination of distinction 
essentially.‖163   
With Hegel, the ideal Platonic world of essences is thus no longer a world of 
subjective essences that are totally beyond the objectivity of existence. Essence, as 
speculative universal of reason rather than formal universal of understanding, gets its 
own identity with itself in the particular objective world of existence, ―in the other, in the 
many, in what is distinguished.‖  Hegel‘s Plato is, therefore, far away from being 
                                                             
162 Ibid., p. 264. 
163 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. T. F. 
Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), § 116, p.181. 
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considered as essentialist in the Parmenidean sense or in the subjective idealism sense. 
Nor can it be considered as existentialist in the Heraclitean sense or in the empirical 
objective idealism sense.  Accordingly, the relationship between essences and their 
objective real existence is not merely a relation of separation and opposition, a relation of 
priority and posterity—as the traditional views say. In other words, the relationship 
between essence and existence is not a relation of transcendence, but a relation of 
immanency. It is a dialectical relation of concreteness and development, determination 
and sublation. 
By not confining contradiction  within the objective realm of existence but rather 
making it equally constitute the main element in the subjective realm of essence, Hegel 
radically departs not only from the old traditional interpretation of Plato but also from 
any transcendental ontology.
164
 Having admitted qualitative differences within the 
traditional view of the absoluteness of essence, Hegel discovers in Plato‘s speculative 
philosophy an ontology that breaks with the transcendence, with the beyond, with the 
thing-in-itself.  
This union of what is different, of Being and non-being, of one and many &., 
which takes place without a mere transition from one to another, constitutes the 
inmost reality and true greatness of Platonic philosophy. This determination is the 
esoteric element in Platonic philosophy, and the other is the exoteric.
165
 
 
If Truth in Hegel‘s Plato finds its highest dialectical sense in the unity of differences, in 
the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and in the unity of reality and appearance, it also 
                                                             
164
 If my reading of Hegel‘s Plato does not reflect only Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato but also Hegel‘s own 
account of the immanency of essence with existence, then it agrees with Deleuze‘s review of Hyppolite‘s 
Logic and Existence. Deleuze summarizes Hyppolite‘s Hegel by saying: ―Philosophy must be ontology, it 
cannot be anything else; but there is no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense [….] Thus, 
that there is no second world is, according to Hyppolite, the major proposition of Hegel‘s Logic, because it 
is at the same time the reason for transforming metaphysics into logic, and for the transformation of logic 
into the logic of sense.‖ Gilles Deleuze, ―Review of Jean Hyppolite‘s Logic and Existence‖ in Hyppolite, 
Logic and Existence, pp.191-193.    
165 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, pp. 264-265. 
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finds its highest moment in the unity of essence and existence. ―Essence therefore,‖ as the 
Logic Encyclopaedia concludes, ―is not behind or beyond appearance, but since it is the 
essence that exists, existence is appearance.‖166   
This result, again, disagrees with Hyppolite who says that, ―by admitting 
negation, he (Plato) wanted to avoid falling into contrariety and contradiction. [….] In 
contrast, Hegelian dialectic will push this alterity up to contradiction.‖ 167 According to 
my analysis, the contradiction is already implied in Hegel‘s Plato‘s world of essences. It 
is this Hegelian detection of the contradiction within the Platonic world of essences 
which allows Hegel‘s Plato to resolve the tension between the universal subjective world 
of essence and the particular objective world of existence. Hegel, rather, pushes the 
Platonic relationship of (essence/existence)-(reality/appearance) up to the relationship of 
subjectivity and objectivity. In its highest dialectical moment, this latter relationship, like 
any other relationship, is the ―union of what is different.‖ 
Having discovered in Plato‘s essences the implied inner dialectical nature of 
reason‘s concepts, Hegel shows that this inner dialectical nature of reason constitutes 
reason‘s own driving principle. It is through this inner activity of reason that reason 
overcomes the contradictions of understanding and becomes able to capture the 
dialectical inner nature of the objective external world of existences. As a result, nothing 
can escape the all-comprehensive dynamicity of dialectical reason, not even the thing-in-
itself.   
This analysis of Hegel‘s reading of Plato disagrees with Julie Maybee‘s reading. 
Whereas Maybee argues that Hegel uses Kant against Plato, or, as she says, ―Kant‘s view 
                                                             
166 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 131, p. 199.  
167 Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, pp. 112-113. 
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that reason itself is dialectical provides the key to responding to Plato‘s argument,‖168 my 
reading shows that Hegel uses Plato against Kant, particularly against Kant‘s dogmatic 
unknowable thing-in-itself. The moment of the esoteric sublation in Plato‘s dialectic, 
which Hegel makes exoteric, explains how the unity between thought and reality is 
possible. This point reflects the break with the Kantian dualism of appearance and the 
thing-in-itself. For Hegel‘s Plato 
grasped in all its truth Socrates‘ great principle that ultimate reality lies in 
consciousness, since, according to him, the absolute is in thought, and all reality is 
Thought. He does not understand by this a one-sided thought, nor what is 
understood by false idealism which makes thought once more step aside and 
contemplate itself as conscious thought, and as in opposition to reality; it is the 
thought which embraces in an absolute unity reality as well as thinking, the 
Notion and its reality in the movement of science, as the Idea of a scientific 
whole.
169
 
 
Maybee‘s error, Hegel would argue, consists in her focusing on the exoteric 
element of the Platonic philosophy rather than its esoteric element.
170
 She reads Plato 
through the lens of reflective understanding rather than the lens of speculative reason. 
This kind of reading mistakenly places Hegel‘s view of Plato within the same traditional 
views of Plato, which consider the world of Ideas in its eternal fixity. She says,  
Rationality itself, he [Plato] assumed, must be constant and unchanging, static and 
fixed. For Hegel, Plato‘s assumption can be rejected by pairing the messy world 
with a new conception of rationality that is not constant, static and unchanging, 
but contains its own moving principle, contradiction and opposition, and so is 
capable of overgrasping the messiness, the comings and goings, the imperfections 
of world. 
171
  
 
                                                             
168 Julie E. Maybee, Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic (Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2009), p.41. 
169 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 198-199. 
170 Maybee traditionally describes Plato‘s Forms by saying: ―The Forms or rational concepts must be in 
another world or in a separate realm—the realm of the Forms.‖ Maybee, Picturing Hegel, p.9. 
171 Ibid., p 36. 
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Against such interpretations of Hegel‘s Plato, my reading shows that the view that 
rationality contains negation and that thereby it is changeable is not a new concept that 
Hegel imposed upon Plato‘s theory of Ideas, but rather a concept that he discovered in the 
Platonic dialectic. If Hegel uses Kant, he uses him not in an argument against the 
speculative Plato, but in one against the false traditional views of Plato. Both these false 
views of Plato and the transcendental idealism view of Kant are sublated in a higher 
moment of speculative Idealism that is peculiar to Hegel‘s system.172  
Moreover, I disagree with Sadler who writes that  
Hegel, by understanding Plato as the discoverer (albeit still in quasi-mythological 
garb) of ‗the concept‘, had made it possible, through the equation concept = eidos 
= category, to understand Plato as a ‗Kantian‘ philosopher.173 
 
 Such views confine Hegel‘s Plato within the strict limitation of subjectivity and within 
the strict limitation of understanding. On the contrary, my view presents Hegel‘s Plato 
within the free activity of the unlimited speculative reason, in which the mutual dynamic 
relationships of subjectivity and objectivity, reality and appearance, essence and 
existence are manifested. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hegel returns to Plato at the 
end of his Science of Logic where Hegel gives his own account of The Absolute Idea. 
Hegel, in contrasting his absolute method of the speculative reflection with the external 
reflection of understanding, writes,  
The procedure of the finite cognition of the understanding here is to take up again, 
equally externally, what it has left out in its creation of the universal by a process 
of abstraction. The absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like 
                                                             
172 In his tracing of the origin of Hegel‘s Logic, Baillie shows how the principle of objective universality in 
Greek thought and the principle of subjectivity in Kant‘s philosophy influenced Hegel‘s own intellectual 
development: ―The antithesis between Kantian doctrine and the Greek spirit is seen to be no mere 
superficial contrast, but a deep-seated opposition of fundamental principle…. Now there seem little doubt 
that it was Hegel‘s appreciation of the full significance of this opposition, and the struggle to resolve it and 
harmonies the elements it contained, that determined his further development.‖ J.B.Baillie, The Origin and 
Significance of Hegel‟s Logic (London: Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 18. 
173 Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being (London: The Athlone Press, 1996), p.32. 
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external reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter, 
since it is itself that subject matter‘s immanent principle and soul. This is what 
Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves, 
that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not 
stray away from their catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons, but 
should keep before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness 
what is immanent in them. 
174
 
 
 
The Hegelian Transition to Aristotle 
According to Hegel, Plato‘s three speculative dialogues nonetheless still suffer 
from a kind of deficiency: they do not ―show forth the necessary movement of pure 
Notion,‖175 due to some external considerations from which Plato could not perfectly free 
himself.  Hegel‘s reinterpretation of Plato‘s speculative dialectic is an overcoming of this 
deficiency. He argues that this deficiency could be found in any philosophy that treats the 
movement of pure thought not within its internal pure notions alone, but also with 
relation to external things. In accordance with his logic, Hegel demands that speculative 
concepts must necessarily define themselves in relation to each other, rather than in 
relation to external things. Based on this demand, Hegel dialectically purifies Plato‘s 
dialectic by dropping out any external material consideration in the movement of thought. 
By doing so, his dialectical interpretation pushes the Platonic dialectic towards the very 
final ends of the Logical moment of the Notion in which essence and existence are 
absorbed, on the one hand, and the Phenomenological moment of the Absolute Knowing 
in which subjectivity and objectivity are dissolved, on the other. 
In the preface of his Phenomenology, Hegel writes,  
I can bear in mind that if at times the excellence of Plato's philosophy has been 
held to lie in his scientifically valueless myths, there have also been times, even 
called times of ecstatic dreaming, when Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for 
                                                             
174 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 830. 
175 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.246.  
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its speculative depth, and Plato's Parmenides (surely the greatest artistic 
achievement of the ancient dialectic) was regarded as the true disclosure and 
positive expression of the divine life, and times when, despite the obscurity 
generated by ecstasy, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be 
nothing else than the pure Notion.
176
 
 
Although the speculative moment of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, essentiality 
and existentiality, in which Truth gets its fuller determination, is implicitly present in 
Plato‘s speculative dialectic, Plato himself was not conscious enough of it. Plato‘s 
mythical presentation of thought, Hegel argues, is behind this failure.  
But this failure is not only concerned with Plato but also with those philosophers 
who misapprehend him.
177
Against those philosophers who overlap the form and content 
of Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel insists that we must keep ―the form in which Plato has 
propounded his ideas…distinct from Philosophy proper.‖178 Hegel, therefore, excludes 
myth from being an adequate form of truth on the basis that ―the merit of Philosophy 
consists alone in the fact that truth is expressed in the form of the Notion.‖179 He writes, 
The myth is always a mode of representation which, as belonging to an earlier 
stage, introduces sensuous images, which are directed to imagination, not to 
thought; in this, however, the activity of thought is suspended, it cannot yet 
establish itself by its own power, and so is not yet free. …[W]hen the Notion 
attains its full development, it has no more need of the myth.
180
 
                                                             
176 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 71. Regarding this passage, Rockmore remarks, ―His (Hegel‘s) 
allusions here to the speculative depth of Aristotle and to Plato's Parmenides as the greatest example of 
ancient dialectic indicate his understanding of the relation of his position to the ancient tradition.‖ Tom 
Rockmore, Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), p.21. 
177 Hegel writes, ―However much, therefore, Plato‘s mythical presentation of Philosophy is praised, and 
however attractive it is in his Dialogues, it yet proves a source of misapprehensions; and it is one of these 
misapprehensions, if Plato‘s myths are held to be what is most excellent in his philosophy.‖ Hegel, 
Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.216. 
178 Ibid., p. 211. 
179 Ibid. p. 216. Hegel also mentions this point in his introduction to his Lectures on The History of 
Philosophy by saying that ―the Absolute must in Philosophy be in the form of thought.‖ Ibid. p. 90.  
180 Ibid., p.217. In contrast to Hegel‘s claim that the activity of thought is suspended when it is mediated by 
imagination, we should mention to Magnus‘s Hegel and the Symbolic Mediation of Spirit, in which she 
stresses the symbolic nature of Hegel‘s dialectic. See: Kathleen Magnus, Hegel and the Symbolic 
Mediation of Spirit (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). See also, Jenifer Bates‘ review of 
Magnus‘s latter book in Philosophy in Review, Volume XXII no. 5, (October 2002), pp.341-343. 
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This critique of myth is also a critique directed to sensation, feeling, perception, 
and all forms of religious dogmas. 
181
 What stands above these presentations, which 
parallel to some extent those stages in the Phenomenology through which consciousness 
dialectically passes forward, is what Hegel seeks in Plato‘s speculative dialectic. He 
warns his modern readers
182
 not to be captured by these forms of Truth even if 
such a representation of Plato‘s philosophy can be supported by Plato‘s own 
words; but one who knows what Philosophy is, cares little for such expressions, 
and recognizes what was Plato‘s true meaning.183  
 
The Hegelian dialectical reading of Plato, thus far, leads us beyond what looks 
more interesting but less true to what is less interesting but more true in Plato‘s dialogues. 
And, as Hegel says, ―If we read with interest what is speculative, we are apt to overlook 
what is most beautiful.‖184 In terms of the form of thought, the Hegelian task with 
Aristotle seems easier than with Plato, since Aristotle‘s mode of presentation is free from 
                                                             
181 Hegel‘s critique of myth, however, comes under attack from some scholars. Gray, for example, says that 
―Hegel‘s absorption with logic prevented him from doing justice to the poetic insights of Plato.‖ Gray, 
Hegel‟s Hellenic Ideal, p.78. Markus Gabriel, from his side, concludes that Blumenberg ―is right in 
stressing the fact that Hegel‘s closure of reflection upon itself is only expressible in the form of mythology. 
When Hegel speaks about the ‗circle of circles,‘ ‗the Bacchanalian revel,‘ or the ‗Eleusinian mysteries,‘ 
and so on in order to elucidate the gesture of logos‘ closure upon itself, he himself makes use of the 
mythological unity of form and content.‖ Markus Gabriel, ―The Mythological Being of Reflection-An 
Essay on Hegel, Schelling, and the Contingency of Necessity‖ in Markus Gabriel & Slavoj Zizek, 
Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism, (London: Continuum, 2009), p.64. 
Gabriel also says, ―Shelling insists that Hegel is not capable of overcoming mythology precisely because he 
reads logical contents into the form of mythology instead of self-consciously creating a new mythology.‖ 
Ibid., p.65. Ferrarin in his Hegel and Aristotle concludes that ―one could regret that Hegel never makes a 
philosophical use of his friend Creuzer‘s Symbolik and its interpretation of myths apart from his aesthetics 
and philosophy of history.‖ Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, p.53. For me, it is exactly this Hegelian 
dialectical absorption with logic that revealed the poetic insights of Plato. The imaginative consciousness in 
Hegel‘s systematic view of Truth is better understood as a dialectical moment among other dialectical 
moments of thought that furnish the concrete development of the Idea. For more on the importance of the 
imagination in Hegel‘s philosophy see: Jennifer A. Bates, Hegel's Theory of Imagination, (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2004).     
182 We find Gadamer, for instance, takes this Hegelian advance seriously in his reading of Plato‘s Timaeus: 
“Thus a task is precisely set for us. We must make up for what has not been done and, in penetrating 
behind the form of myth, we must make clear its relationship to Plato‘s dialectic as a whole.‖ Hans Georg 
Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith 
(Binghamton: The Vail-Ballou Press, 1980), pp. 158-159. 
183 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 218. 
184 Ibid., p. 252. 
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myth. However, with regard to the content of thought, the task with Aristotle is different.  
―Aristotle,‖ as Hegel confesses,  
is much more difficult to comprehend than Plato. In the latter there are myths, and 
we can pass over the dialectic and yet say that we have read Plato; but with 
Aristotle we enter at once upon what is speculative.
185
 
 
Hegel’s Strategy of Reading Aristotle 
 
Hegel‘ strategy of reading Aristotle heads in the same direction as that of his 
reading of Plato. It is less a critical reading of Aristotle than a critique directed, implicitly 
or explicitly, at other philosophies—especially the modern idealism of his age.186 
Somewhat paradoxically, Hegel sees in Aristotle, as the founder of the law of identity, 
the rich philosophic content that he can employ against the modern philosophies of 
identity: 
With Aristotle it is thus no dry identity of the abstract understanding that is 
indicated, for he distinguishes subjective and objective precisely and decisively. 
Not dead identity such as this, but energy, is for him what is most to be 
reverenced, God.
187
 
 
This passage reflects the interpretive conclusion Hegel gives to Aristotle‘s Absolute –
God— after a long discussion that mainly centers on the Aristotelian relationship of 
(matter/form)-(potentiality/actuality).  
What strikes me most about Hegel‘s reading of Aristotle is the difference between 
Hegel‘s beginning and his ending. Hegel begins with the traditional ontological duality of 
matter/form--/potentiality/actuality and ends with the modern epistemological dualities of 
                                                             
185
 Ibid., p. 333. 
186 In his study of Hegel and Aristotle, Ferrarin writes, ―It is easy to show that Hegel‘s praise of the ancients 
and of Aristotle in particular is no resuscitation of dead dogs, to invoke Lessing‘s remark about Spinoza 
that was later taken by Marx, but the necessary counterbalance to Kantian and Fichtean subjectivism.‖ 
Ferrarin. Hegel and Aristotle, p. 47. He also says, ―In the Lectures on the Metaphysics [of Aristotle] Hegel 
curiously agues polemically against Schelling by showing the superiority of the energeia of the Aristotelian 
God (the unity with itself that realizes itself in its self-objectification) over the abstract system of identity.‖ 
Ibid., p. 145. 
187Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, pp. 345-346. 
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subjectivity/objectivity. This Hegelian circular reduction makes the difference between 
the beginning as ontology and the ending as epistemology seem problematic. This 
reduction finds its ultimate point of view in Hegel‘s modern appropriation of the 
Aristotelian Absolute: 
We in our way of speaking designate the Absolute, the True, as the unity of 
subjectivity and objectivity, which is therefore neither the one nor the other, and 
yet just as much the one as the other; and Aristotle busied himself with these same 
speculations, the deepest forms of speculations even of the present day, and he 
has expressed them with the greatest definiteness.
188
    
 
  In light of Hegel‘s high estimation of the speculative Aristotle, I will, firstly, 
follow the dialectical steps by which Hegel reaches this account of Aristotle. Secondly, 
within the horizon of this Hegelian reducibility of matter/form-potentiality/actuality to 
subjectivity/objectivity, I will try to offer an interpretive reading of the relationship 
between essence and existence. 
*** 
Hegel presents Aristotle as ―one of the richest and deepest of all the scientific 
geniuses that have as yet appeared—a man whose like no later age has ever yet 
produced.‖189 As with Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel considers Aristotle‘s philosophy a 
victim of many misapprehensions throughout the course of the history of philosophy.  For 
Hegel, Aristotelian philosophy has been falsely dissolved into five different forms. These 
false forms started with the Peripatetic and passed through the New-Platonic, the 
                                                             
188 Ibid., p. 345. Hegel, moreover, says, ―Thus, although Aristotle does not express himself in modern 
philosophic language, he has yet throughout the same fundamental theory; he speaks not of a special kind 
of reason, but of the universal Reason.‖ Ibid., p. 346. Ted Sadler notices that ―in the Encyclopedia, Hegel 
equates the Absolute Idea (his own highest reality and truth), with ‗the noesis noeseos which Aristotle long 
ago termed the supreme form of the idea…. For Hegel, not only was this Aristotle‘s most profound answer 
to the question of being qua being, but it was his own answer to essentially the same question. Hegel had 
not, so he considered, answered this question differently, but had clarified both question and answer at a 
higher level of consciousness, more ‗dialectically‘ than had been possible for Aristotle.‖ Sadler, Heidegger 
and Aristotle: the Question of Being, p.9. 
189 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 314.   
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Scholastic, the Renaissance, and ended with the ―false modern ideas and conception,‖190 
of Aristotelian philosophy. None of these forms grasped ―the deep and properly speaking 
speculative side of Aristotelian philosophy.‖191 Their main fault consists in viewing 
Aristotle as a realist who is opposed to Plato and whose philosophy is, as Hegel says, 
―mere empiricism—Locke‘s philosophy at its worst.‖192 Hegel‘s task is to purify 
Aristotle from these false forms and to discover in him what the others could not 
discover. By doing so, Hegel thinks that he could reinstate Aristotle in his proper stage 
within the concrete development of Truth.  
Before I proceed into Hegel‘s interpretation of Aristotle, it is important to 
mention a fact related to Hegel‘s survey of the different historical forms of Aristotelian 
philosophy. The point I raise here is related more specifically to the schools of Peripatetic 
philosophy. Hegel mentions only the Roman philosopher Cicero. Moreover, Hegel 
generally characterizes Peripatetic philosophy as a ―form of a popular philosophy, in 
which attention was principally directed to natural history and to morals.‖193 Hegel here 
entirely excludes many Islamic Peripatetic philosophers such as Al-Kindi , Al-Farabi, 
Avicenna, and Averroes. Interestingly, the traditional Aristotelian view of the Islamic 
Peripatetic philosophers, especially Al-Farabi and Avicenna, is in agreement with 
Hegel‘s view that there is no essential opposition between Plato and Aristotle. Al-Farabi, 
for instance, devotes a well-known book, The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the 
Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle,
194
 to the argument that the two philosophers 
                                                             
190 Ibid., p. 327. 
191 Ibid., p. 327. 
192 See: Ibid., pp.315-316. 
193 Ibid., p. 327. 
194 See: Al-Farabi Abu Nasr, Kitab al- Jam bayna rayay al-hakimayn [The Harmonization of the Two 
Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle] (Beirut: Dar el Machreq, 2000). English trans. 
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Plato and Aristotle are in agreement on their main principles. ―So let it be clear to you,‖ 
writes Al-Farabi, ―that, in what they [Plato and Aristotle] presented, their purpose is the 
same, and that they intended to offer one and the same philosophy.‖195  
I raise this point because Sadra is considered as the inheritor and the complement 
of the Islamic Peripatetic tradition, though in a different direction. This point, however, 
will be examined more when I conceptually contrast Hegel with Sadra in the next 
chapter. 
From Substance to Subject 
For Hegel, Aristotle does not confine his thought only within one determined 
dimension of truth. Aristotle, rather, is open to different aspects of determinations in their 
reference to the whole. Although his starting point is from the external empirical facts in 
their particular determinations, from existence in its independent objectivity, Aristotle  
keeps holding truth in its wholeness which includes all its determinations.  Aristotle, as 
Hegel maintains, ―does not omit determinations; he does not hold now to one 
determination and then to another, but takes them as all in one.‖196  
Here Hegel presents Aristotle as an observer and a thinker at the same time. That 
is, Hegel‘s Aristotle is not only an observer, who loses himself in the objectivity of 
existence, nor is he a thinker who only sinks in the abstract subjectivity of essence. If the 
mere observer consumes himself in the existentiality of the objective world while the 
thinker consumes himself in the subjectivity of the essential and ideal world, Aristotle, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
By C. E. Butterworth in Alfarabi: The Political Writings: "Selected Aphorisms" and Other Texts (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 115-167. 
195 See:  Joep Lameer, Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice, (Leiden: 
Brill, 1994), p.32. 
196 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 329. 
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a speculative philosopher, finds truth in the dialectical relationship between objectivity 
and subjectivity, existentiality and essentiality: 
For Aristotle‘s empiricism is a totality because he always leads it back again 
immediately to speculation; he may thus be said to be a perfect empiricist, yet at 
the same time a thinking one.
197
  
 
With this speculative picture of Aristotle in view, Hegel puts us in the midst of the 
three interrelated moments of the movement of thought: sensation, understanding, and 
reason. Regardless of the different details of his tracing of these moments in his 
Phenomenology and his Logic, Hegel‘s tracing of these moments in Aristotle‘s 
philosophy reaches similar results. For Hegel, Aristotle‘s account of truth is neither 
sensation in its immediate presentation of identity, nor understanding in its mediated 
presentation of non-identity. Hegel‘s Aristotle rises up to the sublated moment of reason 
in which the identity of ―identity and non-identity‖ is the true presentation of the Idea. 
For Hegel, the three epistemological, Aristotelian moments of sensation, understanding, 
and reason interweave with the three ontological, Aristotelian modes of substance 
(Sensible Substance, Human Nous, and Divine Thought).
198
 If these two sides of 
epistemology and ontology are taken speculatively and not abstractly, they reflect the 
logical aspect of the progressively unfolding of the Idea.  
To see how Hegel reaches the above mentioned point, I will proceed with his 
investigation of the four Aristotelian principles of substance: 
In this ontology or, as we call it, logic, he [Aristotle] investigates and minutely 
distinguishes four principles: first, determination or quality as such, the wherefore 
of anything, essence or form; secondly, the matter; thirdly, the principle of 
motion; and fourthly, the principle of final cause, or of the good.
199
  
 
                                                             
197 Ibid., p. 330. 
198 See: Ibid., p. 338. 
199 Ibid., p. 335. 
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There are two interesting features in this passage .The first one is Hegel‘s approximation 
of Aristotle‘s ontology—Aristotle‘s science of being qua being—with Hegel‘s 
speculative logic.
200
 The second one is Hegel‘s equation of Aristotle‘s ―form‖ with 
―quality as such,‖ which he further equates with ―essence‖.  
Hegel‘s characterization of Aristotle‘s ―essence‖ as that which constitutes the 
―quality as such‖ of substance—as that determination without which substance ceases to 
be—problematizes  the status of the category of ―quality‖ in Hegel‘s Logic. In Hegel‘s 
logical doctrine of Being, the characterization of the Hegelian ―Quality‖ looks similar to 
the Aristotelian ―essence‖: 
 Quality is, to begin with, the determinacy that is identical with being, in such a 
way that something ceases to be what it is if it loses its quality.
201
 
 
While in his Logic Hegel considers ―quality‖ as one of the categories of the doctrine of 
Being rather than one of the categories of the doctrine of Essence, his interpretation of 
Aristotle now locates ―quality as such‖ as equivalent to ―essence‖ itself. Why this is so 
can be articulated more when we see how Hegel moves to the two crucial determinations 
of substance in Aristotle‘s ontology: Potentiality and Actuality.  
Hegel introduces the two Aristotelian principles of potentiality and actuality by 
saying: 
There are two leading forms, which Aristotle characterizes as that of potentiality 
and that of actuality; the latter is still more closely characterized as entelechy or 
free activity, which has the end in itself, and is the realization of this end.
202
  
                                                             
200
 I find Etienne Gilson reaches to the same point in his analysis of Hegel‘s philosophy. He concludes, ―In 
Hegel‘s philosophy, logic is the concrete dialectic of being qua being, wherein it appears as progressively 
conquering all determinations which belong to it as such.‖ Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p, 141. 
201 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 85, p. 136. Hegel, moreover, says, ―The something is what it is only 
through its quality; in contrast, although it is true that the thing likewise only exists insofar as it has 
properties, it is not bound with this or that determinate property and therefore it can lose the property 
without ceasing to be what it is‖ Ibid., § 125, p. 195. That Hegel considers quality in terms of the 
Aristotelian account of essence will be discussed more in chapter four in this dissertation.   
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Hegel‘s translation of the Aristotelian energeia is ―Tätigkeit /activity‖. 203 In Hegel‘s 
translation, as Ferrarin puts it, ―actuality cannot be understood independently of 
actualization, an actuality without activity is for him unthinkable.‖204 In light of this 
correlation between activity and actuality, if Hegel‘s subjectivity is a "spontaneous 
conscious activity [that] exists for itself and within itself,"
205
 then subjectivity should be 
viewed not only as activity but also as actuality. Now, if what constitutes substance in its 
deep speculative sense is nothing but essence as ―actualizing form‖, then substance can 
be understood also as a subject insofar as subject is itself actuality. This explains to some 
extent what Hegel means at the beginning of his Logic Encyclopaedia: 
 Philosophy should be quite clear about the fact that its content is nothing other 
than the basic import that is originally produced and produces itself in the domain 
of the living spirit, the content that is made into the world, the outer and the inner 
world of consciousness; in other words, the content of philosophy is actuality.
206
 
 
The Aristotelian actuality parallels the Hegelian being-for-itself /subjectivity, 
while the Aristotelian potentiality parallels the Hegelian being in-itself /objectivity.
 207
 If 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
202 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 335. Aristotle explains the four causes by saying: 
"Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know each thing only when 
we think we recognize its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the 
substance, i.e. the essence (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate 'why' is a 
cause and principle); in another the matter or substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in a fourth 
the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the good (for this is the end of all generation and change).‖ 
Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), Metaphysics. I.3, p. 1555. 
203 Hegel‘s translation of energeia by activity comes under attack from many philosophers. According to 
Ferrarin, ―it has been repeatedly pointed out that Hegel's translation of energeia by "activity" misconstrues 
the Aristotelian meaning." Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, p. 15. Ferrarin introduces many philosophers—
such as Schelling, Trendelenburg, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger—who argue against Hegel‘s translation of 
Aristotle‘s energeia as activity. See: Ibid., pp-15-27. With regard to Schelling, for example, Ferrarin says, 
―This understanding of energeia as including process came very soon under attack. Back with a vengeance, 
Schelling poked sarcasm at Hegel‘s absolute as a God who knew no Sabbath. Hegel‘s God is an eternal 
incessant activity and not a simple final cause like Aristotle‘s.‖ Ibid., p.16. 
204 Ibid., p.26. 
205 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 331, p. 200. 
206 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 6, pp. 28-29. 
207 Hegel writes, ―In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states 
must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia, 
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Hegel seems obscure in his identifying of potentiality with objectivity,
208
 he is clear in his 
identifying of actuality/activity with subjectivity. He writes,  
The Energy [Actuality], or more concretely the Subjectivity, is the actualizing 
form, the negativity which relates to itself. When we, on the other hand, use the 
term ―Essence,‖ we do not posit [express] activity in it; but Essence is only the In-
itself only potentiality without infinite form [―infinite‖ means self-related].209  
 
We notice here that essence is posited within the logical horizon of ―potentiality‖ or ―the 
In-itself‖ just because it does not have ―activity in it‖. However, it is exactly this dead 
kind of essence that Hegel refuses to consider as a true candidate for the Idea. The state 
of in-itself constitutes just a moment in the process of the unlocking of the essence. In 
order for essence to be able to grasp the True as the whole it must be not inert or fixed, it 
must rather be in a state of activity. And if actuality is an active state of actualization 
which includes its end within it, essence as actuality must be not only in-itself but also 
for-itself. We already find this meaning of developmental essence in Hegel‘s preface of 
his Phenomenology:  
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that 
it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely 
in this consist its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of 
itself.
210
 
 
For Hegel‘s Logic, the appearance of essence—essence‘s shining-forth — is the 
existential actualization of essence, and this happens through mediation—through the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
δσναμις); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus, ενεργεια)….The whole variation in 
the development of the world in history is found on this difference.‖ Hegel, Lectures on The History of 
Philosophy, p. 21. 
208
 Hegel writes, ―The expression δύναμις is with Aristotle the beginning, the implicit, the objective; also 
the abstract universal in general, the Idea, the matter, which can take on all forms, without being itself the 
form-giving principle.‖ Ibid., p. 335. 
209 G.W.F. Hegel, The section of ―The Philosophy of Aristotle‖ in Hegel‘s Lectures on The History of 
Philosophy, edited and translated by WM. T. Harris in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 
2(April, 1871), p. 181. 
210 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 20, p. 11. 
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negative, self-relating of essence.
211
 It is in this Hegelian account of the speculative 
Aristotle that essence becomes the ―actualizing form‖ which breaks with the static 
traditional view of essence which does not move beyond the level of ―in-itself‖. The 
actualization of essence constitutes the essence of essence, so to speak. And this essential 
actualization is manifested in the dialectical movement from the moment of in-itself to 
the moment of for-itself, that is, from potential objectivity to actual subjectivity.  
 But this movement is not enough for essence to be true speculative actuality. For 
the speculative essence must be not only ―in-itself‖, nor only ―for-itself‖, but ―in-and-for 
itself‖. As Hegel says in his Science of Logic, essence 
is not only this being-in-itself; as mere being-in-itself it would be the abstraction 
of pure essence, but it is equally essentially being-for-self; it is itself this 
negativity, the self-sublating of otherness and determinateness.
212
  
  
Essence within this third moment of the Idea is no longer that of immediate essence of 
intuition, nor of abstract essence of understanding, but of speculative essence of reason. 
Essence becomes the Notion which includes within it its determinations not in a state of 
immediacy, nor in a state of opposition and difference, but in a state of sublation. The 
relationship of in-itself/for-itself is also articulated in the language of Hegel‘s 
Phenomenology to support the same point, though from different perspective: 
So long as Science lacks this actual dimension, it is only the content as the in-
itself, the purpose that is as yet still something inward, not yet Spirit, but only 
spiritual Substance. This in-itself has to express itself outwardly and become for 
itself, and this means simply that it has to posit self-consciousness as one with 
itself.
213
 
 
                                                             
211 See: Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 131, p. 190.  
212  Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 390. 
213 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 26, p. 15. 
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 In light of these two Aristotelian determinations of potentiality/actuality,
214
 and 
their Hegelian corresponding relationship of in-itself/for-itself, I will try now to see how 
the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity unfolds, and how, 
accordingly, the relationship between essence and existence can be viewed. 
The Three Dialectical Moments of the Aristotelian Idea 
Hegel recognizes and discerns two opposite sides within the Aristotelian 
substance, both of which, taken separately and abstractly, do not reveal the truth of the 
Idea. On the one side, we have potentiality, being-in-itself, or objectivity. The reference 
of this side is the sensuous perceptible substance. On the second opposite side, we have 
actuality, being-for-itself, or subjectivity. The reference of this side is human nous or 
understanding.  Now, generally speaking, Hegel shows that the true speculative Aristotle 
cannot be found in either of these one-sidednesses of substance. Hegel‘s Aristotle should 
be found in the third higher moment of substance which represents the true speculative 
Idea and which sublates the two preceding moments. This higher speculative moment is 
the divine Thought—the true concrete Subject.215 
 For the sake of my argument, I take the first Aristotelian side of substance as the 
representative of the logical Hegelian doctrine of Being—not in its sophisticated details 
                                                             
214 Hegel writes, ―The closer determination of this relation of energy [actuality] to potentiality, of form to 
matter, and the movement of this opposition, gives rise to the different modes of substance.‖  Hegel, 
Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 338. 
215 In addition to this theological dimension of Hegel‘s account of Aristotle‘s Absolute as divine Thought, 
Hegel considers the Absolute from the stand point of the pure speculative logic as the Absolute Idea. 
Hegel‘s speculative understanding of the Absolute Idea moves beyond religion insofar as religion stays 
occupied with picture thinking and fails to recognize reason as the act of the Self. Hegel writes, ―The Spirit 
of the revealed religion has not yet surmounted its consciousness as such, or what is not the object of its 
consciousness; Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere 
of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity.‖ Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 788, p. 479. In the 
Logic, Hegel writes, ―Reason, which is the sphere of the Idea, is the self-reveled truth in which the Notion 
possesses the realization that is wholly adequate to it, and is free, inasmuch as it cognizes this its objectivity 
world in its subjectivity and its subjectivity in its objectivity world.‖ Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 597.       
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by which Hegel surpasses Aristotle in the Doctrine of Essence, but only in its general 
point of view. Similarly, the second Aristotelian side of substance operates as the 
representative of the logical Hegelian doctrine of Essence. Just as Hegel‘s Logic shows 
that neither the doctrine of Being in its immediate presentation of the Idea nor the 
doctrine of Essence in its mediate presentation of the Idea grasps the Idea in its 
concreteness, so we find that neither the first side of the Aristotelian substance, reflected 
in the objectivity of sensuous substance, nor the second side of the Aristotelian substance 
reflected in the subjectivity of the human nous, grasps the concreteness of the Idea. And 
as the Hegelian logical doctrine of the Notion represents the summit of the Idea in which 
subjectivity and objectivity are dialectally dissolved in the identity of identity and non-
identity, so too ends the doctrine of the Aristotelian divine Thought.  
Unlike the case with Plato, these three moments of the Idea are not included 
implicitly in the philosophy of Aristotle but are explicitly articulated by him. If Hegel‘s 
task with Plato consists in making these implied moments of the speculative Idea explicit, 
and bringing them together in a system, Hegel‘s task with Aristotle is to bring together 
these explicit moments in a system.
216
 In what follows, I will give a summary account of 
the Hegelian systematic view of these three moments in order to see how the Idea is not 
only Substance but also Subject, or in Hegel‘s words, how ―everything turns on grasping 
and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.‖217 
 
 
                                                             
216
 Hegel points to the unsystematic order of the different kinds of the Aristotelian substance: ―Here 
Aristotle enumerates the substances, and to him they appear as a series of different kinds of substance, 
which he merely takes into consideration one by one, without bringing them together into a system.‖  Ibid., 
p.338. 
217 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 17, p.10. 
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The Sensuous Perceptible Substance or the Immediate Moment of Objectivity 
The sensuous substances are all these kinds of material objects that we encounter 
in our ordinary experience. They are all these individuals around us. At this stage of 
sense-experience, these individual substances seem objective in their independent unity—
each represents its individual objectivity in itself regardless of its relation to the others.  
But the dialectic of the object shows that this seemingly individual unity is not an internal 
unity between the constitutive principles of matter and form. Matter and form, 
potentiality and actuality, are related externally rather than internally. The absence of the 
self-organizing factor within sensuous substance is a deficient characteristic of this stage 
of the Idea. As a result, this moment fails to grasp the inner depth of the self-constructed 
Idea. Hegel writes, 
The sensuous perceptual substance is that in which the matter is still distinguished 
from the efficient form. Hence this substance is finite; for the separation and 
externality of form and matter are precisely what constitute the nature of finite.
218
 
 
This moment, then, does not reflect the true unity of the two determinations of 
matter/potentiality and form/actuality. That is, it does not reflect the concrete-self-identity 
of essence. Essence as such has not been actualized speculatively to be ―for-itself‖. In 
Hegel‘s language, this is an inadequate standpoint of the Idea since it reflects just the 
externality of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. ―Thus in sensuous substance,‖ 
Hegel concludes, ―there appears the diversity of the moments, though not as yet return 
into themselves.‖219 This returning into itself of the diversity of the moments is what 
                                                             
218 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 338. Hegel, in the introduction to his Lectures, says, 
―The finite is not true, nor is it what it is to be—its determinate nature is bound up with its existence. But 
the inward Idea abolishes these finite forms: a philosophy which has not the absolute form identical with 
the content, must pass away because its form is not that of truth.‖ Ibid., p.37. 
219 Ibid., p. 339. 
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constitutes the moment of ―for-itself‖, the moment of actuality, which the subjective, next 
stage of the Idea is its realization.  
The Human Understanding or the Moment of Abstract Subjectivity 
The second kind of substance is the subjective soul as a thinking activity. Here we 
find that the moments of subjectivity and objectivity are not external like that of the 
sensuous substance, but internal. Hegel explains, 
A higher kind of substance, according to Aristotle (Met, IX.2; VII.7; XII.3), is 
that which already contains the activity which is the object of its process. This is 
the in-and-for-itself determined Understanding whose content is the final cause 
which it actualizes through its activity without undergoing change like the mere 
sensuous substance.
220
  
 
That is to say, the Aristotelian rational soul, as a moment of subjective activity, is the 
object of its own activity. The aim of the activity of this subjectivity, which for the 
rational soul ―is essentially actuality,‖ and ―not only formal activity‖221 is itself the 
content of understanding. The content of this activity, as well as the realization of this 
content, does not come ―from somewhere else,‖ as Hegel says, but from within the 
activity of thought itself. This kind of substance, therefore, is not only in-itself but also 
for-itself. This in-and-for-itself constitutes ―understanding‖ as absolutely determined.   
The content of the activity of understanding, however, does not remain only 
internal to itself. ―The active,‖ Hegel says, ―posits its content in reality.‖222 Consider, for 
instance, an architect who actualizes a project he has in his mind by building a house. But 
this activity of the understanding which is now actualized in reality is different from a 
matter upon which the idea is realized. Matter here appears as a condition for the 
actualization of the Idea. 
                                                             
220 Ibid., p. 340. 
221 Ibid.  
222Ibid.  
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Thus here we still have a matter which understanding demands as its hypothesis. 
The two extremes are matter as potentiality, and thought as efficiency: the former 
is the passive universal, and the latter the active universal.
223
 
 
Although this moment exhibits the Idea in more comprehensive view than the previous 
moment, it is still not adequate enough to articulate the pure speculative Idea. This 
moment is an abstract subjectivity which knows how to distinguish but does not go a 
further step to unite the differences. This moment, in Hegel‘s language of the Science of 
Logic, does not "free itself from its immediacy and external concretion,"
224
 and, 
moreover, does not "attain to the pure knowing which takes as its object those same pure 
essentialities as they are in and for themselves."
225
 
The Divine Thought or the Absolutely Differentiated Idea: The Speculative 
Subject 
If the two preceding moments of objectivity and subjectivity exhibit a sense of 
separation and externality between (potentiality/in-itself) and (actuality/for-itself), 
between matter and form, between reality and thought, between existence and essence, 
the third moment resolves absolutely all these kinds of deficiencies. All these dualities 
are now sublated in a high speculative identity represented in the Absolute as unmoved 
mover.  
The highest point is, however, that in which potentiality, activity and actuality are 
united—the unmoved, which yet at the same time moves, and whose essence is 
pure activity, without having matter.
226
  
 
With this moment, therefore, we reach the stage of the truly speculative Idea in 
which all determinations are internal to the Idea and in which all the material and external 
                                                             
223 Ibid., p. 340. 
224 Hegel, Science of Logic, § 10. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p.340. 
 84 
 
considerations are sublated. It is the moment in which essence is no longer static identity 
but ―pure activity‖.  Essence is thus liberated from the strict limits of the abstract 
understanding and becomes free activity within the unlimited circularity of the immanent 
Reason. Essence as pure activity, as pure subjectivity, is no longer a transcendent entity 
that exists beyond the objectivity of essence, and it is no longer the unknowable thing-in-
itself. The epistemological and ontological gulf between thought and reality is totally 
absorbed in the Aristotelian Absolute of the unmoved mover.
227
 Hegel‘s summary of the 
internal activity of Aristotle‘s Absolute pushes in the same direction of Hegel‘s own 
philosophy. He writes, 
The object of thought is first produced in the activity of thinking, which in this 
way separates the thought as an object. Hence, in thinking, that which is moved 
and that which moves are the same; and as the substance of what is thought is 
thought, what is thought is the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical 
with the thought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one 
and the same. The chief moment in Aristotle‘s philosophy is accordingly this, that 
the energy of thinking and the object of thought are the same.
228
 
  
It is thus only when essence breaks with the limitations of the abstract identity of 
understanding that Substance can become Subject. And Hegel is clear in this: 
                                                             
227 Both Hegel's Absolute Idea and Aristotle's prime unmoved mover is perfectly independent and self-
sufficient. However, there is difference between them. On the one hand, Aristotle does not systematically 
regard the prime unmoved mover as a unity of parts but as pure and simple form without parts. In contrast, 
Hegel considers the Absolute as the wholeness of organic totality in which the parts are contained and 
sublated. In this regard, Glenn Magee writes, ―It could be said that Hegel transplants Aristotle's criterion for 
"natural substance" into the "heavens," and conceives the Unmoved Mover (Absolute Idea) on the model of 
organic being. This should not be surprising, for Hegel would regard Aristotle's transcendent Unmoved 
Mover as an unrealized abstraction." Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2001), note 7. p.189. See also: De Gruyter, Is Aristotle Prime Mover A 
Pure Form? in Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (December1981), 
pp. 80-95. Hegel, in his Science of Logic, writes, ―The Absolute Idea, as the rational Notion that in its 
reality meets only with itself, is by virtue of this immediacy of its objective identity, on the one hand the 
return to life; but it has no less sublated this form of its immediacy, and contains within itself the highest 
degree of opposition.‖ Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 824. J.F. Findlay writes, ―The mind for Hegel, as for 
Aristotle, is thus the place of forms, a bustling Agora where such forms are involved in endless transactions 
and conversations, and though it is by the intermediations of such forms that there is a reaching-out to their 
individual instances, they none the less enjoy a relative independence there, a detachment in the thought-
ether, that they never enjoy elsewhere.‖ J. F. Findlay, Forward in Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. xi. 
228 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 344-345. 
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If Aristotle had made the jejune identity of understanding, or expression, his 
principle, he would never have risen to a speculative Idea like this, wherein 
individuality and activity are placed higher than universal potentiality.
229
 
 
Reason‘s sublation of understanding, in fact, represents the deep speculative meaning not 
only for Aristotle‘s philosophy—as Hegel argues— but also for Hegel‘s own philosophy.  
Hegel selects a crucial and long quotation from Aristotle‘s metaphysics, Met. XII.7, to 
suggest that Aristotle‘s Absolute supports the Hegelian theme of the circularity of reason. 
Hegel enthusiastically comments on that quotation by saying:  
This great definition given by Aristotle of absolute Being as the circle of reason 
which returns into itself, is of the same tenor as modern definitions; the unmoved 
which causes movement is the Idea which remains self-identical, which, while it 
moves, remains in relation to itself.
230
 
 
It is this crucial moment of the circularity of reason which supersedes 
understanding and brings identity in difference and difference in identity, motion in 
stability and stability in motion, potentiality in actuality and actuality in potentiality, 
essence in existence and existence in essence.
231
 All these dualities are absorbed in the 
dynamicity of the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Hegel, 
therefore, distinguishes his speculative Idealism from the idealism of his age. And he 
does not hesitate to oppose his celebrated discovery of the speculative Aristotle against 
his opponents: 
If in modern times it has seemed a new thing to define the Absolute Essence as 
pure activity, we see that this happened only through ignorance of the Aristotelian 
philosophy. The scholastics have rightly viewed this as the definition of God, and 
                                                             
229 Ibid., p. 346. 
230 Ibid., p. 343.  
231
 Hegel presents this notion of circularity from the outset of his Introduction to his Lectures by saying:  
―As concrete, this activity is a succession of processes in development which must be represented not as a 
straight line drawn out into vague infinity, but as a circle returning within itself, which, as periphery, has 
very many circles, and whose whole is a large number of processes in development turning back within 
themselves.‖ Ibid., p. 27.    
 86 
 
have applied to Him the designation of actus purus; there is no higher idealism 
than this.
232
 
 
If there is no ―higher idealism‖ than this, then it is inevitably Hegel‘s own 
idealism that is now presented in approximate manner with Aristotle and the scholastics. 
For my reading, it is a dialectical approximation which operates as mediation by which 
Hegel aims to reform the deficiencies of the philosophies of modern times — as an effort 
to reinstate the Idea in its concrete philosophical development.  Hegel, after all, does not 
merely stop at the Greek level of the Idea but moves further to ―the Christian Teutonic‖ 
level of Spirit.
233
 Whether Hegel‘s discovery of the speculative Idea of Plato and 
Aristotle can be used as mediation to reform Sadra‘s transcendental Existentialism is the 
topic of my later chapters.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
232 Hegel, The Philosophy of Aristotle, p.186.  
233 Hegel says, ―The Greek world developed thought as far as to the Idea; the Christian Teutonic world, on 
the contrary, has comprehended Thought as Spirit; Idea and Spirit are thus the distinguishing features.‖ 
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p.101. In this regard and according to Hegel‘s speculative 
Aristotle, Hegel would agree with Jennifer Bates that ―what is missing in the Aristotelian account‖ is ―the 
inwardizing movement of Geist,‖ but I do not think he would agree with her that Aristotle misses ―the unity 
of the idea.‖ See: Bates, Hegel‟s theory of  
imagination, p. 63. 
 87 
 
Chapter: Three 
 
Sadra and Hegel on the Metaphysical Essentialism of Arabic Philosophy 
 
Introduction: 
In his introduction to his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel writes,  
Speculative Logic contains all previous Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves the 
same forms of thought, the same laws and objects—while at the same time 
remodeling and expanding them with wider categories.
234
 
 
The speculative Idea here requires its dialectical concrete development in such a way that 
it should not only negate but also sublate its previous stages. Does not that mean that any 
speculative philosopher, in order to produce his new philosophy, should be conscious of 
the principles of the philosophies that precede him? Although this demand theoretically 
looks possible, practically it seems difficult. Difficulties such as the foreign language and 
the distant geographical places of the previous philosophies could contribute to 
preventing the philosopher from being fully aware of previous philosophies. Sadra and 
Hegel are cases in point. The satisfaction of absorbing the previous philosophies cannot 
be applied to Sadra, for he is not aware of the modern progression of philosophy in the 
West.
235
 Neither can it be applied to Hegel, whose evaluation of Arabic philosophy ends 
                                                             
234 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, § 9, p. 13. 
235
 There is no any mention of any modern western philosopher in Sadra‘s writings. For more on Sadra‘s 
life and philosophical works see: Sajjad Rizvi, Mulla Sadra Shirazi: His Life, Works and Sources for 
Safavid Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). One of the main reasons for this absence is 
the stoppage of the movement of translation from other foreign languages to Arabic. After the decline of 
Arabs in Spain in 1492, the movement of translation is reversed from Arabic to Latin. As Hegel writes, 
―The fact that Arabs studied Aristotle is historically important. Aristotle‘s works were translated from 
Arabic into Hebrew (in particular by Jews in Spain and Portugal, who were closely associated with the 
Arabs), and from these [Hebrew] versions they were translated into Latin, or they were translated from 
Arabic into Latin. So translation from Arabic is one of the main channels through which the writings and 
philosophy of Aristotle become known in the West.‖ G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
1825-6 Volume III, Medieval and Modern Philosophy, trans. R.F. Brown and J,M, Stewart with the 
assistance of H.S. Harris, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2009), p.30.  
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with Averroes.
236
 In this context, more than four centuries of the history of Arabic 
philosophy— from the death of Averroes in the thirteenth century up until the death of 
Sadra in the seventeenth century— are totally absent in Hegel‘s Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy.  
Situating Sadra‘s philosophy within Hegel‘s Lectures raises two interrelated 
problems. The first one is concerned with the historical period in which Sadra‘s 
philosophy appeared. The second one pertains to the nature of the philosophical themes 
of Sadra‘s thought. If we follow Hegel‘s division of the historical development of 
philosophy, Sadra, whose philosophy flourished in the seventeenth century, could be 
situated within Hegel‘s classification of ―The Third Period: Modern Philosophy.‖237 
More precisely, it could be better fit within what Hegel called ―Transition to the Modern 
Era.‖238 Here we meet with Hegel‘s treatment of Francis Bacon and Jacob Boehme, both 
of whom are contemporary to Sadra.
239
 This account, however, conflicts with the themes 
of Sadra‘s philosophy. The problematic relationship between existence and essence, 
which constitutes the basic ground of Sadra‘s philosophy, is more related to ―The Second 
Period: Medieval Philosophy,‖240 rather than Modern philosophy. 
Considering Sadra from the Hegelian standpoint of medieval philosophy faces 
another problem. Despite the fact that Sadra does not chronologically belong to this 
period, Hegel deals externally and briefly with ―Arabic Philosophy,‖ to which Sadra 
belongs. He writes, ―In this second period, philosophy has its locus in the Christen world; 
                                                             
236 In his brief comment on Arabic philosophers, Hegel mentions Averroes as the last Arabic philosopher. 
See: Hegel, Hegel‟s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Haldane, p. 35. 
237 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p.83.  
238Ibid., p. 85. 
239 Sadra was born in 1571, while Bacon in 1561 and Boehme in 1575. For more on Hegel‘s treatment of 
Bacon and Boehme, see: Ibid., pp. 88-103. 
240 Ibid., p. 13. 
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we need refer to Arabs and Jews only in an external way, for the historical 
background.‖241 Sadra‘s situation with Hegel becomes further complicated if we add the 
fact that Sadra, whose writings are mostly in Arabic, is ethnically Persian.
242
 Sadra is thus 
seemingly excluded from the divisions of Hegel‘s history of philosophy. He lacks a place 
in Hegel‘s Lectures, for neither could he properly be fit within modern philosophy, nor 
within medieval philosophy.   
Hegel‘s critique of Arabic philosophy, however, could be used as an entrance to 
appropriate Sadra‘s thought within Hegel‘s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The 
point here is to see whether Hegel‘s critique of Arabic Philosophy is applicable to Sadra‘s 
philosophy. If it is applicable, then the stage of Sadra‘s philosophy within the 
development of philosophy would face the same judgment that Hegel already passes on 
that of Arabic philosophy. ―We cannot say that Arabic philosophy involves its own 
proper principle and stage in the development of philosophy,‖243 Hegel states. In what 
follows, I will argue that the main points which Hegel considers as deficiencies of Arabic 
philosophy are among those that Sadra himself criticizes and tries to overcome. This will 
be in light of Sadra‘s account of the primacy of existence over essence, on the one hand, 
and the identity of the knower and the known, on the other hand.  
The earlier chapters have dealt with Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s critiques of the 
traditional views of the Greek essentialism of Plato and Aristotle. Without entering in 
specific differences between them, both Sadra and Hegel refuse to accept the abstract 
considerations of essence to be equivalent to Truth. In this chapter, Sadra‘s critique of the 
                                                             
241 Ibid., p. 15. 
242 For more on the influence of the Parisian culture on Sadra, see:  Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sadr al-Din 
Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy, Background, Life and Works (Tehran: Institute for Humanities 
and Cultural Studies, 1997). 
243 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p.30. 
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essentialism of Arabic philosophy will be examined under the light of Hegel‘s critique of 
Arabic philosophy.  
Hegel’s Reading of Arabic Philosophy 
Two remarks can be noted concerning Hegel‘s concise presentation of Arabic 
Philosophy. First, Hegel‘s sources do not rely on his immediate contact with the primary 
texts of Arabic philosophy—neither in its original Arabic nor in its Latin translated 
version.
244
 His sources rather rely primarily on secondary sources written by the Jewish 
philosopher, Maimonides, and the German historian, W. G. Tennemann.
245
 This 
emphasizes the point that Hegel‘s critique of Arabic philosophy is of an external 
character. Secondly, Hegel confuses two distinct and opposite Islamic currents of 
thought. The first one is led by the theologians, known as Speakers/Medabberm,
246
who, 
as Hegel rightly says,  
used Greek [philosophical] science especially for the defense of their dogmas, 
since there was a pressing need to defend Islam against the Christian who made 
up a large part of the peoples they had subdued.
247
  
                                                             
244 Hegel is aware of the Latin translation of Arabic philosophy. He writes, ―Some of these commentaries 
were also translated into Latin and printed, and they are still extant, but nothing much is to be gained from 
them.‖ Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p.30.  
245 Hegel‘s dependence on Maimonides is obvious from Hegel‘s many quotations from Maimonides‘ The 
Guide of the Perplexed. As for his dependence on Tennemann, Robert Brown writes in his notes on Hegel‘s 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ―This brief summary of Arabic philosophy and its role as one 
channel for the transmission of Aristotle‘s philosophy is based on Tennemann‖ (Geschichte 8, pt. 1:367-
440). See: Ibid., p. 30, no. 33. Brown also writes, ―Hegel‘s source on this two-stage translation process 
[from Greek to Syriac and from Syriac to Arabic] is Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann‘s Geschichte der 
Philosophie, 11 vol. (Leipzig, 1798-1819), 8, pt. Ibid., p. 29, no. 31. 
246
 As Brown writes, ―Hegel follows Maimonides in using the Hebrew term medabberim, which in Latin is 
rendered loquentes (‗speakers‘). In the west this school of speculative theologians is now commonly known 
by the Islamic term Mutakallimum (‗dialecticians‘), from Kalam (speculative theology).‖ Ibid., p. 30, no. 
34. For more on the philosophy of Kalam, see: Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
247 Ibid., p. 30. In contrast to Hegel, Massimo Campanini presents two other opinions for the purpose of 
Muslims‘ translation and use of Greek philosophy. One is maintained by Gutas who argues that the reason 
beyond this translation is politics: "translations were carried out because they were useful to the policies of 
the first Abbasid caliphs". As for the second opinion, Campanini writes, "The Moroccan philosopher al-
Jabri, presenting a somewhat different view from that of Gutus, asserts that...Philosophy was to be a 
weapon against the ideological attack of Gnosticism which threatened the very foundations of state." See: 
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The second intellectual current, which comes as an opposition to the first one, is 
established by the Islamic philosophers, who deal with Greek philosophy in itself, not in 
order to serve religious interests.
248
 Hegel, however, subsumes the Islamic philosophers 
under the rubric of ―Commentators of Aristotle.‖249 For him, these philosophers ―sank 
into a metaphysics of the understanding and into a formal dialectic.‖250 He briefly 
mentions Alkendi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Tofail, and finally Averroes, with whom 
Arabic philosophy is, in Hegel‘s view, supposedly terminated.251  
Hegel‘s listing of the theologian Algazel, who is the very opposite to the 
philosophers,
252
 among the commentators of Aristotle supports the point that Hegel is not 
aware enough of the opposition between the speakers and the philosophers in Arabic 
philosophy. This opposition, in fact, has a long history in Arabic philosophy. It 
eventually culminates in two well-known books: The Incoherence of The Philosophers by 
the theologian Algazel, and the reply book of The Incoherence of The Incoherence by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Massimo Campanini, An introduction to Islamic Philosophy, trans. Caroline Higgitt, (Edinburgh, UK, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 41-42. 
248 For more on the opposition between the speakers and the philosophers in Arabic philosophy, see: Majid 
Fakry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp.209-240. 
249 Hegel, Hegel‟s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Haldane, p.34. 
250 Ibid., p. 25. 
251 See: Ibid., pp.34-35.  
252 As Michael Marmura mentions in his introduction to Algazel‘s The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 
Algazel undertakes ―to refute twenty philosophical doctrines. Seventeen are condemned as heretical 
innovations, three as totally opposed to Islamic belief, and those upholding them as outright infidels.‖ 
Michael E. Marmura, Translator‘s Introduction, in Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. 
Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utha: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), p. xv. And, as Algazel himself 
writes, ―the source of their [Islamic Philosophers‘] unbelief is in their hearing high-sounding names such as 
―Socrates,‖ ―Hippocrates,‘ ―Plato,‖ ―Aristotle,‖ and their likes and the exaggeration and misguidedness of 
groups of their followers in describing their minds; the excellence of their principles; the exactitude of their 
geometrical, logical, natural, and metaphysical sciences—and in [describing these as] being alone (by 
reason of excessive intelligence and acumen) [capable]of extracting these hidden things.‖ Ibid., p. 2.    
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philosopher Averroes.
253
 These two books represent the highest phase of the opposition 
between faith and reason in Arabic philosophy, if not even in medieval philosophy.
254
  
Whereas the opposition between the speakers and the philosophers is not central 
in Hegel‘s reading of Arabic philosophy, for Sadra, it is exactly the attempt to overcome 
this opposition that distinguishes him from both the speakers and the philosophers. This 
claim increases the problematic situation of Sadra within Hegel‘s Lectures, for Sadra 
cannot be fit even within the Hegelian division of Arabic philosophy into 
speakers/theologians and philosophers/commentators. Sadra‘s philosophy, in fact, forms 
a kind of synthesis between the irrationality of the speakers based on faith, on one hand, 
and the one-sided rationality of the philosophers based on the formality of understanding, 
on the other hand. This claim will be supported in light of Hegel‘s critique of both the 
speakers and the philosophers. 
Hegel’s Critique of the Speakers 
Hegel‘s critique of the Islamic speakers‘ dogmas is a continuation of his systemic 
critique of religion, faith, feelings, myths, and mysterious knowledge.
255
  For him, these 
                                                             
253
 For more on the opposition between Algazel (Al-Ghazali) and Averroes, see: Avital Wohlman, Al-
Ghazali, Averroes and the Interpretation of the Qur'an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam, trans. 
David Burrell (New York:  Rutledge, 2010). 
254
 Averroes‘s interpretation of Aristotle had well-known influence on number of Christian philosophers in 
the latter Middle Ages and during the Renaissance. The movement of Latin Averrorism entered in conflict 
with the faith of church. Hegel wrote on this matter without mentioning Averroes. He wrote, however, 
about the significant role of ―the University of Cordova in Andalusia‖ in which Averroes was the most 
prominent philosopher. Cordova was, as Hegel says, ―a center-point of learning; many from the lands of the 
west journeyed thither, just as even the Pope Sylvester II…for the purpose of studying under the Arabs.‖ 
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Haldane, p. 74. When Hegel wrote about the 
consequence of this learning which leads to the conflict with faith he referred to Aristotle, not to Averroes‘ 
interpretation of Aristotle. Hegel writes, ―On the first appearing of the Aristotelian writings, the Church 
made difficulties; the reading of his metaphysics and physics and the abstracts prepared therefrom, as also 
the exposition of the same, was forbidden by a church synod held at Paris 1209.‖ Ibid.,, p. 47. 
255 For more on Hegel‘s systemic critique of religion, see: The Concept of Religion: Hegel's God and the 
Relation Between Religion and Philosophy in Thomas A. Lewis, Religion, Modernity, and Politics in 
Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 135-179. See also: ―Richard III, Hamlet, Macbeth, and 
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cognitive forms are external considerations of truth; they do not stem internally from the 
pure activity of the speculative reason. These forms do not, as Hegel writes, ―come from 
reason as independent;‖ they do not take ―self-consciousness,‖ as ―an essential moment 
in the truth.‖256  Within this line of thought, Hegel writes, 
The Arabians, like the Christians of the West, were restricted by the dogmas of 
their Church (if one may call it so), few though these dogmas were; yet this last 
circumstance of the small number of the dogmas certainly gave them greater 
liberty. But according to all that we know of them, they established no principle 
of self-conscious reason that was truly higher, and thus they brought Philosophy 
no further. They have no other principle than that of revelation, therefore only a 
principle that is external.
257
   
 
For Hegel, then, the speakers‘ determinations of truth are external in that they drive their 
principle from outside and not from within thought itself. Thought in this case is not free 
and spontaneous. Speakers‘ thought is restricted with what Hegel describes as ―the dead 
externality of authority.‖258  
Although Sadra accepts ―revelation‖ as a source of knowledge,259 he is different 
from the speakers who only look to how philosophical arguments, as Hegel critically 
says, ―had to be deployed in order to support their assertions.‖260 Sadra‘s account of 
revelation, rather, shares what Quentin Lauer describes as ―Hegel‘s conviction that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Henry V: Conscience, Hypocrisy, Self-Deceit and the Tragedy of Ethical Life‖ in Jennifer Ann Bates, 
Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination (Albany: State University of New York, 2010), pp. 201-222. 
256
 Hegel, Hegel‟s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Haldane, p. 217. 
257 Ibid., p.30. 
258 Hegel describes philosophy in modern times as different from that of middle ages by saying that 
―because the independently existent thought, this culminating point of inwardness, is now set forth and 
firmly grasped as such, the dead externality of authority is set aside and regarded as out of place.‖ Ibid., pp. 
217-218. 
259 For more on Sadra‘s intellectual view of revelation, see: Zailan Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition 
and Reason in the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra: An Analysis of the al-Hikmah al- Arshiyyah (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). See also the recent work on Sadra‘s philosophical interpretation of scripture by 
Mohammed Ruston, The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mulla Sadra (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2012). 
260 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p. 30. 
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revelation must be intelligible if it is to be a revelation at all.‖261 In fact, what Hegel 
found interesting in the Church Fathers can be also applied to Sadra‘s method of thought. 
For Hegel, Church Fathers do not restrict themselves to the level of the writings of the 
Bible but go beyond that to reach its deep spirit. Their principle, as Hegel points out, is: 
―the letter kills but the Spirit gives life.‖262This principle is also present in Sadra‘s 
philosophy. He, for instance, devotes a book, Breaking the Idols of Ignorance, just to 
criticize the theologians and the Sufi for their inability to go deeper to the meaning of 
revelation. Exposing the reason behind their failure to capture the spirit of revelation, 
Sadra writes, 
This is because the sight of their intellect is concentrated on the forms of things 
and their imaginary frames and they do not extend their sight to their secrets or 
truths, nor do they perceive the balance between the seen world and the unseen 
realm. They have missed that and have become confused by the contradictory 
parables explained by the religious laws and prophets. Thus, they neither 
perceive, in the way the elite perceive, anything of the truths of belief in God, His 
attributes, signs, angels, books, messengers and the Last Day.
263
 
 
Before seeing how Hegel examines the self-consistency of the speakers‘ thought-
content, some remarks should be mentioned on Hegel‘s reading of the speakers. Firstly, 
among the many Islamic theological schools, the two opposite schools of Asharite and 
Mutazilite are the only theological schools which Hegel brings in his treatment of Arabic 
philosophy. On the one hand, he does not give more attention to Mutazilite School and 
just considers it as ―the first to take an interest in the abstract knowledge.‖ 264 On the 
other hand, he focuses exclusively on the ontological and epistemological consequences 
                                                             
261 Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God (Albany: State University of New York, 1982), p. 8. Lauer adds, 
―Hegel is convinced that God has told us nothing of himself if what he has told us is unintelligible to 
human reason.‖ p. 8.  
262 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p. 24. 
263 Mulla Sadra, Breaking the Idols of Ignorance, trans. M. Dasht Bozorgi and F. Asadi Amjad (London: 
ICAS Press, 2008), p.5.  
264 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Brown, p. 27. 
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of Asharite‘s doctrine of atoms. I raise this point because the significant difference 
between these two schools in regard to the theory of causation, which Hegel criticizes, is 
absent in Hegel‘s reading of them.265 Sadra, on the other side, was aware of this 
opposition between these two theological schools. His theory of causation overcomes this 
opposition, as we will see. 
In order to satisfy some theological demands related to divine freedom, the 
speakers make some modifications on the Greek theory of atoms.
266
 It is not my purpose 
to enter into these details. My point, rather, is to see how Hegel identifies the 
contradiction of the speakers‘ account of causation in relation to their theory of atoms. In 
this regard, Hegel writes, 
Maimonides says: ―The ground-principle of the Medabberim[speakers] is that 
men can have no certain knowledge of the nature of things, because in the 
understanding the contrary may ever exist and be thought. Besides this they in the 
majority of instances confound imagination with understanding, and give to the 
former the name of the latter.‖ They adopted as a principle, ―atoms and empty 
space,‖ where all connection appears as something contingent. ―Production is 
nothing but a connection of atoms, and decay nothing but the separation of the 
same; and time consists of many ‗nows.‘‖267  
 
After this short quotation from Maimonides, Hegel criticizes the speakers by saying: 
 
In this way nothing but the atom really exists. They have thus in the more 
advanced cultivation of thought brought to consciousness the main standpoint, 
then as now the standpoint of Orientals—that of substance, the one substance. 
This pantheism, or Spinozism, if you like to call it so, is thus the universal view of 
Oriental poets, historians, and philosophers. 
268
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Although it is difficult to understand how Hegel reduces in one step the speakers‘ 
unlimited atoms into Spinoza‘s one substance, three serious points of deficiency in the 
speakers can be deduced. The first one is related to their skeptical epistemological view. 
The second one is related to their ontological view based on the permanency of substance 
and the ever-changeability of accidents. The third one is concerned with their view of 
time.  
Hegel starts from the speakers‘ account of knowledge and moves to their account 
of ontology. He, following Maimonides, bases the speakers‘ ontology on their ―ground-
principle‖ of the uncertainty of knowledge. In fact, the case with the speakers is the 
opposite. It is their ontology of the permanency of substance and their account of the 
ever-changeability of accidents that lead them to their skeptical view of knowledge. That 
is to say, their ontology is prior to their epistemology. Hegel, however, touches on this 
point later when he further elaborates on the speakers‘ account of accidents. He writes, 
―In the same way knowledge also is an accident, which is created by God at every 
moment that I know anything; today we no longer possess the knowledge which we 
yesterday possessed.‖269 As we will see later on, Sadra focuses his critique of the 
speakers on the three points that Hegel mentions—that of epistemology, ontology, and 
temporality. But his critique—contra to Hegel and Maimonides—starts primarily from 
exposing the deficiency of the speakers‘ ontology of the permanency of substance that 
eventually leads them to consider knowledge as an accident. Rather than starting from 
epistemology and moving to ontology, in his own philosophy Sadra moves from ontology 
to epistemology. And rather than arguing for the account of the permanency of substance, 
Sadra argues that substance substantially moves. With this account of trans-substantial 
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motion of existence, knowledge is re-defined. Knowledge is not to be understood as an 
accident, as the speakers assert, but as a mode of existence. The intensification of 
existence goes side by side with the intensification of knowledge. The more existence 
becomes simple and pure, the more knowledge becomes simple and pure—as we will see 
later. 
Hegel discovers in the speakers the notion of the contingency of relations which 
reflects the speakers‘ denial of the necessity of the causal connection between events. In 
order to find room for the omnipotence of God, who is not bound to laws of nature, the 
speakers deny the necessary connection between cause and effect. Instead, they consider 
the causal relationship as a mere habit. In his Incoherence, Algazel, who, as Hegel 
acknowledges, ―was a sceptic of great ability‖270—well before Hume271—writes,  
The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is 
habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary, according to us. But with any 
two things, where ―this‖ is not ―that‖ and ―that‖ is not ―this‖ and where neither 
the affirmation of the one entails the affirmation of the other neither the negation 
of the one entails negation of the other, it is not a necessity of the existence of the 
one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of the nonexistence of the 
one that the other should not exist—for example the quenching of thirst and 
drinking , satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the 
appearance of sun, death and decapitation, healing and the drinking of medicine, 
the purging of the bowels and the using of a purgative, and so on to [include] all 
[that is] observable among connected things in medicine, astronomy, arts, and 
crafts. Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side 
by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation.
272
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matter.‖ Edward Omar Moad, Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and Acquisition in Philosophy East and 
West, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Jan, 2007), p. 12, no. 30.  
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Hegel, however, criticizes the speakers‘ dogmas without discussing Algazel‘s debate with 
the Islamic philosophers. For him, Algazel just ―held the words of the Prophet to be pure 
truth, and wrote the Destructio of Philosophorum.‖273  
On the basis of their belief of the continuity of God‘s creative activity, the 
speakers, as Hegel says, argue that ―no accident can endure for two moments; as soon as 
it arises it perishes too, and the substance (God) always creates another in its place,‖274 
Here the only true cause is God: 
Everything may just as well be something else as what it is, and there is no reason 
at all why anything should be one way rather than another. They (the speakers) 
term it a mere habit that the earth revolves round a center-point, that fire moves 
upward and that it is hot; it is just as possible, they say, that fire should be cold.
275
 
  
The speakers‘ rejection of the idea of different, discrete substances acting upon each 
other through necessary causation leads Hegel to this conclusion: 
In the pure philosophy of the so called ―Speakers‖ was expressed the principle, 
peculiar to the Oriental mind, of the dissolution of definite thought in all its 
consequences as the dissolution of all connections and relation.
276
 
 
 For Hegel, what make thought definite are its concrete determinations. The 
concreteness means that the dialectical, inclusive relationship between various 
determinations must be brought dialectally back into a systematic totality—a totality that 
insofar as it excludes and negates its parts, it includes and sublates them. Truth as a 
whole, then, must include all determinations—nothing should be left out. That is to say, 
truth should have nothing outside itself but contain everything within it. This inclusive 
view of truth contrasts with the speakers‘ account of substance which does not include its 
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accidents/determinations. In the speakers, there is no reconciliation of particulars, 
accidents, or qualities—taken as determinations— with the whole as a substance or God. 
―All determinations are thus fleeting or perishable; the individual alone is permanent,‖277 
writes Hegel.  
With the speakers, therefore, determinations are always in a state of negation—a 
negation that never comes into self-consciousness. For Hegel, this kind of negation does 
not reach the stage of the speculative negation in which different moments of the dialectic 
must be sublated in a higher stage. The speakers, therefore, do not go beyond ―the 
abstract moment of negativity.‖ Hegel writes, 
This abstract negativity combined with the permanent unity, is thus a fundamental 
conception in the Oriental way of looking at things….Thus the Arabians 
developed the sciences and philosophy, without further defining the Idea; their 
work is rather the dissolution of all that is definite in this substance, with which is 
associated mere changeableness as the abstract moment of negativity.
278
  
 
Hegel’s Logic and the Critique of the Speakers  
Let us now turn to Hegel‘s Logic and see whether his criticism of the speakers‘ 
account of causation is consistent with his own position. The abstract moment of 
negativity, which Hegel finds in the speakers‘ account of causation, can be approximated 
to what, in his doctrine of essence, Hegel calls ―External negation‖: 
External negation—and this is what abstraction is—only shifts the 
determinateness of being away from what is left over as Essence; it only puts 
them, so to speak, elsewhere, leaving them the affirmative character they 
possessed before.
279
   
 
For Hegel, since the speakers‘ negation of accidents neither emerges internally from 
substance itself, nor returns into substance, this negation is an external and abstract 
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negation. This kind of negation would ground substance upon something other than its 
own essence. Its essence would be, as Hegel describes in his logic, ―inherently lifeless 
and empty.‖280 Now, since the speakers consider God as the only one substance whose 
determinations are abstractly negated, this speakers‘ God is abstract. We have seen that 
Hegel characterizes the speakers‘ account of substance as a kind of Spinozism.281 This 
characterization is in accord with his critique of Spinozism in his Logic when he writes 
that ―Spinozism is a defective philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold 
determining is an external thinking.‖282 For Hegel, in order to give concrete meaning to 
God as the absolute ground of opposite determinations, the relationship of 
ground/grounded must be re-thought.  
For Hegel, rethinking the relationship of ground/grounded means shifting it from 
the sphere of abstraction to the sphere of speculation. In the former, the duality of ground 
and grounded is thought under the abstract distinction between the opposites of 
identity/positive and difference/negative. In the latter, the duality is thought within the 
horizon of the unity of opposites. As Hegel writes, ―the proximate result of opposition 
(when realized as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as 
difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completed notion.‖283 Hegel‘s 
speculative account of ground does not thus operate within the abstract moment of 
negativity in which the opposites are excluded as determinations. Rather, ground is 
viewed as the principle into which the opposite determinations speculatively return. To 
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clarify this point and approximate it to Hegel‘s critique of the speakers, we will take 
finite being and necessary being as our example of opposites. 
 Hegel writes, ―Finite things in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this, to be 
contradictory and disrupted within themselves and to return into their ground.‖284 But 
what is the ground of finite beings? The speakers, from their theological account, 
consider God as the ungrounded ground of finite beings. However, in their inference of 
the necessary being from the contingent beings, the speakers‘ absolute view of the 
ungrounded ground suffers a contradiction.
285
 For, as we learn from Hegel‘s logic, the 
contingent being as the grounded—which in the case of the speakers is abstractly 
excluded from the necessary being— is included in the necessary being. ―The grounded,‖ 
as Hegel finds, ―completely contains within itself the ground, their relation is an 
undifferentiated essential compactness.‖286 According to Hegel, the necessary being is 
not ungrounded as the speakers‘ inference claims. Hegel explains,  
The true inference from a finite and contingent being to an absolutely necessary 
being does not consist in inferring the latter from the former as from a being that 
is and remains the ground. On the contrary, the inference is from a being that, as 
is also directly implied in contingency, is only in a state of collapse and is 
inherently self-contradictory. 
287
   
 
It is thus only when we think the contradiction within a finite being as a speculative 
negation rather than an abstract negation that the inference of the necessary from the 
contingent is true. ―The truth,‖ Hegel writes, ―is that the absolute is, because the finite is 
the inherently self-contradictory opposition, because it is not.‖288   
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In contrast to the speakers, Hegel considers the self-contradictory of a finite being 
not as a defect that should be excluded from the necessary being but as something 
essential and inherent in everything. ―Contradiction,‖ as Hegel writes, ―is the very 
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is 
unthinkable.‖289 Hegel rethinks contradiction as the ground which is ―the approximate 
result of opposition.‖ Contradiction is thus included within the absolute being as the 
ground in which the finite beings dissolve their self-contradiction. So, although the 
necessary is, as Hegel says, ―derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is 
derived as a vanishing element in itself.‖290The speakers‘ derivation of the necessary is, 
accordingly, abstract in that it does not explicitly contain its determinations within it. ―It 
only puts them, so to speak, elsewhere, leaving them the affirmative character they 
possessed before,‖ as Hegel says above. 
If the speakers consider the relationship between the absolute being as ground and 
the finite being as grounded as a one-sided relation of dependency, Hegel considers it as a 
relation of mutual dependence. For him, this relationship is not unilateral relationship but 
circular relationship. That is, insofar as the grounded absolutely depends on the ground, 
the ground absolutely depends on the grounded:  
The ground and what is grounded are one and the same content: the difference 
between the two is the mere difference of form, which separates simple-relation 
on the one hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other.
291
 
 
As the dialectic proceeds, the category of ground is developed further in the category of 
reciprocity. Here the relation of cause and effect finds its ultimate speculative unity as a 
self-contained relationship. ―Reciprocity,‖ as Hegel writes, ―is undoubtedly the proximate 
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truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the 
notion.‖292 Here the cause, although it is distinct from its effect, is at the same time its 
own effect, and vice versa. That is, cause and effect imply one another: 
effect contains nothing whatever that cause does not contain. Conversely, cause 
contains nothing which is not in its effect. Cause is cause only in so far as it 
produces an effect, and effect is nothing but this, to have a cause. Cause as such 
implies its effect, and effect implies cause.
293
 
 
 In this speculative account of causality, the relationship between cause and effect is no 
longer a mere habit or accident, as the speakers say, but something inherent and 
necessary. Cause and effect are essentially mutual implications within the development of 
truth towards the Absolut Idea. 
As in his Lectures, Hegel in his Logic is aware of the reason behind the 
theologians‘ rejecting of the necessity between cause and effect—a reason that is related 
to their concern about the freedom of God. But, as Hegel writes in his Logic, ―those, who 
fancy they honor Divine Providence by excluding necessity from it, are degrading it by 
this exclusiveness to a blind and irrational caprice.‖294  
Sadra’s Critique of the Speakers 
 
While the speakers stop, as Hegel concludes, at ―the abstract moment of 
negativity,‖ Sadra goes a moment further. The ever changeability of determinations 
which led to the dissolution of definite thought—which Hegel discovers in the speakers‘ 
account of the relationship between accidents/determinations and substance /unity—is 
pushed by Sadra further into substance itself. With Sadra, the changeability of the 
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contingent world emerges primarily from within the inner activity of substance itself. As 
we have seen in the first chapter, for Sadra, substance is substantially a dynamic unity of 
process. In light of this necessary dynamicity inhered in substance—which reflects the 
dynamicity of existence as a whole— the habit-relationship between cause and effect is 
criticized and rejected.
295
  
For Sadra, therefore, the changeability of accidents is a necessary consequence of 
the changeability of substance in itself. Substance‘s changeability is thus not imposed 
from outside but emerges from within. The importance of this account of the inner 
changeability of substance is reflected in its consequences related to time. As Fazlur 
Rahman explains,  
Mulla Sadra illustrates the succession of body in time with the example of the 
continuity of body in space. Just as a body extended in space is made up of 
continuous and successive parts, so do the potentially infinite successions in time 
constitute movement and extension in time. This continuity ensures both the 
difference and unity of a thing in time. Just as parts of an extension in space are 
essentially and existentially different from one another, so are the parts of 
movement in time different from one another: A thing is no longer the same in 
two successive moments. It is not only of the nature of matter to experience 
continuous change through different forms, but it is of the nature of body form 
itself to change continuously.
296
 
 
In contrast to the speakers‘ theory of atoms in which the world is, as de Boer says, ―a 
discontinuous mass, without any living reciprocal action between its parts,‖297 Sadra 
defends the view that the world is a continuous process based on the necessity of the 
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substantive change of existents. His philosophy thus breaks with the abstract unity of 
substance defended by the speakers.
298
  
The relationship of existence/essence, as well as the relationship of 
substance/accident, is reinterpreted by Sadra in light of the relationship of cause/effect. 
According to his account of causation, the substantial motion of existence—as a 
primordial cause of everything—results in the various essences as effects. For Sadra, it is 
because of the primary and necessary changeability of existence as a cause in itself that 
effects, as well as the changeability of effects, are produced. Essences as effects of the 
substantial movement of existence are reflected as mental representations in the human 
mind. In other words, existence in its actual and substantial movement manifests itself to 
the human mind in and through various essences. This conceptual reflection of essences 
in the human mind reflects, in effect, the intelligible content of reality. The intelligibility 
of reality is thus not given from outside existence, but from the inner activity of existence 
itself. That is to say, the intelligibility of reality emerges from within and not from 
something beyond. For Sadra, it is on the ground of this immanent intelligibility of 
existence that the identity of thought and being, the knower and the known is possible. In  
this regard, Kalin writes, 
Sadra establishes a close link between degrees of existence and levels of 
consciousness. A logical result of this is a doctrine of ‗ontological vitalism‘ 
according to which all things, animates and inanimate, have some degree of 
consciousness by virtue of the fact that they exist. It is within this context that 
Sadra develops his central thesis that when we interact with the world around us, 
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we interact with the various modalities and degrees of existence. What we know 
or claim to know is always an aspect of existence.
299
  
 
Sadra‘s attempt to overcome the deficiency of theological thought of the speakers 
from within, however, does not set him completely free from some dogmatic 
attachments. In Islamic tradition, the problem of causation is not taken in itself as a 
scientific problem; rather, it is taken in terms of the theological problem of the 
relationship of the divine will to the human will. Sadra‘s approach to the problem of 
causation consists of how positing a priori causation within the cosmos would not run 
contrary to the free will of God. So, the question that is central to Sadra is this: How 
could ―determinism and freedom‖ in God, Man, and Nature be possible without 
contradiction? Sadra‘s answer to this question is guided by his metaphysical 
existentialism. The answer aims to clarify the causal, ontological relationship between 
existence and essence, on the one hand, and the causal, epistemological relationship 
between subject and object, on the other hand.  
To clarify Sadra‘s view of determinism and freedom within the framework of the 
existential causality, the following long passage by him is important: 
The saying attributed to the foremost monotheist , ‗Ali,‘ ―There is neither total 
determinism [of human acts] nor total freedom,‖ does not mean that a given 
human action is a sort of composite of determinism and freedom; nor does it mean 
that it neutralizes both [by becoming a compound of them]; nor does it mean that 
from one point of view it is by constraint while from another point of view it is 
free; nor yet does it mean that man is really determined and is free only in form—
as the chief of philosophers[Avicenna and indeed al –Farabi] has expressed it; 
nor, finally, does it mean that man has a partial and deficient freedom and a 
similarly partial and deficient determination. What this saying means is that in 
man [voluntary actions]…freedom and determinism are the same. The adage, ―In 
everything the golden mean is the best,‖ is truly realized in this view; [only we 
must make its meaning precise in this context]. For, the mean between extremes is 
sometimes produced by a compounding of the two extremes in such a way that 
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both sides lose their extremeness; for example, water may achieve such a balance 
between hot and cold that it is no longer either hot or cold actually, and yet it 
cannot go outside these two categories. In such a mean, it is said, the mean 
―cancels out‖ both sides. But there is another sense of „mean‟ [which is more 
appropriate in our case]; this means that in a simpler and higher level or mode of 
existence, both sides are actually present [and neither of them is removed], but 
they become identical with one another in such a way that they do not contradict 
each other [nor do they cancel each other out]. ‗Mean‘ in this sense is better than 
the mean in the earlier sense.
300
  
 
The idea that underlies this passage can be interpreted in the general light of Hegel‘s idea 
of sublation.
301
 The point here is to touch on the three elements of abolishing, preserving, 
and transcending in Sadra‘s notion of ―means.‖ 
 In the above passage Sadra suggests a ―means‖ by which the absolute simplicity 
of existence is a mediation of extremes, of opposites, of what is different. Mediation here 
is nothing other than existence in its highest simple mode— existence as absolute infinity 
which includes all finites. For Sadra, the ―means‖ in its true highest simplicity must be 
neither one of its extremes, nor the combination of both in such a way that they are 
abstractly negated. Instead of the abstract conception of ―means‖ based on the traditional 
Aristotelian view of the abstract essence in which the opposites are canceled, Sadra‘s 
existential account holds a ―means‖ in which the opposites are actually identical. The two 
opposite extremes, as Sadra says, ―become identical with one another in such a way that 
they do not contradict each other nor do they cancel each other out.‖ This moment of 
identity can be realized at a final stage of the unfolding of existence. God, Man, and 
Nature, as three distinct moments, are reflected within this progressively unfolding of 
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existence that leads to the absolute identity of determinism and freedom. Freedom thus 
excludes and includes determinism insofar as determinism excludes and includes 
freedom. They are distinct and identical at the same time. Each abolishes, preserves, and 
transcends the other.  
Hegel’s Logical Account of Ground 
Let us now consider Hegel‘s account of the relation between identity and 
difference in comparison with Sadra‘s above view. To make this comparison consistent 
also with Hegel‘s critique of the speakers, we will view it in light of Hegel‘s account of 
ground. 
Hegel writes, ―The Ground is the unity of identity and difference.‖302 Ground here 
is the source into which identity and difference solve their contradiction. But what is the 
relation of ground in terms of essence and existence? Sadra and Hegel, as we will see, 
provide two different answers. 
 Sadra, as we have seen above, maintains that the ground into which the opposites 
of identity and difference return is existence in its simplicity. For him, the reconciliation 
of differences is reflected in the continuous process of the unfolding of existence. As 
Sadra writes, ―everything is an instantiation and ‗particularization‘ of existence which 
unfolds itself in a myriad of ways, modes, states, and degrees.‖303This process of 
existential unfolding ultimately finds its final realization in the self-centered totality of 
the Absolute simplicity of existence. In this stage of absolute existence, the differences 
that constitute the nature of essences are completely identical to the degree that there 
would be no essence but only pure existence.  
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In contrast to Sadra, Hegel writes, ―The ground is the essence in its own 
inwardness; the essence is intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a 
ground of somewhat, of an other.‖304Moreover, contrary to Sadra‘s ―positive simplicity of 
existence,‖ Hegel introduces the ―negative simplicity of essence‖ as the ground into 
which identity and difference found their solved contradiction: ―Essence, as infinite 
return-into-self, is not immediate but negative simplicity; it is a movement through 
distinct moments, absolute self-mediation.‖305 Now, since, as Hegel writes, ―an Existence 
only proceeds from the ground,‖306 and since the ground is the essence, then, existence 
proceeds from essence. But how come that essence is the ground from which existence 
proceeds? To understand the emergence of existence from essence we should first 
understand the emergence of essence from being. 
Essence in Itself: Essence’s Issuing From Being 
At the end of the Doctrine of Being and on the section of ―Transition into 
Essence‖ Hegel writes, ―Absolute indifference is the final determination of being before 
it becomes essence; but it does not attain to essence.‖307 The indifference which precedes 
the issuing of essence refers to the general feature of the sphere of Being in which the 
categories of the immediate being are indifferent to each other. They are immediately 
taken to be externally distinct from each other. But their logical movement ultimately 
unveils the deficiency of this relationship of indifference. As the dialectic proceeds in the 
section of measure, the qualitative determinations and the quantitative determinations of 
the immediate being necessitate each other. In their unity in measure, quality becomes in 
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itself quantity and vice versa. They now intrinsically mediate each other. They are no 
longer indifferent immediate determinations of being as the ordinary consciousness 
considers them.
308
 Being at this moment is a unity constituted by relative, non-immediate 
moments. ―We now obtain,‖ as Hegel writes, ―the being that is negated in its 
determinations, in general terms the sublated being that is Essence.‖309 Hegel summaries 
the process of the emergence of essence from Being in § 111 of his Encyclopaedia Logic: 
Instead of the more abstract sides (of being and nothing, of something and an 
other, etc.) the infinite, the affirmation as the negation of the negation, now has 
quality and quantity for its sides. Theses sides (α) have passed over into one 
another: quality into quantity (§ 98) and quantity into quality (§ 105), and they 
have thus exhibited themselves to be negations. (β) But in their unity (in measure) 
they are at first distinct, and each is only through the mediation of the other; and 
(γ) after the immediacy of this unity has proven to be self-sublating, this unity is 
now posited as what it is in-itself, as simple self-relation that contains within it 
being in general and its forms as sublated.—Being or immediacy which, through 
self-negation, is mediation with itself and relation to itself, and which is therefore 
equally mediation that sublates itself into relation to itself or into immediacy—
this being or immediacy is Essence.
310
  
 
Essence, therefore, is not something beyond the immediate being, as the traditional views 
of the metaphysical essentialism might think. It is rather the result of the dialectic of 
quality, quantity, and measure, as determinations of being that are no longer fixed but 
pass over into each other. That is, essence emerges at the moment when the relation 
between the determinations of immediate being is not the indifferent relationship of 
immediacy, but different relationship of mediation.  
At the end of the doctrine of being we reach, therefore, the conclusion that the 
immediacy of being is no longer simple immediacy but mediation. Essence as mediation 
is thus not the starting point of thought, for it comes after the thought of what is 
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immediately there before us. ―Essence,‖ as Hegel writes, ―issues from being; hence it is 
not immediately in and for itself but is a result of that movement.‖311 Essence is non-
immediacy and as thus it is the negation of immediacy. Here we reach the negative 
feature of essence. For, although essence issues from immediacy, it is the negation of 
immediacy. 
 If, however, essence emerges when it has been proved that the immediacy of 
being is not simple immediacy, essence cannot be understood apart from its relation to 
immediacy. Essence here is the essence of what is immediately given. This means that 
essence at the moment of its emergence from the immediate being is not independent as 
such. Regarding essence in its immediate contrast with the immediate being, essence 
seems to have its own immediacy as the essential comparing to what is unessential. That 
is, when we take essence to be immediately different from the immediacy of the doctrine 
of being, immediacy is still in consideration of essence.
312
 Here we have two kinds of 
immediacy: the immediacy of essence itself and the immediacy from which essence has 
emerged. The latter is the simple immediacy of the doctrine of being which is now 
negated by the essence in its own immediacy.  
 The dialectic of essence, however, does not stop at this ―first negation‖ 313of the 
initial immediacy of being. If it stops at this moment, Hegel would be a traditional 
essentialist who believes in two distinct beings, one essential and the other unessential. 
For him, essence is rather the negation of the immediate negation of immediacy, or 
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absolute negativity of being. ―But essence,‖ Hegel writes, ―is the absolute negativity of 
being.‖314 In this double negation of immediacy, 
the immediate that is still distinguished from essence is not merely an unessential 
determinate being but the immediate that is in and for itself a nullity; it is only a 
non-essence, illusory being.
315
 
 
Although illusory being also seems as if it is distinct from essence,
316
 essence‘s 
reflective movement shows that this illusory being is itself projected by the essence 
itself.
317
 As Hegel writes, ―This illusory being is not something external to or other than 
essence; on the contrary it is essence‘s own illusory being.‖318 This makes Hegel again 
different from an essentialist in the traditional sense. For, in the light of considering 
essence as a process of negativity, there is no distinction between what seems to be 
illusion and what is immediately taken to be beyond this illusion.
319
The illusion of the 
immediacy of being is ―essence itself in the determinateness of being.‖320 
In its process of self-negativity, essence, however, does have immediacy in 
itself.
321
 But the intrinsic immediacy of essence is not the first immediacy of essence that 
results in the difference of essence from both the unessential being and the illusory being. 
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It is rather the sublation of this first immediacy, which does not reflect the true 
determination of essence. Hegel characterizes essence‘s intrinsic immediacy that sublates 
the first immediacy, which results in unessential being and illusory being, as ―the 
immediacy that is as pure mediation or absolute negativity.‖322 Essence‘s intrinsic 
immediacy as pure mediation and absolute negativity determines the very nature of 
essence in itself.  
This latter consideration of essence in itself, which Hegel also calls simple 
essence, leads us to sharp distinction between Hegel and Sadra. As we have seen in the 
first chapter, Sadra treats essence from two prospective: essence in itself, and essence for 
existence. We found that Sadra‘s essence in itself is equivalent to nothing. For Sadra, 
essence in itself does not have any meaningful sense; essence has meaning only in 
relation to the reality of existence. In contrast, the meaningful richness of essence in itself 
in its Hegelian account makes it the absolute negativity that exposes the deficiency of any 
kind of external immediacy, whether it be the immediacy of the unessential being or the 
immediacy of the illusory being. For Hegel, essence in itself is not mere nothing as Sadra 
maintains but ―the movement of nothing to nothing, and so back to itself.‖ 323 Essence in 
itself contains its mediation; as thus, it is not (abstract self-identity) that could be equated 
with nothing. Hegel‘s essence in itself is rather (speculative self-identity) in which 
opposition is not left out but included within essence as ground—a ground in which the 
contradiction of the opposites is resolved. 
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However, Hegel‘s consideration of essence does not stop only at the level of 
essence in itself. Here are the three interrelated perspectives of essence as Hegel 
introduces them before he treats them in details: 
I. As  simple essence, essence in itself, which in its determinations remains 
within itself 
II. As emerging into determinate being, or in accordance with its Existence 
and Appearance 
III. As essence that is one with its Appearance, as actuality.324 
 
These are the three sections that cover the whole of the Doctrine of Essence. Our above 
analysis is only related to section one, which Hegel further named as ―Section One: 
Essence as Reflection Within Itself.‖325 Let us now touch on the second section in which 
essence emerges into existence.  
Essence’s Emerging into Existence  
Before its issuing from the general immediacy of the sphere of Being, ―essence,‖ 
as Hegel writes, ―was already implicit within measure.‖326The unity of simple essence, or 
essence in itself, is thus contained in the sphere of Being but ―only as an implicit 
unity.‖327  Essence in this state is ―indeterminate essence.‖328 If essence at the end of the 
doctrine of being has no determinate being, the sphere of essence is its own sphere in 
which ―it must develop determinate being.‖329 Hegel writes, 
Since essence is at first simple negativity, it now has to posit in its own sphere the 
determinateness that is only implicit in it, in order to give itself determinate being 
and then being-for-self.[…] The negativity of essence is reflection; and the 
determinations are reflected, posited by essence itself and remaining in essence as 
sublated. 
330
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In its own reflective process of negativity essence determines itself within itself as 
the ground of its two moments of reflection: (inward reflection/identity) and (reflection-
into-another/difference). Essence as ground is thus the unity of identity and difference. 
But this unity is not abstract; instead, it is self-sublating unity.
331
 For Hegel, it is in 
considering the unity of identity and difference as speculative unity rather than abstract 
unity that essence as ground determines itself and thus emerges into existence. That is, 
the speculative unity of essence as ground involves essence‘s self-sublating of its own 
determinations that results in its emerging into existence. Hegel writes, 
The ground is self-sublating and what it sublates itself toward, the result of its 
negation, is existence. Existence, therefore, which is what has emerged from the 
ground, contains the latter within itself, and the ground does not remain behind 
existence; instead, it is precisely this process of self-sublation and translation into 
existence.
332
 
 
Essence in its own meditating movement of reflection thus sublates itself within 
itself. Essence‘s sublating of itself constitutes it as ground that does not result in 
nothing—as Sadra might argue— but in existence. As Hegel writes, ―reflection, in ending 
with the sublating of itself, does not therefore have for result nothing.‖333 Existence, 
rather than nothing, is, therefore, the reflective result of essence‘s meditating movement 
with itself in which the ground and the grounded become identical. As Hegel writes, 
―essence has passed over into Existence in so far as essence as ground no longer 
distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded, or in so far as this ground has sublated 
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itself.‖334 In this essence‘s self sublating of its own determinations, the reflected 
determinations of essence are dialectically affirmed as the ground of existence.   
If existence proceeds from essence, does that imply the priority of essence over 
existence? It looks as if we retreat with Hegel to a kind of essentialism in which essence 
in its ontological primacy takes advantage over against existence. But Hegel‘s existence 
is not viewed as an ontological entity that is bestowed or predicated upon a static essence, 
which might exist in the Platonic world of Ideas or in God‘s knowledge. For Hegel, the 
inner dynamicity of essence in itself, which constitutes it as pure mediation or absolute 
negativity, produces existence not ―as a predicate or as a determination of essence‖335—
as the traditional metaphysics of essentialism holds. Instead, the intrinsic dynamicity of 
essence as the ground of its own opposites produces existence as ―a being that has come 
forth from negativity and inwardness.‖336 This result breaks with the transcendental 
relationship between essence and existence in its traditional sense.  For, as Hegel writes,  
Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground in it; the ground 
does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by its very nature suspends 
itself and translates itself into existence.
337
 
 
In its intrinsic process of negativity toward its unfolding as existence, essence has 
determined itself as ground. Essence as ground is speculative unity of its inclusive 
opposites rather than abstract unity of exclusive opposites. Essence emerges into 
existence when it proves to be the ground in which the contradiction of identity and 
difference is resolved. In its unfolding process into existence, essence sublates its three 
immediate moments of unity: (1) The immediate unity of essence as implicitly reflected 
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in the section of measure in the sphere of Being, (2) the immediate unity of essence when 
it is regarded in contrast to what seems as unessential being, and (3) the immediate unity 
of essence as reflected in the positing reflection of illusory being. Essence as ground that 
emerges into existence is the sublation of all these immediacies. The movement of 
essence by which it emerges into existence is thus intrinsic movement within essence 
itself. Existence is thus the result of essence‘s immanent movement within itself—a 
reflective movement from one of its determinations to its opposite one and so back to 
itself. In this immanent movement, the opposite determinations of essence do not stand 
on their own dependency—as it is the case with the determinations in the sphere of 
Being. In Essence, as Hegel writes,  
we do not have a genuine other, but only diversity, relation between the One and 
its other. Thus in Essence passing-over is at the same time not passing-over. For 
in the passing of what is diverse into another diversity, the first one does not 
vanish; instead, both remain within this relation.
338
 
   
The remaining of the opposites within the same mediated relation of essence does not 
mean that they are in static relationship, for they are sublated by essence itself in its 
emerging into existence. This reflective dialectic within essence results in existence. 
Here, as Hegel writes, ―Existence is essence‘s absolute emptying of itself.‖339 
Let us analyze further essence‘s reflective movement within itself that results in 
existence, as we found above. At the beginning of the doctrine of essence, Hegel deals 
intensively with three types of reflection: positing/pure, external, and determining 
reflection.
340
 In what follows I will not enter into the complex details of the development 
of these reflections. I just want to follow the general path that essence, in its reflective 
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process of determinacy, takes in the way of its determining itself as ground. The point is 
to see the logical results of these moments of reflection that essence intrinsically endures 
before it ―converts itself into ground and passes over into Existence.‖341  
Essence‘s initial movement as positing reflection results in considering the 
immediacy of the sphere of Being neither as distinct unessential being nor as distinct 
illusory being. With positing reflection the two latter kinds of being no longer stand in 
their immediacy contrasting the immediacy of essence. They are now reflectively brought 
back into essence itself.  In this inward reflection, essence determines itself as identity 
with itself. As Hegel writes in his introducing to the category of identity in his 
Encyclopaedia Logic, ―essence shines within itself or is pure reflection. In this way it is 
only relation to self (though not as immediate but as reflected relation): identity with 
itself.‖342 But this inward reflection which results in essence‘s category of identity is 
further opposed by essence‘s external reflection. If the former reflection is inward 
reflection that results in identity, the latter reflection is reflection-into-another that would 
result in difference. As the external reflection opposes the positing reflection, they are 
now both united further in the determining reflection. ―Determining reflection is,‖ as 
Hegel writes, ―the unity of positing and external reflection.‖343 The reflective movement 
of essence as manifested in determining reflection is thus the unity of positing 
reflection/identity and external reflection/difference. It is in this determining reflection 
that essence sublates its own opposites of identity and difference and then determines 
itself as the ground in which the contradiction is resolved. Hence, as Hegel writes, 
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―Ground is the unity of identity and distinction….the inward reflection which is just as 
much reflection-into-another and vice versa.‖344 It is in this moment of its reflective 
totality as ground of its own opposites that essence determines itself.  
Thus essence, in determining itself as ground, proceeds only from itself. As 
ground, therefore, it posits itself as essence, and it is in positing itself as essence 
that its determining consists.
345
     
 
Essence thus determines itself as ground that sublates its own reflected 
determinations. Through the mediation of determinate ground, the dialectic of essence 
proceeds from the absolute ground to the conditioning ground.
346
At the moment of the 
determinate ground we reach the sufficiency of ground in which ―there is nothing in the 
ground that is not in the grounded, and there is nothing in the grounded that is not in the 
ground.‖347But this identity of the ground and the grounded ―remains a mere formalism 
and empty tautology.‖348  It is not until the formalism of the determinate ground is further 
sublated in the conditioning ground that essence emerges into existence. ―For existence,‖ 
as Hegel writes, ―is the immediacy that has emerged from the sublating of the mediation 
by which ground and condition are related, and in emerging it sublates this emerging 
itself.‖349    
Hegel‘s essentialism is thus not abstract essentialism in which the relation 
between existence and essence stands as abstract duality. For essence‘s reflection is 
neither only inward reflection of identity nor only external reflection of difference. The 
determining reflection of essence is rather the speculative totality of these previous kinds 
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of reflection and kinds of being. It is the speculative unity of identity and difference that 
determines essence as ground that emerges into existence. Here the identity of essence is 
not to be taken as abstract identity, nor is difference to be taken as abstract difference.  
Hegel‘s essentialism is different from abstract essentialism in that it is not a one-
sided determinateness of truth. For Hegel does not view identity as ―unmoved 
identity,‖350 governed only by the mere nature of the law of identity as ―analytic‖. ―It is 
evident,‖ for Hegel,  
that the law of identity itself, and still more the law of contradiction, is not merely 
of analytic but of synthetic nature. For the latter contains in its expression not 
merely empty, simple equality-with-self, and not merely the other of this in 
general, but, what is more, absolute inequality, contradiction per se. But…the 
law of identity itself contains the movement of reflection, identity as a vanishing 
of otherness.
351
 
 
By discovering the ―synthetic‖ nature of the law of identity, Hegel becomes able to states 
that ―truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference.”352 We will see in the 
next chapter how Hegel‘s synthetic approach of essentialism is a sublation of the two 
analytic views of the positive, qualitative account of essence of the traditional 
metaphysics, on the one hand, and the negative, qualitative account of essence of Sadra, 
on the other hand.  
But our above analysis of the relationship between essence and existence does not 
mean that Hegel stops at the moment of essence‘s emerging into existence. Existence 
itself becomes an immanent moment within essence‘s unfolding toward the Notion.  As a 
dialectical movement of reflection toward the Notion, the Logic of Essence has three 
general moments: positedness, transitoriness, and determinateness. The latter moment is 
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the sublation of the previous two moments. In this context, Hegel writes, ―it is the 
determinate that has brought into subjection its transitoriness and its mere positedness, or 
has bent back its reflection-into-other into reflection-into-self.‖353 Not until the logical 
movement of reflection reaches its category of ―reciprocity,‖ does essence free itself from 
the externality of its other and becomes self-determined reflection. For it is in the 
opposites of cause and effect as reciprocal determinations of essence that mediation 
becomes self-mediation rather than mediation by its other. Here ―reciprocity,‖ as Hegel 
writes, ―stands, so to say, on the threshold of the notion.‖354 Notion as self-mediation is 
thus the sublation of the mediation of Essence and the immediacy of Being. ―The 
Notion,‖ Hegel writes, 
is to be regarded in the first instance simply as the third to being and essence, to 
the immediate and to reflection. Being and essence are so far the moments of its 
becoming; but it is their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are 
submerged and contained. They are contained in it because it is their result, but no 
longer as being and essence.
355
 
 
Let us conclude here by returning to our discussion of Hegel and Sadra in relation 
to the speakers. There is a difference between Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critiques of the 
speakers‘ account of causation. While Hegel treats it from outside its theological context, 
from outside its sophisticated details related to other theological themes, Sadra reads, 
analyzes, and exposes its deficiency from within its theological context. Despite the two 
different approaches of Sadra and Hegel, the final result looks similar. Both of them 
refuse to accept the relationship between cause and effect to be a mere habit. Both insist 
on the necessity between cause and effect. Both push this necessity between cause and 
effect to a high level of identity which ultimately finds its manifestation in the Absolute. 
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Whereas Sadra‘s Absolute is the higher moment of ―simple existence‖356 that 
progressively includes and transcends essence, Hegel‘s Absolute is the highest moment 
of the speculative Idea that dialectically includes and transcends Being and Essence.  
Sadra’s Critique of the Philosophers’ Account of Causality: From the 
Essential Contingency to the Existential Contingency. 
Supposing that an effect must need a cause, what is the main reason of having a 
need for a cause? In other words, why does an effect need a cause? Or, as As-Sadr puts it, 
―why do things require causes or agents without which they cannot come to exist; and 
what is the real cause that makes them depend on those causes and agents?‖357 Prior to 
Sadra, there were two opposite Islamic answers, one by the speakers and the other by the 
philosophers. As we have seen above, Sadra‘s philosophy is in accord with Hegel‘s in 
rejecting the speakers‘ denial of the necessary connection between cause and effect. We 
will see now how Sadra‘s rejection of the philosophers‘ account of causality is grounded 
on the basis of the primacy of existence over essence.   
Under the influence of the theological account of creation in time, the speakers 
maintain that the reason why an effect needs a cause consists in its ―temporal 
origination‖. For them, because the existents have been preceded by ―non-existence,‖ 
they need a cause to bring them to existence. The speakers, therefore, consider ―the need 
of things for their causes as based on the creation of these things.‖358 Accordingly, God is 
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uncaused cause because He is not created. In other words, since God is not originated in 
time, then He does not require a cause.  
This account of causality is rejected by another revival scheme of causation 
offered by the philosopher Avicenna. Sadra, however, rejects Avicenna‘s view. Let us 
first explain Avicenna‘s view to understand how Sadra rejects it.  For Avicenna, 
―contingency,‖ rather than ―temporal origination,‖ is the reason why an effect needs a 
cause. This account is viewed within Avicenna‘s three modalities of Being: Necessity, 
Impossibility, and Contingency. By definition, neither ―necessity‖ nor ―impossibility‖ is 
the reason for having a cause. On the other side, contingency by definition means that an 
essence has an equal relation to ―existence‖ and ―non-existence.‖ The crucial point that 
implies this account is this: Contingency is eternally realized in essence before it exists or 
originates in time. That is to say, essence subsists before its actual existence. On this 
account, it is possible to consider ―essence‖ as eternal and originated—eternal in its 
contingency and originated in its temporality. That is to say, it is because in the first place 
an essence in itself is eternally contingent/possible that it is then temporally originated .  
Hence, the eternal contingency/possibility of an essence is prior to its temporal 
origination. For if an essence is in itself impossible, rather than possible, it cannot come 
to exist. Accordingly, in order to be granted ―necessity of existence‖ or ―necessity of non-
existence,‖ an essence needs a cause.359The reason why an essence or an effect needs a 
cause thus is part of its contingency. God does not need a cause since He is necessary 
rather than contingent. 
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According to Sadra, the consequence of Avicenna‘s philosophical solution to the 
problem of causality is the affirmation that existence is an accident supervenient to 
essence. In other words, existence is temporally added by God to an essence which is 
eternally contingent. Hence, the philosophical account of essential contingency as a basis 
of causality results in the ontological priority of essence over existence. Essence in this 
account is a distinct ontological entity indifferent to existence and nonexistence; essence 
could exist if there is sufficient cause and it could not exist if there is no sufficient cause. 
For the [Avecennian] philosophers, therefore, since contingency (could be/could not be) 
rather than impossibility (could not be) is equivalent to essence, then essential 
contingency is the reason why an essence needs a cause—a cause for an essence to make 
it appear or exist. Essence for the philosophers, as Sadra describes it, ―is made 
contingent, so it needs [a cause to bring it to existence]. Then it is made necessary, so it is 
necessitated.‖360 Hence, the contingency of essence is viewed as a primary ontological 
stage that precedes the existential externality of essence. This philosophical account of 
causality makes the contingency of essence an ontological condition for existence. That is 
to say, existence is conditioned and preceded by another entity than itself.  
This dependency of existence on something other than itself, which implicitly or 
explicitly supposes that essence precedes existence, is totally rejected by Sadra. He 
considers it as a deficiency in the Islamic philosophers. 
Although Sadra supports the philosophers‘ view that contingency is the reason 
why things require causes, he criticizes them for their mistaken connection between 
―contingency‖ and ―essence.‖ His critique can be viewed as an exposition of the 
metaphysical essentialism of the Muslim philosophers.  Against the notion that essence is 
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the bearer of contingency in a contingent— which entails the pre-reality of essence over 
its external existence— Sadra denies all reality to essence. Avicenna‘s account of 
causation implies that essences in their eternal contingency share a kind of eternality with 
God. In order to save the eternality only for God, Sadra consider essences as pure 
negativity or nothing.  God, in this case, must be pure existence without any trace of 
essence. It is only when we view God as pure existence unmixed with essence that He is 
in no need of a cause. That is to say, it is only on the basis of the primacy of existence 
over essence that God is uncaused cause.  
In order to make God the only cause that does not require cause, the reason why 
things require causes must consist in the existential possibility rather than the essential 
possibility. This line of thought pushes Sadra to consider that, essences, as Rahman puts 
it,  
are nothing, i.e., even ―something‖ cannot be predicated of them except when 
they are conceived by the mind; otherwise, they are absolutely indiscernible in 
their native darkness. The locus of contingency is, therefore, the contingent 
existent itself insofar as it has the possibility of existence.
361
 
 
The existential contingency here affirms the necessary priority of existence over essence. 
Contingency on the existential level, rather than the essential level, means the necessary 
ever-newness of existence according to its substantial movement. For Sadra, this eternal, 
existential contingency constitutes the reason why the things require causes. On this 
existential account of causality, it is not the case that existence causes the essence to exist 
as if essence is ―something‖ independent and waits for an accidental act. This latter view 
of causality is accepted only from an analytical point of view based on the limitation of 
the faculty of understanding. In the external realization of truth, existence as Absolute 
                                                             
361 Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 63.  
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simplicity has nothing outside itself and consequently develops itself within itself. To 
understand this point more clearly let us look how the concept of ―necessity‖ is situated 
in Sadra‘s scheme of Being. 
For Sadra, the logical relation of ―necessity‖ in terms of ―affirmation‖ and 
―negation‖ determines three modes of being: ―Must be/Necessary,‖ ―Could not 
be/Impossibility,‖ and ―Might be or Might not be/Contingency.‖ In their logical relation 
to ―necessity,‖ these three modes of being can be further explained as follows: 
1- The absolute ―affirmation‖ of ―necessity‖ is equivalent to ―Must be,‖ as 
manifested in the Necessary Existent/God—the pure actuality. 
2- The absolute ―negation‖ of ―necessity‖ is equivalent to ―Could not be,‖ 
as manifested in Non-Existence/Nothing—the pure potentiality or the 
prime matter. 
3- The indifference of negation and affirmation of necessity is equivalent 
to ―Might be or Might not be,‖ as manifested in the contingent 
existents—the world as a compound of potentiality/actuality and 
essence/existence. 
But these above distinctions remain, for Sadra, conceptual distinctions rather than 
real distinctions. If we conceptually consider ―necessity‖ in an absolute and unqualified 
sense, then we reach the notion of the Absolute Necessary Existent/God— which entails 
that He Must be. Similarly, if we conceptually posit an absolute negation of ―necessity‖ 
then the result would be the notion of ―Absolute non-existence/ Could not be.‖ But if, on 
the other hand, we consider ―necessity‖ as relative to both ―affirmation‖ and ―negation,‖ 
then neither ―Absolute existence,‖ nor ―Absolute non-existence‖ is our notion. Rather, a 
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new notion emerges that will be neither the notion of ―Absolute existence‖ nor the notion 
of ―Absolute non-existence‖ but the synthesis of both.  
This new synthetic notion reflects the notion of the ―existential contingency‖ in 
which ―existence‖ and ―non-existence‖ are progressively related in a dialectical, implied 
sense.  On the basis of this ―existential contingency,‖ the world incessantly evolves 
through successive stages into its simplest form, ultimately recognizing its existentiality 
in the simplicity of the Absolute Existence/God. Sadra here uses the term ―simple‖ to 
mean, as Rahman says, ―that that which exists at the lower levels with separate or 
mutually exclusive parts exists at the higher levels as mutually inclusive and unitary.‖362 
Existence as absolute simplicity, therefore, includes all things in its unity. Existence 
embraces in its simple unity the totality of its different modes.  
The point that could find appreciation in Hegel‘s Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy consists in Sadra‘s representing of the simple Absolute existence not as 
empty and abstract unity, but as a unity of the different modes of existence. These 
different modes of existences are internally produced due to the substantial movement of 
existence itself.  
The innermost existential activity of substance as determined in itself, and not as 
imposed externally from outside, brings us to Hegel‘s notion of organic life of the 
whole.
363
 The notion of the unfolding of the world on the basis of its inherent, existential 
contingency has, Hegel would say, ―its efficacy in itself.‖  
                                                             
362 Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 232. 
363 Hegel extends his account of organic life to cover the three elements of his system: the logical, the 
natural, and the spiritual. He differentiates, ―logical life as pure Idea from natural life which is dealt with in 
the philosophy of nature, and from life in so far as it stands in connexion with spirit.‖ Hegel, Science of 
Logic, p. 762.     
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That which has organic life, whose principle is formative, which has its efficacy 
in itself, and in the same only remains at home with itself and maintains itself, is 
nothing but the end, the activity determined in itself, which in its relation to what 
is different does not comport itself as mere cause, but returns upon itself.
364
  
 
Sadra‘s notion of the Absolute simplicity of existence entails this Hegelian idea of the 
cause that ―returns upon itself.‖ For Sadra, existence alone is real and God is pure 
existence. The reality of existence reveals itself as organic unity in which the different 
modes of existence, as plurality, find their identity not only in their relation to one 
another but also in their relation to the life of the whole. The contingent existents, as 
modes of the Necessary existence, find their existential originality in God.
365
 For Sadra, 
the Necessary existence/God is pure life, and the contingent existents—in their relations 
to their origin/God—are manifestations of the organic life of existence in its simple 
totality.
366
 Hence the existentiality of the organic life of the whole is a self-contained 
cause which finds its causality in itself. And, as Sadra writes, 
existence, insofar as it is existence, has no agent from which it emanates, no 
matter into which it transforms, no subject in which it is found, no form by which 
it is clothed, no goal for which it is [established]. Rather, it itself is the agent of all 
agents, the form of all forms, and the goal of all goals.
367
 
 
Against the one-sided causality based on the temporality of the world, on the one 
hand, and the one-sided causality based on the eternality of world, on the other hand, 
Sadra‘s view of causality synthesizes temporality and eternality in terms of the 
metaphysical unity of the unfolding existence. But this synthesis is first preceded by 
Sadra‘s distinction of two lines of causes: the horizontal, temporal line of causes, and the 
vertical, eternal line of causes. The former is related to natural causes. The latter is related 
                                                             
364 Hegel, Hegel‟s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p.125.  
365 See: Sadra, Asfàr, p. 47. 
366 See: Ibid., p. 329. 
367 Sadra, Asfar, quoted in Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on 
Existence, Intellect, and Intuition, p. 91. 
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to God‘s existential identity with ―the Intelligence of Muslim Peripatetics, the Forms of 
Plato, and the Attributes of the theologians.‖368 These two lines of causes are interrelated. 
The natural temporal causes cause movement and change but do not give existence to the 
effects. Existence, rather, comes through the vertical line of causes. This does not mean 
that God causes Platonic Forms to come into existence. Existence rather is substantially 
in a state of flux, in a state of unfolding toward its absolute simplicity realized in God. 
The graduated levels of reality correspond to the gradual unfolding of existence on the 
scale of these two interrelated lines of causes.
369
The existential causality here reflects this 
causal dialectical relationship between what is natural and what is supernatural, what is 
material and what is spiritual, what is immanent and what is transcendental. Within this 
causal viewpoint of reality, existence maintains itself as the ultimate real cause which 
eternally emerges from itself and returns to itself.  
Sadra’s and Hegel’s Critiques of The Formal Logic of Arabic Philosophers 
What Sadra considers as ―the concept of existence,‖370 —a concept that we 
abstractly have in our mind about the external and actual existence—approaches what 
Hegel means by the abstract account of ―existence‖ in his Logic. For both Hegel and 
Sadra, the concept of existence as ―abstract category of thought‖ is an inadequate 
predicate of truth or God. Both of them try to advance over the finite characteristics of 
the faculty of understanding which limit reality only within the abstract form of 
existence. In the context of his critique of the metaphysics of abstract existence, Hegel 
writes, 
                                                             
368 See: Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 160. 
369 Sadra‘s account of the graduated levels of existence is discussed in the first chapter in this dissertation.  
370 The difference between ―the concept of existence‖ and ―the reality of existence‖ in Sadra‘s philosophy 
is elaborated upon in our first chapter.  
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The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode of action 
was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed to be permanently 
fixed and not subject to any further negation. Thus one of its questions was: Has 
God existence? The question supposes that existence is an altogether positive 
term, a sort of ne plus ultra. We shall see however at a latter point that existence 
is by no means a merely positive term, but one which is too low for the Absolute 
Idea, and unworthy of God.
371
  
  
That which is unworthy of God is not existence in its concrete and actual sense, but 
existence in its abstract sense. Hegel, therefore, refuses to accept the abstract, narrow, and 
rigid term of existence to be an equivalent to truth. For him, existence, taken as isolated 
and abstract category, is finite form. ―But truth,‖ Hegel writes, ―is always infinite, and 
cannot be expressed or presented to consciousness in finite terms.‖372 But what Hegel 
means here by infinite ―is not to be conceived as abstract away and away for ever and 
ever.‖373 Instead of this spurious infinity, Hegel argues that truth is ―the genuine Notion 
of infinity.‖374 If the spurious infinity is the infinite of the understanding in which the 
finite is negatively excluded from the infinite, the genuine infinite of reason is that which 
speculatively includes the finite within it. For if every negation is a determination then 
the infinite‘s negation of the finite implies the determination of the infinite along with the 
determination of the finite. But this means that the infinite is limited. As thus, the infinite 
contradicts its definition. It is only when we understand the infinite as the negation of 
negation that we reach the genuine infinite as a sublation of the spurious infinite. Hence, 
as Hegel writes, ―in saying what the infinite is, namely the negation of the finite, the 
                                                             
371 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 49.  
372 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
373 Ibid., p. 49. 
374 Hegel, Science of logic, p. 137. 
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latter is itself included in what is said; it cannot be dispensed with for the definition or 
determination of the infinite.‖375      
The difference between the notion of existence as ―abstract‖ and ―an isolated 
predicate of a thing,‖ on the one hand, and the notion of existence as ―concrete,‖ on the 
other, is significant in both Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s philosophy.376 Sadra reflects this 
difference between these two different senses of existence by saying,  
The reality of existence-qua-existence is not limited by generality and 
delimitation, universality and particularity, and inclusiveness and specificity. It is 
neither one [numerically] by a oneness added to it, nor many…. In its inner most 
truth, it is nothing but full realization, actuality and manifestation. These 
meanings of contingency, concepts of universality, attributes of rational 
consideration, and terms of mental analysis are attached to it on account of its 
degrees and stations.
377
 
 
For Hegel, this difference between the abstractness and concreteness of existence reflects, 
in fact, the difference between Dialectic and Reflection:  
Dialectic is different from Reflection. In the first instance, Reflection is that 
movement out beyond the isolated predicate of a thing which gives it some 
reference, and brings out its relativity, while still in other respects leaving it its 
isolated validity. But by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency outwards  by 
which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen 
in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them.
378
 
 
Within these Hegelian and Sadrian account of the concreteness of existence, the Islamic 
philosophers do not advance over the stage of the metaphysics of abstract knowledge. In 
his critique of the Arabic philosophers on this limited view of knowledge, Hegel writes, 
                                                             
375 Ibid., p. 143. 
376 Hegel writes, ―It is the fashion of youth to dash about in abstractions; but the man who has learned to 
know life steers clear of the abstract ‗either—or‘, and keeps to the concrete.‖ Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p.115.  
377 Sadra, Asfar, quoted in Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on Existence, 
Intellect, and Intuition, p. 90.  
378 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p.116. 
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―The Arabians developed the metaphysics of understanding and a formal logic,‖ but 
―much good is not to be got from them.‖379  
The reason why "much good is not to be got from‖ the Islamic philosophers‘ 
formal logic lies in its inability to unite in a concrete system many pairs such as 
subjectivity/objectivity, simplicity/complexity, infinity/finitude, etc.
380
 For Hegel, the 
sphere in which this formal logic operates is Essence: ―The terms in Essence,‖ Hegel 
writes, ―are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in 
themselves. Hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realized, but only 
postulated by reflection.‖381  
This means that the categories of essence are not the final categories by means of 
which thought can adequately grasp the truth. Although the doctrine of essence is an 
advance over the doctrine of being in that it is no longer only immediacy but includes 
mediation, the mediation of essence is still mediation by another and is not self-
mediation. As we have seen before, logic shows that each category of essence is mediated 
by its opposite. Here the opposites within the categories of essence are not absolutely 
taken to be identical; they are “not yet absolutely reflected in themselves,‖ as Hegel says 
above. Essence, therefore, does not absorb the opposites within an absolute unity in 
which these opposites are sublated.  
                                                             
379 Hegel, Hegel‟s lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 34. 
380
 In the context of his critique of the old metaphysics, in which Islamic philosophy is included, Hegel 
gives some examples of those predicates which could not in their abstractness grasp the truth: ―As an 
example of such predicates may be taken: Existence, in the proposition, ‗God has existence‘; Finitude or 
Infinity, as in the question, ‗Is the world finite or infinite?‘; Simple and Complex, in the proposition, ‗The 
soul is simple‘—or again, ‗The thing is unity, a whole,‘ etc. Nobody asked whether such predicates had any 
intrinsic and independent truth, or if the propositional form could be a form of truth.‖ Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, 
p.48.  
381 Ibid., p. 162. 
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Since the opposites that determine the essence are not yet themselves identical, 
essence is not self-determined. Accordingly, the sphere of essence is not the sphere of 
freedom but the sphere of necessity. ―Freedom,‖ by contrast, Hegel writes,  
belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined, 
constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and 
this positedness as self-related is simply that identity.
382
 
 
This is why Hegel finds that ―in essence the actual unity of the Notion is not realized,‖ 
for it will be realized only when essence‘s necessary determination by its other is 
sublated by the free self-determination of Notion in which there is nothing outside it. 
Here we reach the genuine Notion of infinity which does not take the finite outside it but 
within it. The infinite of the understanding which is considered by the logic of essence as 
―the absolute Truth‖ is for Hegel, ―absolute contradiction.‖383 For if, according to the 
logic of abstract essence, infinite and finite are just opposites, the infinite will be as Hegel 
shows ―the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, an infinite which is 
itself finite.‖384   
Here we can find some general similarity between Hegel and Sadra with regard to 
the relation of essence to Truth as Absolute. For Hegel, as we have seen above, essence 
in its abstract sense is posited within understanding‘s epistemological standpoint of 
Truth. For him, this stage of knowledge is a necessary stage toward a further higher stage 
of knowledge, but it is not the ultimate one. Essence accordingly is not the higher 
definition of the Absolute. Essence as a result of the external reflection of understanding, 
which knows how to distinguish between its own isolated determinations, is higher than 
the mere immediacy of sensation, which takes these different determinations in simple 
                                                             
382 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 582. 
383 Ibid., p. 139.  
384 Ibid., p. 140. 
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self-relation. But this stage of abstract essence still falls short in expressing Truth in its 
Absolute and unconditioned sense. For, as we have seen above, this stage knows how to 
distinguish its own opposites but does not know how to unite them.  Any attempt that the 
abstract view of essence makes to unite the differences would result in contradictions that 
could not be reconciled under the formal logic‘s principle of non-contradiction.385 In 
order to embrace the differences in a higher stage, truth as Absolute infinity must, 
therefore, advance over the abstract logic of essence. 
To clarify Sadra‘s epistemological view in terms of the relation between essence 
and truth, it is important to explain his understanding of the relation between subject and 
object. Sadra‘s theory of knowledge operates against many Islamic philosophers who do 
not accept the identity between subject and object. With this regard, let us take, for 
instance, Sadra‘s critique of the Master of the Islamic philosophers, Avicenna. Sadra 
writes, 
There are two points we have to know before delving into the critique of what the 
Master and others have said to reject the unification between the intellector 
[knower] and the intelligibilia [known] in a general and specific way. The first is 
that existence in everything is the principle reality in existentiation, and it is the 
principle of its particularity, the source of its quiddity, and the measure of its 
essence. Existence belongs to the category of things that allow intensification and 
diminution in terms of perfection and imperfection, and it has fundamental 
qualities and modes in every degree of intensification and diminution other than 
what it had before. The second [point]: as motion and transformation take place in 
quality and quantity, it also occurs in the formal substance (al-jawhar al-suri), 
which is connected to matter in a certain way. Motion in every category is 
necessitated by a single existence that is continuous, individual and gradual, and 
has, in every presumed moment of the time of this motion, a specific delimitation 
                                                             
385
 Quentin Lauer writes, ―It has so often been asserted that Hegel denies the principle of non-contradiction 
....The fact is that Hegel affirms over and over again that non-contradiction is an indispensable principle of 
formal logic, of abstract understanding (Verstand); to ignore it on this level can lead to nothing but 
confusion. What is a necessary principle of abstract understanding, however, need not be a principle of 
concrete reason (Vernunft). This is not to say that reason violates the rules of understanding, nor, worse 
still, that reason dispenses with understanding. It is to say that reason, whose standpoint is that of totality, 
infinity, is not compelled, as is understanding, to fight shy of contradiction.‖ Quentin Lauer, Hegel's 
Concept of God (Albany: State University of New York, 1982), pp. 6-7. 
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among the limits of existence, which exists neither before nor after it [i.e., 
motion].
386
   
 
This passage reflects how Sadra‘s theory of the unification of subject/ ―intellect‖ and 
object/―intelligible‖ is based on his theory of existence. His critique of the 
epistemological view of the formal logic is basically founded on his critique of the 
ontological ground of that logic.   
If, for Sadra, the distinction between existence and essence is only conceptual, 
then the way to bridge this conceptual gap between existence and essence is to bridge the 
epistemological gap between the subjectivity of thinking and the objectivity of that which 
is thought. This needs another mode of knowledge that goes beyond the abstract 
knowledge of understanding. Sadra would agree with Hegel in his statement that ―the 
battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has 
reduced everything.‖387 This ―battle of reason‖ eventually culminates in the identity of 
existence/essence by means of the identity of subject/object. The true triumph of the 
battle of reason against the abstractness of understanding is when man reaches ‗complete 
existence‘ through consciousness and self-realization.  
Another example of Sadra‘s arguing against his previous Islamic philosophers can 
be viewed in the light of Suhrawardi‘s refusal of the unity between subject and object. 
Suhrawardi, who is one of the most prominent defenders of the primacy of essence in 
Arabic philosophy, writes, 
Some people have thought that when the perceiver perceives something, he 
becomes [identical with] it. […] When we say that A becomes B, does A remain 
the same and then we have B, thus both of them becoming multiple entities? Or is 
it rather that A is destroyed and B has not come into being, in which case there is 
no unification between the two?...When the soul thinks of A, does it remain the 
                                                             
386 Sadra, Ittihad in Majmu ah, quoted in Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy, p. 52. 
387 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 53. 
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same as it was before [it thought it]? If so, then there is no union or the 
establishment [of a new being]. Or perhaps the soul is destroyed and something 
else has come into being, in which case there is again no unity [obtained between 
the soul and its object of intellection].
388
 
 
In his response to this passage, Sadra exposes Suhrawardi‘s metaphysical essentialism. 
He writes, 
The Shaykh (i.e., Suhrawardi) has assumed that disparity [differentiation] 
(tafawut) takes place between two things in terms of perfection and deficiency in 
their shared quiddities [essences] without regard to any other condition 
concerning difference (fasl) or accident. The truth is that a single concept 
(mafhum) does not possess disparity [differentiation] from the point of view of its 
meaning (ma „na). Disparity [differentiation] can be only in reference to more 
intensity and weakness through the modes of actualization and concrete beings 
(al-wujudat) because existence allows disparity [differentiation] [in terms] of 
perfection and deficiency.
389
 
 
 Sadra clarifies his position against Suhrawardi more clearly by saying: 
The realization of this matter [i.e., the unification of the intellect and the 
intelligible] is impossible except through the principles that were mentioned in the 
beginning of this book [i.e., the Asfar] concerning the view that existence is the 
principle reality and essence is derived from it. It is certain that existence allows 
intensification and diminution, and whatever is strong in existentiation (qawiyy 
al-wujud) becomes more inclusive and encompassing of universal meanings and 
abstract intellective quiddities. When existence reaches the level of the simple 
intellect which is completely disengaged from the world of corporeal bodies and 
quantities, it becomes all of the intelligibila/universals and all things in a manner 
more virtuous and nobler than what they are based upon. Whoever has not tasted 
this path cannot understand the simple intellect which is the source of all detailed 
sciences. That is why you see most of the virtuous people finding it very difficult 
and unable to verify it in spite of their deep involvement in following the science 
of wisdom such as Suhrawardi in the Mutaratht, Talwihat , and Hikmat al-ishraq, 
who has clearly rejected this view, and Imam [Fakhr al-Din] al-Razi and those 
who are in their state and class.
390
 
 
On the epistemological level, Sadra thus believes that the reconciliation of 
opposites could be reached by the intellectual intuition in which the knower and the 
                                                             
388 Suhrawardi,  Kitab al-Talwhihat, quoted in: Ibid.,  pp. 60-61. 
389 Sadra, Hashiyah shara hikmat al-ishraq, p.210, quoted in Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic 
Philosophy, p.65. On Sadra‘s account of the graduated levels of existence, see my chapter one. 
390  Sadra, Asfar, I, 3, pp. 373-374, quoted in Ibid., p.66. 
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known are identical. Here the intellectual intuition is the epistemological ground in which 
the opposites of the knower and the known are dissolved. On the other side, Sadra‘s 
absolute simplicity of existence is the ontological ground in which the opposites of 
essence are absolutely dissolved. For Hegel, this higher stage of groundedness is the 
stage of the Absolute Idea in which Being and Essence, the immediate and mediated, 
subject and object, are brought dialectically in a higher system of totality. This totality, 
however, is not abstract totality in which differences are not distinguished. It is rather a 
sublated identity in which differences are preserved in the higher whole. Both Sadra and 
Hegel consider this process toward the Absolute as unfolding. For Sadra, it is the 
unfolding of the actual existence. For Hegel, it is the unfolding of the Idea which reflects 
the speculative unity of Being and Essence.  
If we take Sadra‘s insistence on the difference between the abstract sense of 
existence and the concrete sense of existence, and add the fact that his philosophy is 
based on the substantial movement of existence, then we can say that Hegel‘s notion of 
Dialectic is already implicit in his philosophy. This can be supported by what Hegel 
means by Dialectic when he says: 
It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly the nature of 
Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything 
is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work.
391
 
  
Despite these general similarities between them, Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critiques of the 
deficiencies of Arabic philosophy are significantly different. Whereas Hegel‘s critique is 
external in the sense that it is imposed upon Arabic philosophy from outside its actual 
formulation, Sadra‘s critique emerges from within the dynamicity of the cultural context 
of the Arabic philosophy itself. In this sense, Sadra‘s critique of his Arabic previous 
                                                             
391 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 116. 
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philosophies satisfies Hegel‘s demand of the progression of philosophy. That demand 
which, as Yovel puts it, must ―emerge from within the development of actual knowledge 
and actual forms, and not as an artificial imposition upon them.‖392   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
392 Yirmiahu Yovel, ―Hegel's Dictum that the Rational is Actual and the Actual is Rational: its Ontological 
Content and its Function in Discourse‖ in The Hegel Myths and Legends of Hegel (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1996), p. 32. 
 139 
 
Chapter Four 
Hegel, Sadra, and the Qualitative Determination of Truth  
In his Science of Logic, right before the section of ―The Transition to Essence," 
Hegel reaches this account of essence: 
This unity thus posited as the totality of the process of determining, in which it is 
itself determined as indifference, is a contradiction in every respect; it therefore 
has to be posited as sublating this its contradictory nature and acquiring the 
character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which has for its result and 
truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but that immanently negative and 
absolute unity which is called essence.
393
 
  
This long and complex sentence displays the most progressive moment in the doctrine of 
Being, in which the immediate unity of Being eventually shows itself to be ―a 
contradiction in every respect.‖ As the dialectic proceeds, the indifferent unity of Being is 
sublated by the absolute unity of essence. Essence, however, is a moment within the total 
spontaneity of the process of determining that unfolds dialectically towards the Idea. If, 
for Hegel, the determining process of truth is ―the nature of the content itself which 
spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing,‖394 Logic is this method 
which dialectally proceeds as a self-explanatory process of scientific knowing. The 
importance of Hegel‘s Logic lies in this self-explanatory principle that exposes truth‘s 
process of determining—a process that leads to the unitary totality of the speculative 
determinate being as Absolute. In my view, Logic as a self-explanatory process of 
determining reveals three main logical moments of determinate being. 
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Determinate being is firstly manifested within the sphere of ―Quality.‖395 The 
qualitative determinate being corresponds to the epistemological standpoint of 
immediacy in general. The second logical moment of determinate being is ―essence‖ as 
unfolded by the mediation of the epistemological view of reflection.
396
 ―But,‖ as Hegel 
discovers, 
the determinate being which essence gives itself is not yet determinate being as in 
and for itself, but as given by essence to itself, or as posited, and is consequently 
still distinct from the determinate being of the Notion.
397
  
 
Thus, the third logical moment of determinate being is ―Notion‖ as is speculatively 
culminated within the epistemological view of sublation. For Hegel, as he concludes, 
―Notion is the absolute that in its determinate being is absolute.‖398   
In what follows, I argue—as a conclusion to this dissertation— that Hegel‘s 
speculative account of truth sublates both the traditional metaphysical view of truth based 
on considering essence as affirmative quality on the one hand, and Sadra‘s existential 
metaphysic based on considering essence as negative quality on the other. This sublation 
lies basically in Hegel‘s speculative treatment of the qualitative determinateness of truth 
as presented in ―Section One: Determinateness (Quality)‖ of his Science of Logic.  
*** 
In his Introduction to his Objective Logic, Hegel writes, 
Objective logic is therefore the genuine critique of them [categories as 
determinations of thought and being]—a critique which does not consider them as 
                                                             
395 Hegel explains the first moment of the emergence of determinate being by saying: ―From becoming 
there issues determinate being, which is the simple oneness of being and nothing.‖ Ibid., p. 109. 
396 I should mention here that I do not consider Hegel‘s logic as merely an epistemological logic but also as 
ontological. Hegel‘s speculative categories as determinations of Truth/ Idea are not only self-
determinations of thought but also self-determinations of being. Hegel‘s logic is this dialectical relationship 
of determining what it is to be and what it is to think—a dialectical relationship that leads to the speculative 
identity of thought and being. 
397 Ibid., p.391.  
398 Ibid. 
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contrasted under the abstract forms of the a priori and the a posteriori, but 
considers the determinations themselves according to their specific content.
399
 
 
According to my reading, Hegel‘s Objective Logic is a critique to the first two moments 
of determinate being: that of (the qualitative determinations of immediacy) as manifested 
in the doctrine of Being, and that of (the reflective determinations of mediation) as 
manifested in the doctrine of Essence. The former can be directed to the classical, formal 
logic which takes the forms of thought as a posteriori—as abstraction from the external 
objective world. The latter is directed to the modern, transcendental logic which take the 
a priori determinations of thought as the objective element of universality and necessity. 
This leads me to consider Hegel‘s objective logic as a critique to two accounts of the one-
sided objectivity of truth:   
1- The classical account of the objectivity of the qualitative determination of truth—
as represented especially by the Aristotelian traditional view.  
2- The modern account of the objectivity of the transcendental logic of truth—as 
represented especially by Kant.  
Whereas the first point is implicit in Hegel‘s objective logic, the second point is explicit. 
In this regard, Hegel writes, ―What has been called objective logic would correspond in 
part to what with him [Kant] is transcendental logic.‖400  Unlike Kant, who focuses on 
―the so-called transcendental aspect of the categories,‖ Hegel focuses on ―the treatment 
of the categories themselves.‖401 His aim is to expose, first, ―what they (categories) are in 
themselves without the abstract relation to the ego common to all,‖ and, second, ―what is 
                                                             
399 Ibid., p. 64. 
400 Ibid., p. 62. 
401 Ibid., p. 63.  
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their specific nature relatively to each other and their relationship to each other.‖402 
Hegel‘s speculative treatment of the categories, represented more effectively in the 
doctrine of Essence, leads to the third shape of determinate being: The Absolute Idea 
determined in-and -for-itself, as exhibits in the speculative logic of Notion.  
 That Hegel treats the sphere of quality as a critique of the traditional view of 
essence can be generally clarified in light of the difference between quality and property. 
―Property,‖ Hegel warns, ―should not be confused with quality.‖403 For, as he adds, 
―something is what it is only by its quality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only 
as it has its properties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and can 
therefore, lose it, without ceasing to be what it is.‖404 In contrast to the accidental 
property, quality is thus the essential characteristic that is identical with being to the 
extent a determinate being ceases to be what it is if it loses its quality. This point makes 
the essentiality of quality in regard to a determinate being equivalent to essence in the 
traditional sense. But, as we will see later on, Hegel‘s dialectical method of self-
determining of Truth exposes the deficiency of the one-sided view of the qualitative 
determination of Truth. 
Several passages from Hegel support my last point. The striking passage can be 
found in Hegel‘s Lectures on Logic, Berlin, 1831. In this passage, Hegel explicitly 
mentions Aristotle:  
Such a determinate being is first given out to be the quale, quality [τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι]405, as Aristotle says. Something is constituted by such and such a nature, 
                                                             
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid., p. 182. 
404 Ibid. my emphasis. 
405 The Greek phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι refers to what a thing was to be, or the essence of the thing. 
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and if it loses that nature its very being falls by the wayside. Its [qualitative] 
determination is inwardly connected with its very being.
406
 
  
It is not by chance that in this passage Hegel brings in Aristotle. This passage is in accord 
with Hegel‘s identification of the four Aristotelian principles as he introduces them in his 
Lectures on The History of Philosophy. Hegel writes,  
In this ontology [Aristotle‘s] or, as we call it, logic, he [Aristotle] investigates and 
minutely distinguishes four principles: first, determination or quality as such, the 
wherefore of anything, essence or form; secondly, the matter; thirdly, the 
principle of motion; and fourthly, the principle of final cause, or of the good.
407
 
   
 Essence, in its Aristotelian metaphysical sense, can be thus equated with a specific 
quality completely jointed to a determinate being. If, for Aristotle, a thing‘s essence is the 
statement of its definition, of what it is,
408
 then, as Hegel writes, ―quality is, in the first 
place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if 
it loses its quality.‖409 And, again, ―a something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and 
losing its quality it ceases to be what it is.‖410  
It is clear from these passages that the function Hegel assigns to quality in the 
logic of being is, in general, equivalent to the function which is assigned to essence by 
the Aristotelian metaphysics. However, this does not mean that Hegel agrees that quality 
is equivalent to the truth of a determinate being. This is merely an initial account of the 
truth of a determinate being within the total spontaneity of the process of determining. 
That is to say, both Hegel‘s initial account of quality and the Aristotelian qualitative 
                                                             
406 Hegel, Lectures on Logic, Berlin 1831, transcribed by Karl Hegel, trans. Clark Butler (Bloomington: 
Indianan University Press, 2008), p. 85. 
407 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, p. 335. 
408 Aristotle writes, ―The essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself.‖ Aristotle, 
Metaphysics (1029b 13-14), trans. W. D. Ross in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.1625-1626. For more on Aristotle‘s account of 
essence, see: David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). 
409 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 124. 
410 Ibid., 134. 
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account of essence are regarded as the ontological principle of a determinate being—a 
principle the loss of which makes the determinate being cease to be what it is; its very 
being, as Hegel mentions,  falls by the wayside. As Hegel writes, ―take away from the 
dog its animality, and it becomes impossible to say what it is.‖411 Quality in this limited 
sense in Hegel‘s doctrine of Being thus plays the same ontological role that essence plays 
in the classical metaphysics. We will see later how Hegel shows the inconsistency of 
regarding quality as equivalent to the truth/essence of a determinate being.   
There is another point that could support my claim of considering Hegel‘s 
quality–in this circumscribed sense – as equivalent to the Aristotelian account of essence. 
Let us, following Hegel‘s evaluation of the speculative Aristotle, take Aristotle as the 
systematic philosopher with whom the concept of being takes its proper place in the 
classical metaphysics. Aristotle‘s science of being as being differs from other determinate 
sciences—such as mathematics, physics, etc.— in that it is not limited or restricted to a 
particular genus of being.
412
 Aristotle‘s being as being is, therefore, free from all the 
restrictions and limitations of a determinate being. In this sense, being as such is the 
negation of all determinations. Being as such is thus an indeterminate being.  
In my view, the starting-point of Hegel‘s Science of Logic carries out this 
Aristotelian demand of the absolute indifference of being as being to its highest possible 
form or mode.
413
 For Hegel, ―it is the abstract indeterminateness and immediacy in which 
                                                             
411 Ibid., p. 37. 
412 Aristotle says, "There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to 
this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of 
these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of 
this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.‖ Aristotle, Metaphysics (1003a18-25), in 
The Complete Works of Aristotle, p. 1584. 
413 In his Heidegger and Aristotle, Ted Sadler writes, ―Hegelian 'Logic' becomes ontological by no longer 
confining itself to the rules of thinking but determining the nature of being, by again taking up being qua 
being as the first of all questions[...] As he pursued this question, Hegel become more attracted to 
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it must be the beginning.‖414 Pure being, as the starting-point of Logic, is absolutely 
different from any other kind of being. While the other modes of being are, determinate, 
restricted, limited,  particularized, and therefore finite, pure being is absolutely 
indeterminate to the extent it “becomes” identical to ―nothing”.415 ―Becoming,‖ then, as 
Hegel shows, consequentially proceeds to ―determinate being,‖ from which the other 
categories deduce themselves spontaneously. 
 Thus both Aristotle‘s being as such and Hegel‘s pure being do not presuppose 
any determination. However, in his semi-systematic process of determining,
416
 Aristotle‘s 
being as such reaches the essential consideration that the very nature of a determinate 
being lies in, as Hegel says, ―its qualitative determination.‖ That qualitative 
determination Hegel writes, ―is inwardly connected with its very being.‖ Hegel clearly 
writes, ―It has already been shown that the beginning is made with being as such, 
therefore, with qualitative being.‖417 Quality, in this immediate and limited account, 
therefore, is the first determination that makes a being a determinate being— a 
determination so identical to a being to the extent a determinate being ceases to be what it 
is if it loses its quality. This immediate account of quality thus becomes equivalent to the 
essence or the ―what it is‖ of a determinate being in the classical metaphysics.  
For Hegel, this classical metaphysical account, as thus far expressed, is deficient. 
In order to show the deficiency of taking quality as an equivalent to the essence of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Aristotle's supremely 'speculative' thoughts on the noesis noeseos.‖ Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: 
The Question of Being (London: Bookcraft, 1996), p.9. He also writes, ―For Heidegger, Hegel was the one 
thinker who had preserved the Aristotelian question of ‗being qua being' by showing that it does not 
succumb to Kantianism.‖ Ibid., p. 24.  
414 Hegel, Science of Logic, p.79. 
415 Hegel writes, ―Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than 
nothing.‖ Ibid., p. 82. 
416 See my chapter two.  
417 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 79. 
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determinate being, Hegel invites us to speculatively contemplate the category of quality 
itself. The point is to investigate whether this category is self-consistent or self-
contradictory. This will be in light of discussing the metaphysical view which bases its 
account of the distinct quality of a determinate being on the abstract assumption that a 
genus must exclude differentia. That is to say, a genus, as a universal, must exclude the 
differences of its species. Genus must only include what is common among its species. 
The essence of a certain species consists in its qualitative difference from other species. 
Hence, as W. T. Stace, in his The Philosophy of Hegel, shows, ―The boundary lines 
between species and species are qualitative limits.‖418 For example, the essence of man, 
as a species subsumed under the genus animal, consists in its specific quality of 
rationality that differentiates it from other species. If man loses his quality of rationality 
that differentiates him from other species, he will cease to be what he is. Difference from 
others is thus considered in the qualitative determination of man but only as exclusion, 
and not as inclusion. That is, quality as a distinct characteristic of a determinate being 
excludes but not includes difference or other. Moreover, when essence in its qualitative 
determinacy is considered in itself as a universal of its individuals, it also excludes the 
differences of its individuals. For Hegel, this exclusion of others from the account of 
quality in the classical sense of essence is self-contradictory. As Stace puts it,  
The problem was how to pass from genus to species in view of the fact that the 
genus expressly excludes the differentia. Now Hegel‘s discovery consists in this, 
that the required differentia is always the negative, and that, when this is 
understood, it is seen that the old view that the genus excludes the differentia is 
not the complete truth.
419
  
 
                                                             
418 Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel: A systematic exposition, p. 143.  
419 Ibid., p. 93. 
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Hegel‘s Logic, as we will see, proves that the other must be included in the account of 
quality as determination. 
From the Hegelian point of view, the metaphysical account of essence— as a 
quality that determines the inner nature of a determinate being—is mistakenly taken to be 
only the reflection of the affirmative reality of a determinate being in itself. As Hegel 
writes, ―quality, taken in the distinct character of being, is reality.‖420 Hegel criticizes this 
one-sided affirmative, qualitative account of reality because it excludes negation from 
being an essential moment of the constitution of the distinct character of being. 
―Reality,‖ Hegel shows, ―is given the value of something positive from which negation, 
limitation and deficiency are excluded.‖421 Against even the conservative religious views 
which consider God only in his positive quality, Hegel writes, ―Thus in God himself, 
quality (energy, creation, power, and so forth), essentially involves the determination of 
the negative—they are the producing of an other.‖422 The insufficiency of the 
determination of quality is exposed further in the logic of Quantity in which, as Hegel 
proves, ―[the] inner connection of being and quality is no longer present.‖423 But, for the 
purpose of my argument, I will not follow the dialectic of quantity in its details.    
 Let us now turn to Sadra and see how we can appropriate his metaphysical view 
of essence with Hegel‘s critique of the qualitative being. According to Hegel‘s Logic, 
―every philosophical system should be regarded as the presentation of a particular 
moment, or a particular stage, in the process of the development of the Idea.‖424 If this is 
                                                             
420 Hegel, Science of Logic, p 111. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid., p. 85. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 86, Addition 2. p. 138. Hegel is serious in his claim that every 
philosophical system should be regarded as a moment of the development of the Idea. He, for example, 
considers Parmenides, Buddhism, and Heraclitus as the three representative philosophies of the three 
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so, Sadra‘s philosophy can be regarded as the presentation of the opposite moment of 
essence as the positive quality of a determinate being. For Sadra, essence is rather the 
negative quality of a determinate existent. This claim I consider as an answer to the 
question that I had posed at the beginning of the third chapter regarding the philosophical 
status of Sadra‘s philosophy within Hegel‘s evaluation of the history of philosophy.  
 Arguing that existence is the only reality, Sadra criticizes his predecessors, 
including the traditional views of Plato and Aristotle, for giving affirmative reality to 
essence—as we saw in chapter one and three. For Sadra, essence-in-itself without 
reference to its mode of existence is absolutely ―nothing‖. By considering essences as 
mere negative qualities rather than positive qualities of determinate existents, the 
knowing existent unfolds ontologically and epistemologically towards the pure simplicity 
of the Absolute Existence/God. The Absolute Truth of truths as Extended existence
425
 
negates any qualitative determination by essence. Essence, as quality in itself, is 
absolutely negative; it is nothing.  
But, in Hegel‘s speculative language, Sadra still operates within the abstract 
sphere of the qualitative determinateness of truth. From the standpoint of Hegel‘s 
speculative logic, Sadra‘s account of essence makes the inward negativity of essence not 
a constitutive element of the Absolute‘s process of determining but a mere negative 
quality. That is to say, although Sadra‘s account of essence implies negation, this 
negation is only taken as mere deficiency and not as a principle drive of unfolding and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
moments of pure being, nothing, and becoming. Hegel writes, ―It was the Eleatics, above all Parmenides, 
who first enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth.‖ Hegel, Science of 
Logic, p. 83. See further Ibid., p. 94. And he writes, ―In the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism, 
nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. Against that simple and one-sided abstraction the deep thinking 
Heraclitus brought forward the higher, total concept of becoming and said: being as little is, as nothing is, 
or, all flows, which means, all is a becoming.‖ Ibid. 
425 For more on Sadra‘s account of the Extended existence, see the first chapter of this dissertation. 
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determining—not as a principle of sublation. Here I agree with Fazlur Rahman that the 
Hegelian idea of sublation is absent in Sadra‘s account of the evolution of existence. 
Rahman in his The Philosophy of Sadra writes, 
Sadra‘s thought presents certain interesting features resembling Hegelianism, 
notably, the explicitly stated idea that contradiction at a lower level are 
systematically synthesized at a higher level which is, therefore, more concert and 
real….In the West, the element of movement was systematically worked out by 
Hegel. In Sadra, however, while the existence of opposites is recognized at all 
contingent levels, which are synthesized at higher levels (that is why, for Sadra, 
the law of contradiction is applicable within the perimeters of opposites at a given 
level only and does not extend beyond that level so far as those opposites are 
concerned), there is no trace of any explicit formulation of the characteristically 
Hegelian doctrine of the generation of its opposite or anti-thesis by a thesis. 
426
 
 
However, I do not agree with Rahman‘s characterization of Hegel‘s element of 
movement as a pattern of thesis, anti-thesis, and syntheses. For this pattern still implies a 
kind of abstract duality between two opposites and implies also a determinate thesis as a 
given presupposition of the system. On my account, Hegel‘s system of logic does not 
start with a determinate thesis but rather with a radical presuppositionless of any 
determination—the pure immediate indeterminate being. In this regard I agree with 
Houlgate who writes that 
in a genuinely presupposition-less philosophy we have no right to assume in 
advance any general model as a standard by which to evaluate Hegel‘s particular 
arguments. We are not to assume, therefore that the Logic is structured according 
to the famous pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Nor indeed that Hegel 
arranges concepts in any other, more subtle, triadic sequence. We have simply to 
consider indeterminate being and observe how, if at all, develops.
427
  
 
It is this inadequate account of negation that leads Sadra to consider essence-in- 
itself as nothing. For Hegel, ―negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to 
                                                             
426 Rahman, The Philosophy of Sadra, p. 268. 
427 Steven Houlgate, The Opening of Logic, p. 34. 
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nothing; but it is a determinate being, a quality, only determinate with a non-being.‖428 
Negation is thus not the same as pure nothing. In contrast to Sadra‘s account of negation 
as nothing, Hegel, therefore, introduces negation as a quality that is also a determinate 
being. It is this grasping of the role of negativity within essence that makes Hegel stands 
above the traditional view of the static essence as mere quality in-itself as well as Sadra‘s 
view of essence as mere nothing. ―Essence,‖ for Hegel ―is what it is through negativity 
which is not alien to it but is its very own, the infinite movement of being. It is being that 
is in itself and for itself.‖429  
Hegel‘s dialectical method of determining thus splits quality into two determinate 
beings, one positive and the other negative.
430
 Here we are faced with two opposite views 
of quality: one considers it in its affirmative dimension as a real quality—as is the case 
with the traditional view of essentialism— and the other considers it as a negative 
quality—as is the case with Sadra‘s view of existentialism. Hegel accepts both views 
only to overcome them. For him, real quality and negative quality both entail the same 
simple oneness that constitutes a determinate being: ―Both are determinate being, but in 
reality as quality with the accent on being, the fact is concealed that it contains 
determinateness and therefore also negation.‖431 For Hegel, the difference between real 
quality and negative quality within a determinate being is internal difference. It is this 
internal qualitative difference—which is speculatively inseparable from its ―quantitative 
difference‖432— that eventually constitutes the truth of self-determined, self-subsistent 
                                                             
428 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 111. 
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 Ibid., 390. 
430 ―In determinate being its determinateness has been distinguished as quality; in quality as determinately 
present, there is distinction—of reality and negation.‖ Ibid., p. 114. 
431 Ibid., p. 207. 
432 Ibid., p 378. 
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being. In Hegel‘s Logic, this more concrete determination of being is implicit in the 
section of ―measure‖ and explicit in the ―doctrine of essence‖.  
Let us now analyze further these two sides of quality—that of the traditional view 
of essentialism and that of the existential view of Sadra—and see how Hegel not only 
criticizes them but also overcomes them.  
The Hegelian understanding of the traditional view of determination considers 
essence as the real determinate quality of a being. Regarded only in its positive aspect, 
essence is understood as the quality of being-in-itself that a determinate being enjoys as 
such. In this view, what constitutes the essence/truth of a determinate being lies in its 
own relation to itself rather than its relation to the other. As thus, essence is pure or 
abstract self-related being. ―Its character, therefore, is to lack all determinate character, to 
be inherently lifeless and empty,‖ 433 as Hegel writes. On the other hand, regarded only in 
its negative aspect—as is the case with Sadra—essence as quality is mere being-for-
other.
434
 Both views, therefore, are one-sided views of quality. Both of them still operate 
within the stand point of formal logic. ―As formal,‖ Hegel agrees, ―this relation recurs in 
the two distinct sides.‖ But, as Hegel further elaborates,  
these sides thus continue themselves into each other also in respect of their 
qualitative determinations; each quality is self-related in the other and is present 
in each of the two sides, only in a different quantum. Their quantitative difference 
is thus indifference in accordance with which they continue themselves into each 
other and this continuation as the self-sameness of the qualities is in each of the 
two unities. The sides, however, each as the whole of the two determinations and 
hence containing the indifference itself, are thus at the same time posited as self-
subsistent relatively to each other.
435
 
                                                             
433 Ibid., p. 390. 
434 Essence‘s being-for-other is concerned with the external reality of existence. For 
Sadra, it is only in relation to what is other than itself, i.e., existence, that essence has a 
meaning or mental being at all. Essence in-itself without reference to its mode of 
existence is thus equivalent to nothing. 
435 Hegel, Science of Logic, p 377. 
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Otherness, or ―the quality of being another,‖436 is thus a constitutive, qualitative moment 
in the determinate being. Quality therefore must not be considered only in-itself as a 
positive reality nor only as for-other as a negative quality. For Hegel, at the very core of 
its nature, a determinate being proves to be its two dialectical moments of being-in-itself 
and being-for-other.   
While the traditional views of metaphysical essentialism focus on the moment of 
being-in-self as a constitution of the quality of a determinate being, Hegel shows that this 
moment cannot logically sustain itself without its other moment. He writes, ―Something 
through its own nature relates itself to the other, because otherness is posited in it as its 
own moment; its being-within-self includes the negation within it, by means of which 
alone it now has its affirmative determinate being.‖437 This makes the two essential 
qualities of being-for-other and being-in-itself not two something(s) but one something 
with two aspects or moments. ―Being-for-other and being-in-itself are,‖ as Hegel writes, 
―moments of one and the same something.‖438 
In his speculative treatment of quality by which he overcomes the abstract 
determinateness of quality, Hegel gives this example: 
The determination of man is thinking reason; thought in general, thought as such, 
in his simple determinateness—by it he is distinguished from the brute; in himself 
he is thought, in so far as this is also distinguished from his being-for-other, from 
                                                             
436 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 136. 
437 This identity between something and the other is not an abstract identity in which the other is dissolved 
completely in something. ―The other,‖ Hegel adds, ―is also qualitatively distinguished from this 
[something] and is thus posited outside the something.‖ Ibid., 125. That is to say, the quality that 
constitutes the essence of something should not be regarded only in the affirmation of quality in-itself. 
Rather, as Hegel says, ―the negation of its other is now the quality of something, for it is as this sublating of 
its other that it is something.‖ Ibid. 
438 Ibid., p. 119. For Hegel, as Houlgate puts it, ―This difference between something‘s being-in-itself and its 
other-relatedness is not merely accidental but is actually constitutive of being-in-itself: a thing enjoys its 
ownmost being in itself only insofar as this is explicitly distinguished from the thing‘s relation to other 
things.‖ Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, p. 336. 
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his own natural existence and sense-nature through which he is directly connected 
with his other.
439
 
  
Here Hegel refers to the relation of quality as ―simple determinateness‖ to its other. 
Houlgate‘s comment on this passage supports my point. He writes, 
As an example (borrowing a phrase from Fichte), Hegel mentions the 
determination of humanity (die Bestimmung des Menschen), which he claims is 
―thinking reason.‖ That which characterizes humanity‘s proper nature and 
distinguishes us from the animals, Hegel maintains, is thought (Denken). Thought, 
however, is not a purely inner quality of which each individual alone is aware. It 
is a quality that exhibits itself in and suffuses our dealing with others (whether we 
act in explicit accordance with the dictates of reason or not). Thought is our 
determination, therefore, because it is the defining character of humanity evident 
in our relation to others.
440
 
 
Moreover, essence as a mere quality of being in itself is limited to what Hegel 
calls the category of determinateness (Bestimmtheit) and not to the category of 
determination (Bestimmung).The former views the determinate being only in the 
simplicity of its intrinsic quality or nature regardless of its other-relatedness. As Hegel 
shows, ―determinateness thus isolated by itself in the form of being is quality—which is 
wholly simple and immediate.‖441 And again, ―the determinateness is in the form of 
being, and as such it is quality.‖442 It is noteworthy to mention here that Hegel in the 
Doctrine of Essence still considers Modern Idealism as a philosophy that operates within 
the sphere of determinateness. He writes, ―The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian, 
Kantian, Fichtean, and others have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have 
not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than skepticism did.‖443 Determination, 
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441 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 111. 
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on the other hand, brings the truth of the determinate being not only in its relation to its 
own affirmative quality but also in its intrinsic quality to others. Hegel writes, 
Determination is affirmative determinateness as the in-itself with which 
something in its determinate being remains congruous in face of its entanglement 
with the other by which it might be determined, maintain itself in its self-equality, 
and making its determination hold good in its being-for-other.
444
 
 
Unlike the traditional views that make essence a quality that encloses in rigid identity, 
Hegel argues that ―it is the quality of something to be open to external influences and to 
have a constitution.‖445 The truth of a determinate being, therefore, does not consist in the 
abstract unity of the qualitative enclosure of being in-itself. Hegel‘s true speculative unity 
of being, as he writes,  
is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in the 
opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a 
second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome.
446
 
 
Hegel, therefore, liberates the determinate being from the sole quality of being-in-itself, 
which represents only its subjective side, by revealing its other essential quality of being-
for-other. For Hegel, these two qualities of determinate being—whether in its ontological 
or epistemological level— are no longer separate. But this does not mean that they are 
not distinguishable. It is exactly this dialectical difference between these two identical 
moments of determinate being (being-in-itself/subjectivity, and being-for-
other/objectivity) that is essential for the constitution of the determinate being. In its 
dialectical unfolding toward the Notion, however, determinate being is neither being-in-
itself as a positive quality, nor being-for-other as a negative quality, but being-for-self. 
Hegel writes, ―As mere being-in-itself it would be only the abstraction of pure essence; 
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but it is equally essentially being-for-self; it is itself this negativity, the self-sublating of 
otherness and determinateness.‖447  
It is important to mention here that the latter statement comes at the very 
beginning of The Doctrine of Essence. Here it is clear that Hegel equates what is mere 
―being-in-itself,‖ which in the Doctrine of Being is equivalent to quality as affirmative 
reality, with abstract essence. Hegel thus sublates both the traditional view of truth based 
on the abstract affirmation of essence as real quality and Sadra‘s view of truth based on 
the negation of essence as negative quality.  
*** 
If, as Hegel writes, ―the truth of being is essence,‖448 then, what is ―the essence of 
being‖ which can be considered as ―the truth of being‖? Before we answer this confusing 
question we need to investigate another question:  Is it logically valid to substitute 
Hegel‘s proposition of ―the truth of being is essence‖ with the proposition of ―the truth is 
the essence of being‖ without contradiction? The short answer is this: no, if we consider 
the latter propositions as abstract propositions, and yes, if we consider them as 
speculative propositions. To clarify this point, let us again confront Sadra with Hegel by 
the mediation of the traditional view of essence as quality.  
For classical metaphysics, as we have seen, ―the essence of being‖ consists in its 
distinctive quality taken as affirmative reality that excludes negation or difference. In this 
account, ―the truth of being‖ is essence as a quality that holds only what is identical and 
rejects what is different. For Hegel, this position is logically rejected as one-sided truth 
that exposes self-contradiction. For Sadra, as Christian Jambet puts it, ―if God is 
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existence, the object of our highest knowledge will be the nature of the act of existing 
rather than the essence of things.‖449 Now, if we can substitute Hegel‘s proposition of 
―the truth of being is essence‖ with the proposition of ―the truth is the essence of being,‖ 
then, for Sadra, ―existence is the essence of being,‖ because existence is God.  
Sadra could agree with Hegel that ―the truth of being is essence‖ only insofar as 
―the essence of being‖ is absolutely identical with existence to the extent that ―the truth 
of being‖ becomes actual existence. In this sense, what is actually determinate, for Sadra, 
is not essence, but existence. Essence is only reflectively determinate in the subjectivity 
of the human mind as a mental being. That is to say, essence takes its determination not 
from itself as an independent real quality but from existence. Existence is independent 
being while essence is dependent being. Existence is dynamic substance that in its 
perpetual unfolding towards the existential simplicity of the Absolute/God produces 
essences as mere conceptual accidents appearing in the human mind. Existence is the real 
that exists in the most actual sense, while essence appears reflectively in the human mind 
as inadequate representation of the reality of existence. Sadra thus overturns the 
Platonism upside down. Rather than essence, existence is itself the differentia that makes 
a determinate being what it is. What determines and differentiates the quality and value 
of some existent from other existent is its existential degree that it occupies within its 
gradual existential unfolding towards the Absolute existence. Existence, therefore, is the 
real deferential quality of a determinate existent. 
 For Sadra, the determining process of truth as a whole consists in this ontological 
tension between the intensification of existence as affirmative qualitative reality and the 
                                                             
449 Christian Jambet, The Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mulla Sadra, trans. Jeff Fort (New 
York: Zone Books, 2006), p. 47. 
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diminution of essence as negative quality. The more existence a determinate existent has, 
the less essence it has. Consequently, the determinate existent, which is free from any 
determinations related to the negativity of essence, is the Absolut Existence/ God. Hence, 
God as absolute affirmative quality of His existential reality is pure and absolute 
existence. For Sadra, ―this absoluteness,‖ of the existentiality of God is, as Jambet puts it, 
a simple negation that implies the negation of all qualification, statuses, and 
determinations…it is the absence of linkage and of definition in a description or a 
name, a determination, or anything else to the point of negating this negations 
themselves, in so far as they are things that express only a point of view of the 
intelligence regarding them.
450
 
 
 In his description of the unity of this Absolute Existence, Sadra writes, 
His Unity is not the particular unity that is found in an individual of a (particular) 
nature; nor is It the generic or specific unity that is found in any general notion or 
any quiddity. Neither is It the conjunctive unity that is found when a number of 
things become assembled or unified into a single thing; nor is It the unity of 
contiguity found in quantities and measurable things. Nor, as you will learn, is It 
any of the other relative unities, such as unity by resemblance, homogeneity, 
analogy, correspondence, reduplication—although (certain) philosophers have 
allowed that—congruence, or any of the other kinds of unity that are not the True 
Unity. No, His Unity is other (than these relative ones), unknowable in Its 
innermost core…except that His Unity is the Source of all (particular) beings.451 
 
As the source of all particular beings, the unity of the Absolute existence is the existential 
ground of one Extended existence, which at once includes and transcends the Relative 
existence. Essences do not proceed from the Absolute existence, for they are ―nothing‖ in 
themselves. From God, as infinite and eternal existence, comes only existence. ―So,‖ as 
Sadra concludes, ―privation (or ―nonbeing‖) does not enter into the existence and actual 
occurrence of a thing, although it may enter into its definition and its concept.‖452 There 
is thus no ―nothing‖ in the existential level of realization. ―Nothing‖ is only a conceptual 
                                                             
450 Jambet, The Act of Being, p. 183. 
451 Mulla Sadra, The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, trans. James 
Morris (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 96-97. 
452 Ibid., p. 96. 
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notion that arises in the human mind when essence is simply considered in itself without 
reference to its mode of existence.
453
 From God, as pure existence, issues only one 
existence: the Extended existence, which is the mediation between the unity of the 
Absolute existence and the multiplicity of the Relative existence. While the Absolute 
existence remains absolutely unknowable in His unity, the Extended existence as (unity 
in multiplicity) and (multiplicity in unity) can be grasped by the intuitive rather than the 
discursive reasoning.
454
 
 In Sadra‘s metaphysical view of the reality of existence, there is no reality of 
essence except as a reflective creativity of the human mind under the impact of the reality 
of existence. Essences as such, without the impact of the reality of existence, have no 
qualitative determination other than absolute nothing. This account makes essence 
unessential quality. But the proposition ―essence is unessential quality‖ is a 
contradiction, for it will imply that the essence of the Absolute is also unessential quality. 
But Sadra‘s Absolute is free from any trace of essence. Sadra‘s philosophy cannot solve 
this contradiction within the Absolute except by appealing to a theory of knowledge that 
goes against the cognitive laws of understanding. In this aspect, Sadra comes close to 
Hegel. Sadra, as we have seen in the third chapter, embraces the theory of the identity 
between knower/intellect and known/intellectual.
455
 As Sadra writes, ―Everything that is 
intelligible in its being is also actively intelligizing. Indeed, every form in perception—
                                                             
453
 John Wippel writes, ―Thomas [Aquinas] would never admit, and [...] neither would Avicenna, that an 
essence or nature, taken absolutely in itself, could exist without being realized either as actually existing in 
an individual, or as being present in the mind in universal fashion.‖ John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes 
in Thomas Aquinas II, Volume 2 (USA: the Catholic University of America Press, 2007), pp. 47-48. 
454 For more on Sadra‘s discussion of intuitive and discursive knowledge, see my first chapter. 
455 For Sadra, as Jambet writes, ―At its root, knowledge is existence itself, not the duplication of the 
external thing in a psychic form. It reveals the central, immaterial light by which the existent exists. It is, 
therefore, a recognition of the intelligible in the intellect, a certain mode of unification of the intellect and 
the intelligible.‖ Jambet, The Act of Being, p. 83.  
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whether it be intelligible or sensible—is unified in its being with that which perceives 
it.‖456 However, on the ontological level, the status of the inessentiality of essence is still 
a matter of contradiction that Sadra could not solve except by a dogmatic return to the 
theological account of Plato‘s Forms. Although essences, for Sadra, are deficiencies and 
mere negative qualities that reflectively appear in the human mind, existents still have 
intellective forms, ―existing in God‘s knowledge and the world of His Decree.‖457 Out of 
some theological considerations, Sadra is forced to this account, ―since none of these 
Forms and Names has an independent being, but rather are all modes of the Divine 
Essence and the veils of the divine Lordship.‖458  
 How can the unessential—essences as negative qualities—on the one hand, and 
the true—God as pure existence— on the other, be reconciled without contradiction? 
While Sadra could not solve this contradiction except by a dogmatic return to the 
intellectual forms of Plato, Hegel solves this contradiction by the speculative 
interpretation of the Platonic intelligible world of essences. We have already seen this in 
Hegel‘s reading of Plato in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.459 The same point 
is brought back in Hegel‘s Logic. Hegel discovers that otherness is implicitly constituted 
in the classical definition of essence as real quality. Hegel‘s speculative account of 
quality renders explicit what is implicit in the classical definition of essence as 
affirmative quality of reality. In his Logic, Hegel explicitly brings Plato in order to 
emphasize that the truth of something, its inner quality that makes it what it is, neither 
                                                             
456 Mulla Sadra, The Wisdom of the Throne, p. 113. 
457 Ibid., p. 143. 
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459 See my chapter two. 
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should be considered as merely being-in-itself nor as merely being-for-other. Hegel 
writes, 
Plato says: ―God made the world from the nature of the One and the Other 
(touheterou); he brought them together and formed a Third out of them, which is 
of the nature of the One and the Other.‖—This expresses the general nature of the 
finite which, being something, does not stand over against the other indifferently, 
but in such a way that it is in-itself the other of itself and hence alters. Alternation 
exhibits the inner contradiction with which being-there[determinate being] is 
burdened from the start, and which drives it beyond itself.
460
  
 
This passage implies that the internal qualitative difference in a determinate being 
constitutes a contradiction. But this contradiction is not pure nothing. Rather, it is a 
determinate negation that provides the main drive of alternation and change at the very 
core of the determinate being. This result brings us closer to Sadra‘s account of the 
substantial change of a determinate existent. For Sadra, as we have seen in Chapter one, 
change and alteration emerge from within the inner nature of a determinate existent. That 
is to say, change is not externally imposed upon a determinate existent but stems 
internally from its very nature. Hegel agrees, 
Such changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere possibility, the 
realization of which is not a consequence of its own nature. But the fact is, 
mutability lies in the notion of existence, and change is only the manifestation of 
what it implicitly is. The living die, simply because as living they bear in 
themselves the germ of death.
461
   
   
However, unlike Hegel, Sadra does not take changeability, which for him is 
inherent in a determinate existent, as a dialectical relationship between two opposite 
moments, one positive and the other negative. He merely considers the negative aspect of 
                                                             
460 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 136. Hegel also writes, ―By means of a dialectical treatment, Plato shows in his 
strictly scientific dialogues the general finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding. Thus, for 
example, in the Parmenides, he deduces the Many from the One, and, notwithstanding that, he shows that 
the nature of the Many is simply to determine itself as the One. This was the grand manner in which Plato 
handled the dialectic.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 81. Addition 1. p. 129.  
461 Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 137. 
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a determinate existent as a mere subjective reflection in the human mind. In the objective 
side of reality there is but realized existence unfolding gradually from one degree of 
existence to another higher degree of existence. In this gradual picture of the unfolding of 
existence there is no reality to essence in itself. Here we reach again the paradoxical 
proposition in Sadra‘s philosophy: Essence is unessential. 
If we take the proposition of ―essence is unessential‖ as an abstract proposition 
that operates by the formality of understanding based on the law of non-contradiction, 
then this proposition is clearly self-contradictory. Hegel accepts this abstract proposition 
of understanding only to overcome it by the speculative propositions of reason. Logic‘s 
doctrine of Essence, as we saw in the third chapter, presents Hegel‘s critique of such 
abstract thinking of understanding. For this kind of thinking knows how to distinguish 
between the essential and the unessential but fails to unite them. From the standpoint of 
Hegel‘s speculative propositions, ―the truth of being‖ is ―essence‖ insofar as what is 
essential is not only ―different‖ from but also ―identical‖ with what is unessential.  
It is thus not surprising that Hegel starts the doctrine of Essence with the section 
of ―The Essential and the Unessential.‖ And, as he says, ―In the sphere of essence, we 
have first essence opposed to the unessential.‖462This first abstract duality of ―the 
essential and unessential‖ is thus the foundation for all other abstract dualities, and 
overcoming this duality will open the door for solving all other abstract dualities. The 
significance of Hegel‘s speculative logic of essence is to prove that the essential— the 
being-in-itself, the quality as affirmative reality— does not only exclude the unessential, 
the being-for-other, the quality as negative, but also includes it in a higher speculative 
unity of being-for-self: ―The in-itself into which something is reflected into itself out of 
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its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself, but as negation of its being-for-other 
is mediated by the latter, which is thus its moment.‖463   
Against the traditional view of essence as inner qualitative nature of 
determinateness, Sadra asserts the absolute negation of essence. For him, truth consists in 
the affirmation of the outer existence in its unfolding towards its absolute simplicity in 
God. From the Hegelian point of view, Sadra‘s existential account of truth is still a one-
sided view of truth: 
The sense in which, on one hand, outer existence is made the criterion of the truth 
of a content is no less one-sided than when the idea, essential being, or even inner 
feelings is represented as indifferent to outer existence and is even held to be the 
more excellent the more remote it is from reality.
464
  
 
For Sadra, the ultimate definition of the Absolute is the pure simplicity of 
existence in which the mental being of concepts—including the concept of existence and 
the concept of essence—is dissolved. Existence in its pure simplicity is the Absolute. 
From the Hegelian point of view, Sadra‘s Absolute is indeterminate for it does not 
contain negation within it and this is why it remains absolutely unknowable for Sadra. 
Hegel would accept this indeterminate simplicity of the Absolute not as an ultimate 
moment of truth but as one moment that constitutes the whole mediated movement of the 
Absolute. In his Logic, at the beginning of the chapter of The Absolute, Hegel writes, 
The simple substantial identity of the absolute is indeterminate or rather in it 
every determinateness of essence and Existence, or of being in general, as well as 
of reflection, has dissolved itself. Accordingly, the process of determining what 
the absolute is has a negative outcome, and the absolute itself appears only as the 
negation of all predicates and as the void.
465
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 Sadra‘s Absolute is accordingly the void. For Hegel, the ultimate definition of the 
Absolute does not stop at this moment, in which “essence and Existence, or of being in 
general,‖ are dissolved. Essence and existence are also definitions of the Absolute, but 
they are inadequate definitions of the Absolute. Unlike Sadra, who excludes essence from 
the definition of the Absolute and holds firmly only to existence, Hegel includes both 
essence and existence as moments of the determining process of the Absolute.  
We can also point to another difference between Hegel and Sadra—a difference 
related to the priority of essence over existence. There is a difference between the 
affirmation that essence has a speculative, logical priority over existence—as it is the 
case with Hegel— and that it has mental, human, priority over existence—as it is the case 
with Sadra. Hegel‘s speculative priority of essence over existence is considered in Logic 
without any reference to what is external to the pure thought. ―What we are dealing with 
in logic,‖ Hegel writes,  
is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our 
thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or 
distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-
determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself. 
466
 
 
In contrast, Sadra‘s mental priority of essence over existence is considered in relation to 
what is external to the human thinking.  
Hegel‘s view of the logical priority of essence over existence, however, does not 
mean, as we found in the previous chapter, that essence exists in a transcendental realm 
over against existence. Nor does he consider existence ―as a predicate or as a 
determination of essence, the proposition of which would run: essence exists, or has 
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existence.‖467 Sadra would agree with Hegel‘s disapproval of considering existence as a 
predicate of essence. Unlike the Avicennian tradition, Sadra does not regard existence as 
an accidental reality superadded to essence.
468
 It is only by means of the human mind‘s 
conceptual analysis of reality that essence has priority over existence. In the external 
sense of reality, it is the essence which can be considered as accident to existence. As far 
as finite beings are considered, Sadra rejects the real distinction between essence and 
existence and maintains only the conceptual distinction between them. God is the only 
existent in whom there is neither real nor conceptual distinction between essence and 
existence. This is what makes God pure simplicity of existence, for Sadra. 
Unlike Sadra, who treats and limits the concept of essence to the human mind, 
Hegel exposes the ontological possibilities of essence within the scope of the absolute 
reason that goes beyond the finite mind. If we take Hegel in his own words, what he 
means by thought is neither subjective in the sense that is only related to human mind, 
nor objective in the sense that is only related to the extra-mental reality. Rather, thought, 
which in its immanent activity produces its own dialectical determinations, is the absolute 
reason. ―Logic is to be understood,‖ Hegel writes, 
as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it 
is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this 
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation 
of nature and finite mind.
469
 
 
Hegel thus simply considers the thought of essence in itself and in its immanent relation 
to its own determinations. His logic of essence is pure thought without any referring to 
                                                             
467 Ibid., p. 483. 
468 For more on Avicenna‘s account of the relationship between essence and existence, see: F. Rahman, 
"Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4(Oxford, 1958), pp.1-16. See 
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the American Oriental Society 92 (1972), pp.425-35. 
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what can be considered as external to the movement of thought. This speculative 
treatment of essence in itself leads him to reject the abstract distinction between essence 
and existence. Rather than the proposition ―essence exists‖ which implies distinction 
between essence and existence, Hegel concludes,  
the proposition should therefore run: essence is Existence; it is not distinct from 
its Existence. Essence has passed over into Existence in so far as essence as 
ground no longer distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded, or in so far as 
this ground has sublated itself.
470
 
 
Whereas Hegel‘s logical priority of essence is a sublated priority that pushes 
essence towards more logical unfolding that revels its ontological possibilities, Sadra‘s 
mental priority of essence confines essence only within its anthropological horizon. Sadra 
insists only on essence‘s mental being, whose significance is merely reflected within the 
human subject. Hegel, on the other side, liberates essence from its anthropological limit 
by discovering within it its own logical necessity of contradiction—a contradiction that is 
sublated by essence itself as the ground that must result in existence. Essence‘s own 
sublating of its opposites is the ground that produces existence not as abstract qualitative 
determination of reality but as a dynamic net of reciprocal relations of ground and 
grounded. By breaking with its anthropological limitations, essence becomes able to push 
its unfolding towards its concrete determination as manifested in the Notion. Essence, as 
the truth of being, extends and penetrates into all possible aspects of being. For these 
aspects of being are themselves essence‘s self-negativity that leads ultimately to the truth 
as the Idea. And, as Hegel writes, ―the definition of the Absolute as the Idea is now itself 
absolute. All the definitions given previously return into this.—The Idea is the Truth.‖471 
*** 
                                                             
470 Ibid., p. 483. 
471 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §213, p. 286. 
 166 
 
As a process of determining, Hegel‘s Logic starts with the determination of the 
indifference as manifested immediately in the sphere of Quality. As the dialectic 
proceeds, this moment eventually proves to be a contradiction in every respect. Logic 
consequently proceeds to the determination of difference as manifested in essence ―as a 
system of reflected determinations.‖472 Proving that the moment of essence ―is still 
fettered by the externality of immediate being,‖473 the Logic is spontaneously necessitated 
to progress to the third moment of determination in which indifference and difference are 
brought back in a higher moment of identity. At that point, the Logic reaches the 
speculative moment of Notion, the speculative identity of undifferentiated unity and 
differentiated unity, or the speculative identity of immediacy and mediation as shown in 
the Subjective Logic. 
In his Preface to the First Edition of his Science of Logic, Hegel writes 
I maintain that it is this self-construing method alone which enables philosophy to 
be an objective demonstrated science. It is in this way that I have tried to expound 
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Consciousness is spirit as a 
concrete knowing, a knowing too, in which externality is involved; but the 
development of this object, like the development of all natural and spiritual life, 
rests solely on the nature of the pure essentialities which constitute the content of 
logic.
474
 
 
Truth‘s process of determining as a ―self-construing method‖— whether in the Logic or 
in the Phenomenology— progressively develops itself through an immanent critique of 
itself. It results in the speculative Idea of Being and Essence if this immanent critique is 
taken only as a pure movement of the determinations of onto-epistemological 
categories—a movement that insofar as it shows the immediacy and independency of 
thought‟s own determinations, also shows their mediation and dependency on each other. 
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But this pure movement of thought dialectically reflects the rational structure of the 
movement of the reality of the experience as actual existence. ―What is rational is actual 
and what is actual is rational‖ 475can be understood as a dialectical process by which the 
speculative logic of the Idea in its pure rationality on one hand, and the 
phenomenological consciousness of the Absolute Knowing in its realized actuality on the 
other, are brought into identity-in-difference. Truth in its speculative wholeness reflects 
this dialectical identity between the logical Idea and the phenomenological Absolute 
Knowing. But this identity is not abstract identity. Rather, it is a speculative identity of 
circularity that contains both immediacy (Being) and mediation (Essence) in a higher 
totality (Idea).  
 Hegel writes,  
there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else, which 
does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two 
determinations revel themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the 
opposition between them, it is to be a nullity.
476
 
 
Both the Logic as the science of ―pure knowing‖ 477 and the Phenomenology of Spirit 
1807 as ―the science of manifested spirit,‖478 represent Hegel‘s consideration of these 
determinations of immediacy and mediation. Considering this opposition between 
                                                             
475 G. W. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. trans. H.B.Nisbet. ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 20. Kenneth Westphal writes, ―Hegel has been accused of 
conservatism or worse. The most common basis for this charge is Hegel's claim that what is rational is 
actual and what is actual is rational. This claim has been taken as blanket endorsement of the status quo.‖ 
Kenneth Westphal, ―The Basic context and structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right‖ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 234. I 
disagree with such interpretations, for they do not take on their account the inner power of negativity that 
Hegel discovers within the essence of being by which it overcomes (existence) as a status quo. Essence as 
Actuality is an advanced moment of rationality that sublates the existence as a status quo. This dissertation, 
however, is more limited to essence as existence rather than essence as actuality. For more on Hegel‘s 
account of what is actual and what is rational see: Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, (Oxford: Oxford 
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Reading, pp. 81-117. 
476 Hegel‘s Science of Logic,  p. 68 
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immediacy and mediation within the pure activity of cognition is the business of the 
Logic. Logic here reveals the concrete unity of immediacy and mediation inasmuch as 
this unity reveals ―the nature of cognition as such.‖479 However, ―the more concrete form 
of cognition,‖ Hegel tells us, ―falls to be considered in the philosophy of spirit and in the 
phenomenology of spirit.‖480  
Both the Logic and the Phenomenology begin with immediacy. While the Logic 
begins with pure immediacy, the Phenomenology begins with empirical immediacy. ―In 
this science of manifested spirit the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous 
consciousness and this is immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the word.‖481 The 
Phenomenology ultimately results in ―the Idea as pure knowledge,‖482 which itself is the 
presupposition of logic.
483
 ―In logic,‖ Hegel writes, ―the presupposition is that which has 
proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration—the Idea as pure 
knowledge.‖484 The beginning of Logic, therefore, proves to be ―neither an arbitrary and 
merely provisional assumption, nor is it something which appears to be arbitrarily and 
tentatively presupposed, but which is subsequently shown to have been properly made 
the beginning.‖485 In the Logic, the pure Idea, as resulted from the empirical dialectic of 
immediacy and mediation in the Phenomenology, is now examined purely and 
immanently within the pure dialectic of immediacy and mediation. The resulted Idea of 
Phenomenology as the beginning of Logic remains immanent in its scientific 
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 In this regard, Karin De Boer writes, ―The Phenomenology thus concludes by opening up the element of 
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development.
486
 This immanency of the Idea within its own dialectical development 
produces its own determinations—the Logic‘s different categories as self-deduction. 
These categories as determinations of ―thought and being‖ are themselves the unfolding 
of Truth. Since essence and existence are among other determinations that operate within 
the immanent dialectical relationship of immediacy and mediation, Hegel cannot be 
classified as an essentialist in the traditional sense or as an existentialist in the Sadrian 
sense. Hegel‘s account of reality, as this dissertation has tried to show, is the sublation of 
the one-sided view of essence as the qualitative determination of reality and the one-sided 
view of existence as the sole affirmative qualitative reality. It is the sublation of the one-
sided view of the traditional essentialism as well as the one-sided view of the 
existentialism of Sadra.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
486 Hegel writes, ―The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a 
pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also 
the last and the last is also the first.‖  Ibid., p. 71. 
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